Category Archives: Labor & Employment Law

Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8

After a labor union began picketing on a supermarket’s privately owned walkway in front of the store’s customer entrance, the supermarket owner sought a court injunction to prevent the picketing. The owner argued that because the union was using the walkway for expressive activity without complying with the supermarket’s regulations, the union was trespassing on its property. The trial court denied relief, concluding that the supermarket owner had failed to satisfy Cal. Lab. Code 1138.1′s requirements for obtaining an injunction against labor picketing. The court of appeal reversed, holding (1) the walkway was not a public forum, and therefore, the store owner could regulate speech in that area; and (2) both the Moscone Act and section 1138.1 violate free speech and equal protection because they give speech regarding a labor dispute greater protection that speech on other subjects. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) a union’s picketing activities in the supermarket’s privately owned entrance area do not have state constitutional protection; (2) however, those picketing activities do have statutory protection under the Moscone Act and section 1138.1; and (3) these statutory provisions do not violate the federal constitutional prohibition on content discrimination in speech regulations. View “Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8″ on Justia Law
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State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Vista

A charter city entered into certain contracts for the construction of public buildings. A federation of labor unions then petitioned the superior court for a peremptory writ of mandate, asserting that the city must comply with California’s prevailing wage law notwithstanding local ordinances stating otherwise. The prevailing wage law requires that certain minimum wage levels be paid to contract workers constructing public works. At issue on appeal was whether, under the state constitution, the subject matter of the state’s prevailing wage law was a “statewide concern” over which the state has primary legislative authority, or whether the matter was a municipal affair and therefore governed by the charter city’s local ordinances. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal, which in turn affirmed the trial court’s judgment denying the union’s petition for a writ of mandate, holding that there was no statewide concern at issue in this case, and therefore, the state’s prevailing wage law did not apply to the charter city. View “State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Vista” on Justia Law
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Kirby, et al. v. Imoos Fire etc.

Plaintiffs sued IFP and multiple DOE defendants for violating various labor laws as well as the unfair competition law (UCL)(Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200 et seq.). The amended complaint stated seven claims, the sixth of which alleged the failure to provide rest breaks as required by Labor Code 226.7. Plaintiffs ultimately dismissed this claim with prejudice after settling with the DOE defendants. IFP subsequently moved for attorney’s fees under Labor Code 218.5. The trial court awarded fees and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The court concluded, in light of the relevant statutory language and legislative history, that neither Labor Code 1194 nor 218.5 authorized an award of attorney’s fees to a party that prevailed on a section 226.7 claim. Accordingly, the court reversed on this claim and affirmed the judgment on plaintiffs’ other claims. View “Kirby, et al. v. Imoos Fire etc.” on Justia Law
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Dicon Fiberoptics v. Franchise Tax Bd.

The Enterprise Zone Act, Gov. Code, 7070 et seq., was enacted “to stimulate business and industrial growth” in “areas within the state that are economically depressed due to a lack of a private sector.” Among the incentives available to businesses that operated within an enterprise zone was a hiring tax credit in the amount of a percentage of the wages paid to a “qualified employee.” Rev. & Tax. Code, 23622.7, subd. (a). The Franchise Tax Board conducted an audit and refused to accept some of the certifications that Dicon claimed for a hiring tax credit. The Board found that the documents Dicon produced to establish that workers were “qualified employees” were insufficient and denied the requested tax credit in part. The court reversed the appellate court’s holding that a certification issued by a governmental agency for purposes of the hiring tax credit under section 23622.7 constituted “prima facie proof a worker is a ‘qualified employee,’” which shifted to the Board the “burden of demonstrating an employee is not a qualified worker for which no voucher should have issued.” In all other respects, the Board did not challenge the appellate court’s judgment and the judgment was affirmed. View “Dicon Fiberoptics v. Franchise Tax Bd.” on Justia Law
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