Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves Taylor Capito, who filed a class action lawsuit against San Jose Healthcare System, LP, also known as Regional Medical Center San Jose, challenging the assessment of Evaluation and Management Services (EMS) fees for two emergency room visits. Capito argued that Regional had a duty to notify emergency room patients about EMS fees beyond listing them in the chargemaster, such as through posted signage or during the patient registration process. She claimed that Regional's failure to do so constituted an unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and violated the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA).The trial court sustained Regional's demurrer without leave to amend, and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The appellate court reasoned that hospitals do not have a duty to disclose EMS fees beyond what is required by the relevant statutory and regulatory framework, following the reasoning in similar cases like Gray v. Dignity Health and Saini v. Sutter Health. The Court of Appeal also affirmed the trial court's order striking the class allegations in Capito's first amended complaint.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeal's judgment. The court held that hospitals do not have a duty under the UCL or CLRA, beyond their obligations under the relevant statutory and regulatory scheme, to disclose EMS fees prior to treating emergency room patients. The court emphasized that requiring such disclosure would alter the balance of competing interests, including price transparency and the provision of emergency care without regard to cost, as reflected in the multifaceted scheme developed by state and federal authorities. The court also dismissed Capito's appeal from the trial court's order striking her class allegations as moot. View "Capito v. San Jose Healthcare System, LP" on Justia Law

A landlord, JJD-HOV Elk Grove, LLC (JJD), owns a shopping center in Elk Grove, California, and leased space to Jo-Ann Stores, LLC (Jo-Ann). The lease included a cotenancy provision allowing Jo-Ann to pay reduced rent if the number of anchor tenants or overall occupancy fell below a specified threshold. When two anchor tenants closed, Jo-Ann invoked this provision and paid reduced rent for about 20 months until the occupancy threshold was met again.The Sacramento County Superior Court ruled in favor of Jo-Ann, finding the cotenancy provision to be an alternative performance rather than a penalty. The Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District affirmed this decision, distinguishing the case from a previous ruling in Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress For Less, Inc., which found a similar provision to be an unenforceable penalty.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine the validity of the cotenancy provision. The court held that the provision was a valid form of alternative performance, allowing JJD a realistic choice between accepting lower rent or taking steps to increase occupancy. The court found that the provision did not constitute an unreasonable penalty under California Civil Code section 1671, nor did it result in a forfeiture under section 3275. The court emphasized that contracts should be enforced as written, especially when negotiated by sophisticated parties.The Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, upholding the cotenancy provision as a valid and enforceable part of the lease agreement. View "JJD-HOV Elk Grove, LLC v. Jo-Ann Stores, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2018, Richard Allen Mitchell was charged with one felony count of resisting an executive officer and one misdemeanor count of possessing a controlled substance. The prosecution also alleged that Mitchell had a prior "strike" conviction. Five years later, just before the trial was to begin, the trial court reduced the felony charge to a misdemeanor and referred Mitchell to a veterans court program.The Ventura County District Attorney sought review of the trial court's order by filing both an appeal and a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal. The district attorney argued that the trial court lacked statutory authority to reduce the felony charge to a misdemeanor before sentencing. The Court of Appeal stayed the trial court proceedings and issued an order to show cause. After briefing, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court's order was unauthorized and granted the requested relief, determining that the order was appealable under certain statutory provisions.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeal's finding on appealability. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's order was not appealable under the cited statutory provisions because it did not set aside or terminate any portion of the action but merely modified the charges. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's order was unauthorized and in excess of its jurisdiction, making it subject to writ review. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal but noted that the trial court's subsequent actions, taken while a temporary stay was in effect, were void. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "People v. Superior Court (Mitchell)" on Justia Law

