Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Everardo Rodriguez and Judith Arellano purchased a two-year-old car with over 55,000 miles on it, which still had an unexpired manufacturer’s powertrain warranty. Despite numerous repair attempts by the defendant, FCA US, LLC (FCA), the car continued to experience engine problems. Plaintiffs sued FCA under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, seeking to enforce the refund-or-replace provision, arguing that their car qualified as a “new motor vehicle” because it was sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty.The Riverside County Superior Court granted FCA’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs’ car did not qualify as a “new motor vehicle” under the Act. The Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” does not include previously owned vehicles with some balance remaining on the manufacturer’s express warranty.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The Court held that a motor vehicle purchased with an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty does not qualify as a “motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” under section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2) of the Song-Beverly Act unless the new car warranty was issued with the sale. The Court emphasized that the statutory language and the broader context of the Song-Beverly Act support this interpretation, maintaining the distinction between new and used vehicles and their respective warranty protections. View "Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the petitioners sought to disqualify a trial court judge based on alleged bias and prejudice. The key facts revolve around a wage-and-hour class action lawsuit initiated by the real parties in interest against the petitioners, their employer. During the litigation, the trial judge made comments suggesting the petitioners were attempting to evade liability through corporate restructuring. These comments were cited by the petitioners as evidence of bias.The Fresno County Superior Court judge struck the petitioners' statement of disqualification as untimely. The petitioners then sought writ review in the Court of Appeal, which held that the nonwaiver provision of section 170.3(b)(2) precluded the application of the timeliness requirement in section 170.3(c)(1) when a party alleges judicial bias or prejudice. The Court of Appeal reasoned that the nonwaiver provision should be interpreted to prohibit all forms of waiver, including implied waiver due to untimeliness.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeal's interpretation. The Supreme Court held that the nonwaiver provision of section 170.3(b)(2) applies only to judicial self-disqualification and does not affect the timeliness requirement for party-initiated disqualification attempts under section 170.3(c)(1). The Court emphasized that the statutory text, structure, legislative history, and case law support this interpretation. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment and remanded the case for the lower court to determine whether the petitioners' statement of disqualification was filed in a timely manner. View "North Am. Title Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Giles Albert Nadey, Jr. was convicted of unlawful sodomy and first-degree murder for the killing of Terena Fermenick. The jury found that both offenses involved the use of a knife and that the murder occurred during the commission of unlawful sodomy. After the first jury deadlocked on the penalty, a second jury sentenced Nadey to death. The case involved significant DNA evidence linking Nadey to the crime, and the prosecution theorized that Nadey killed Fermenick shortly after she signed a work order for carpet cleaning services he provided.The Alameda County Superior Court handled the initial trial, where Nadey was convicted and sentenced to death. During the trial, the defense challenged the DNA evidence and the credibility of the state's expert, but did not call their own DNA expert, Dr. Edward Blake, to testify. The defense's failure to present Blake as a witness became a point of contention, with the prosecution arguing that this indicated the defense had no evidence to contradict the state's findings.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and affirmed the judgment. The court held that the evidence of Blake's involvement was properly admitted and that the prosecutor's comments on the defense's failure to call Blake did not constitute misconduct. The court also found that any error in the trial court's handling of a juror's note regarding the defense's access to a DNA expert was harmless. Additionally, the court concluded that the admission of testimony from a pathologist who did not conduct the autopsy did not violate Nadey's confrontation rights, as much of the testimony was proper and any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Nadey" on Justia Law

The case involves Angelica A. (mother) and Luis C. (father), who have two children, Dezi C. and Joshua C. In 2019, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed petitions to assert dependency jurisdiction over the children due to the parents' substance abuse and domestic violence issues. Both parents denied having Indian heritage, and the juvenile court initially found that ICWA did not apply. The children were removed from their parents' custody, and parental rights were eventually terminated in January 2022, with the children deemed adoptable by their paternal grandparents.The mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the Department failed to comply with its duty under ICWA and related California provisions to inquire about the children's possible Indian ancestry from extended family members. The Court of Appeal acknowledged the Department's deficient inquiry but concluded that the error was harmless unless the record contained information suggesting a reason to believe the children might be Indian children.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and held that an inadequate initial ICWA inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. The court directed the Department to conduct an adequate inquiry and document it properly. If the juvenile court finds the inquiry proper and concludes that ICWA does not apply, the order terminating parental rights will be reinstated. If the inquiry reveals a reason to know the children are Indian children, the court must proceed in conformity with ICWA and California implementing provisions. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Dezi C." on Justia Law

The case involves Jeremiah Ira Williams, who was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 100 years to life plus 86 years and two months for committing multiple forcible sexual offenses under California's One Strike law when he was 24 years old. Williams argued that the exclusion of One Strike offenders from early parole eligibility under California’s youth offender parole statute (Pen. Code, § 3051) violated his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He contended that it was irrational to exclude young adults convicted of One Strike offenses from early parole while not excluding young adults convicted of murder without special circumstances.The San Diego County Superior Court convicted Williams on multiple counts, including robbery, forcible rape, and sodomy by use of force, among others. The jury found him guilty on most counts and found true several aggravating factors, including personal use of a firearm and infliction of great bodily injury. The trial court imposed the lengthy sentence based on these findings. Williams appealed to the Fourth Appellate District, Division One, arguing that the exclusion of One Strike offenders from early parole eligibility violated equal protection. The Court of Appeal rejected his claim, finding a rational basis for the differential treatment based on the threat of recidivism by violent sexual offenders.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeal’s judgment. The court held that the Legislature could rationally exclude One Strike offenders from early parole eligibility under section 3051 based on concerns about the high risk of recidivism and the aggravated nature of their offenses. The court concluded that these concerns provided a rational basis for the differential treatment, thus rejecting Williams' equal protection challenge. The court remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal to consider any briefing on Williams' entitlement to the benefit of any ameliorative legislation enacted during the pendency of his appeal. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

Victor Raul Tellez was charged with three counts of lewd or lascivious acts upon a child and faced a maximum prison term of 12 years. On the advice of his attorney, he accepted a plea deal, pleading guilty to one count and receiving a three-year prison sentence. Tellez was not informed that his conviction would make him eligible for civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). After completing his prison term, the District Attorney initiated SVPA proceedings for his involuntary commitment to a state hospital.Tellez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego County Superior Court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not being advised of the SVPA consequences. The superior court denied his petition, and the Court of Appeal also denied it, stating that prevailing norms did not require such advisement and that Tellez had not demonstrated prejudice. Tellez then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review.The California Supreme Court held that Tellez did not sufficiently demonstrate he was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to advise him of the SVPA consequences. The court noted that Tellez provided insufficient evidence that he would not have accepted the plea deal had he been informed of the SVPA consequences. Therefore, the court did not address whether his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. However, recognizing the significant liberty deprivation involved in SVPA commitments, the court exercised its supervisory powers to require trial courts to inform defendants of potential SVPA consequences when pleading guilty or no contest to a qualifying offense. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed on the ground that Tellez had not demonstrated prejudice. View "In re Tellez" on Justia Law

David Meinhardt, a police officer, was suspended for 44 hours by the City of Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety, a decision upheld by the City of Sunnyvale Personnel Board. Meinhardt filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, challenging the suspension. On August 6, 2020, the court issued an order denying the petition. The City served Meinhardt with a notice of entry of this order on August 14, 2020. Subsequently, on September 25, 2020, the court entered a formal judgment, which Meinhardt served on the City on September 22, 2020.The Fourth Appellate District, Division One, dismissed Meinhardt's appeal as untimely, holding that the August 6 order was the final judgment from which the appeal should have been taken. The court reasoned that the order was sufficiently final to constitute the judgment, thus starting the 60-day period for filing an appeal.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to resolve the issue of when the time to appeal begins in administrative mandate proceedings. The court held that the time to appeal starts with the entry of a formal judgment or the service of notice of entry of judgment, not with the filing of an order or other ruling. The court emphasized the importance of clear, bright-line rules to avoid confusion and ensure that parties do not inadvertently forfeit their right to appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, finding that Meinhardt's appeal, filed within 60 days of the entry of the formal judgment, was timely. View "Meinhardt v. City of Sunnyvale" on Justia Law