In this case, a fire destroyed the building where Cory Michael Hoehn and his roommate lived. The building’s insurer, California Capital Insurance Company, determined that careless smoking caused the fire and sued Hoehn and his roommate for negligence, seeking damages. The company attempted to serve Hoehn with the complaint and summons, but the service was allegedly improper. A default judgment was entered against Hoehn in April 2011. In January 2020, Hoehn learned of the default judgment when his wages were garnished and promptly moved to set aside the judgment, claiming he was never properly served.The Placer County Superior Court denied Hoehn’s motion, ruling it was time-barred because it was filed more than two years after the default judgment. The court also found no extrinsic fraud or mistake. The Court of Appeal affirmed, relying on precedent that a motion to vacate a judgment for improper service must be made within two years if the judgment is not void on its face.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine the validity of the two-year time limit for such motions. The court held that the judicially created rule imposing a two-year limit on motions to vacate void judgments for improper service is not supported by the statute’s text, legislative intent, or sound justification. The court concluded that a motion to vacate a judgment void for lack of proper service under section 473(d) is not subject to a two-year limitation. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Cal. Capital Ins. Co. v. Hoehn" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Everardo Rodriguez and Judith Arellano purchased a two-year-old car with over 55,000 miles on it, which still had an unexpired manufacturer’s powertrain warranty. Despite numerous repair attempts by the defendant, FCA US, LLC (FCA), the car continued to experience engine problems. Plaintiffs sued FCA under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, seeking to enforce the refund-or-replace provision, arguing that their car qualified as a “new motor vehicle” because it was sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty.The Riverside County Superior Court granted FCA’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs’ car did not qualify as a “new motor vehicle” under the Act. The Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” does not include previously owned vehicles with some balance remaining on the manufacturer’s express warranty.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The Court held that a motor vehicle purchased with an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty does not qualify as a “motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” under section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) of the Song-Beverly Act unless the new car warranty was issued with the sale. The Court emphasized that the statutory language and the broader context of the Song-Beverly Act support this interpretation, maintaining the distinction between new and used vehicles and their respective warranty protections. View "Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioners sought to disqualify a trial court judge based on alleged bias and prejudice. The key facts revolve around a wage-and-hour class action lawsuit initiated by the real parties in interest against the petitioners, their employer. During the litigation, the trial judge made comments suggesting the petitioners were attempting to evade liability through corporate restructuring. These comments were cited by the petitioners as evidence of bias.The Fresno County Superior Court judge struck the petitioners' statement of disqualification as untimely. The petitioners then sought writ review in the Court of Appeal, which held that the nonwaiver provision of section 170.3(b)(2) precluded the application of the timeliness requirement in section 170.3(c)(1) when a party alleges judicial bias or prejudice. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the nonwaiver provision should be interpreted to prohibit all forms of waiver, including implied waiver due to untimeliness.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeal's interpretation. The Supreme Court held that the nonwaiver provision of section 170.3(b)(2) applies only to judicial self-disqualification and does not affect the timeliness requirement for party-initiated disqualification attempts under section 170.3(c)(1). The Court emphasized that the statutory text, structure, legislative history, and case law support this interpretation. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment and remanded the case for the lower court to determine whether the petitioners' statement of disqualification was filed in a timely manner. View "North Am. Title Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Giles Albert Nadey, Jr. was convicted of unlawful sodomy and first-degree murder for the killing of Terena Fermenick. The jury found that both offenses involved the use of a knife and that the murder occurred during the commission of unlawful sodomy. After the first jury deadlocked on the penalty, a second jury sentenced Nadey to death. The case involved significant DNA evidence linking Nadey to the crime, and the prosecution theorized that Nadey killed Fermenick shortly after she signed a work order for carpet cleaning services he provided.The Alameda County Superior Court handled the initial trial, where Nadey was convicted and sentenced to death. During the trial, the defense challenged the DNA evidence and the credibility of the state's expert, but did not call their own DNA expert, Dr. Edward Blake, to testify. The defense's failure to present Blake as a witness became a point of contention, with the prosecution arguing that this indicated the defense had no evidence to contradict the state's findings.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The court held that the evidence of Blake's involvement was properly admitted and that the prosecutor's comments on the defense's failure to call Blake did not constitute misconduct. The court also found that any error in the trial court's handling of a juror's note regarding the defense's access to a DNA expert was harmless. Additionally, the court concluded that the admission of testimony from a pathologist who did not conduct the autopsy did not violate Nadey's confrontation rights, as much of the testimony was proper and any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Nadey" on Justia Law

The case involves Angelica A. (mother) and Luis C. (father), who have two children, Dezi C. and Joshua C. In 2019, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed petitions to assert dependency jurisdiction over the children due to the parents' substance abuse and domestic violence issues. Both parents denied having Indian heritage, and the juvenile court initially found that ICWA did not apply. The children were removed from their parents' custody, and parental rights were eventually terminated in January 2022, with the children deemed adoptable by their paternal grandparents.The mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the Department failed to comply with its duty under ICWA and related California provisions to inquire about the children's possible Indian ancestry from extended family members. The Court of Appeal acknowledged the Department's deficient inquiry but concluded that the error was harmless unless the record contained information suggesting a reason to believe the children might be Indian children.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and held that an inadequate initial ICWA inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. The court directed the Department to conduct an adequate inquiry and document it properly. If the juvenile court finds the inquiry proper and concludes that ICWA does not apply, the order terminating parental rights will be reinstated. If the inquiry reveals a reason to know the children are Indian children, the court must proceed in conformity with ICWA and California implementing provisions. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Dezi C." on Justia Law

The case involves Jeremiah Ira Williams, who was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 100 years to life plus 86 years and two months for committing multiple forcible sexual offenses under California's One Strike law when he was 24 years old. Williams argued that the exclusion of One Strike offenders from early parole eligibility under California’s youth offender parole statute (Pen. Code, § 3051) violated his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He contended that it was irrational to exclude young adults convicted of One Strike offenses from early parole while not excluding young adults convicted of murder without special circumstances.The San Diego County Superior Court convicted Williams on multiple counts, including robbery, forcible rape, and sodomy by use of force, among others. The jury found him guilty on most counts and found true several aggravating factors, including personal use of a firearm and infliction of great bodily injury. The trial court imposed the lengthy sentence based on these findings. Williams appealed to the Fourth Appellate District, Division One, arguing that the exclusion of One Strike offenders from early parole eligibility violated equal protection. The Court of Appeal rejected his claim, finding a rational basis for the differential treatment based on the threat of recidivism by violent sexual offenders.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeal’s judgment. The court held that the Legislature could rationally exclude One Strike offenders from early parole eligibility under section 3051 based on concerns about the high risk of recidivism and the aggravated nature of their offenses. The court concluded that these concerns provided a rational basis for the differential treatment, thus rejecting Williams' equal protection challenge. The court remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal to consider any briefing on Williams' entitlement to the benefit of any ameliorative legislation enacted during the pendency of his appeal. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

Victor Raul Tellez was charged with three counts of lewd or lascivious acts upon a child and faced a maximum prison term of 12 years. On the advice of his attorney, he accepted a plea deal, pleading guilty to one count and receiving a three-year prison sentence. Tellez was not informed that his conviction would make him eligible for civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). After completing his prison term, the District Attorney initiated SVPA proceedings for his involuntary commitment to a state hospital.Tellez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego County Superior Court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not being advised of the SVPA consequences. The superior court denied his petition, and the Court of Appeal also denied it, stating that prevailing norms did not require such advisement and that Tellez had not demonstrated prejudice. Tellez then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review.The California Supreme Court held that Tellez did not sufficiently demonstrate he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to advise him of the SVPA consequences. The court noted that Tellez provided insufficient evidence that he would not have accepted the plea deal had he been informed of the SVPA consequences. Therefore, the court did not address whether his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. However, recognizing the significant liberty deprivation involved in SVPA commitments, the court exercised its supervisory powers to require trial courts to inform defendants of potential SVPA consequences when pleading guilty or no contest to a qualifying offense. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed on the ground that Tellez had not demonstrated prejudice. View "In re Tellez" on Justia Law