Michael R. Rattagan, an Argentinian lawyer, was retained by Uber Technologies, Inc. through its Dutch subsidiaries to assist with launching Uber's ridesharing platform in Argentina. Rattagan also agreed to act as the Dutch subsidiaries' legal representative in Argentina, a role that exposed him to personal liability under Argentinian law. Despite warnings about potential personal exposure, Uber allegedly concealed its plans to launch the platform in Buenos Aires, which led to significant legal and reputational harm to Rattagan when the launch was deemed illegal by local authorities.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Rattagan’s third amended complaint without leave to amend, ruling that his fraudulent concealment claims were barred by the economic loss rule as interpreted in Robinson Helicopter v. Dana Corp. The court concluded that Robinson provided only a narrow exception to the economic loss rule, which did not apply to Rattagan’s claims of fraudulent concealment. The court also found that Rattagan’s negligence and implied covenant claims were time-barred.The Supreme Court of California, upon request from the Ninth Circuit, addressed whether a plaintiff may assert a tort claim for fraudulent concealment arising from or related to the performance of a contract under California law. The court held that a plaintiff may assert such a claim if the elements of the claim can be established independently of the parties’ contractual rights and obligations, and if the tortious conduct exposes the plaintiff to a risk of harm beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties when they entered into the contract. The court clarified that the economic loss rule does not bar tort recovery for fraudulent concealment in these circumstances. View "Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The City of Los Angeles contracted with PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to modernize the billing system for the Department of Water and Power (LADWP). The rollout in 2013 resulted in billing errors, leading the City to sue PwC in 2015, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation. Concurrently, a class action was filed against the City by Antwon Jones, represented by attorney Jack Landskroner, for overbilling. Discovery revealed that the City’s special counsel had orchestrated the class action to settle claims favorably for the City while planning to recover costs from PwC.The Los Angeles County Superior Court found the City engaged in extensive discovery abuse to conceal its misconduct, including withholding documents and providing false testimony. The court imposed $2.5 million in monetary sanctions against the City under the Civil Discovery Act, specifically sections 2023.010 and 2023.030, which allow sanctions for discovery misuse.The California Court of Appeal reversed the sanctions, interpreting the Civil Discovery Act as not granting general authority to impose sanctions for discovery misconduct beyond specific discovery methods. The appellate court held that sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 do not independently authorize sanctions but must be read in conjunction with other provisions of the Act.The Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision, holding that the trial court did have the authority to impose monetary sanctions under sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 for the City’s pattern of discovery abuse. The Supreme Court clarified that these sections provide general authority to sanction discovery misuse, including systemic abuses not covered by specific discovery method provisions. View "City of Los Angeles v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP" on Justia Law

The case involves Angelica A. (mother) and Luis C. (father), who have two children, Dezi C. and Joshua C. In 2019, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed petitions to assert dependency jurisdiction over the children due to the parents' substance abuse and domestic violence issues. Both parents denied having Indian heritage on their Parental Notification of Indian Status forms. The juvenile court initially found that ICWA did not apply based on the parents' denials. The children were removed from their parents' custody, and the parents were provided with reunification services, which were later terminated due to non-compliance. The court eventually terminated the parents' rights, concluding the children were adoptable by their paternal grandparents.The mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the Department failed to comply with its duty under ICWA and related California provisions to inquire about the children's possible Indian ancestry from extended family members. The Court of Appeal acknowledged the Department's inquiry was deficient but concluded the error was harmless unless the record suggested a reason to believe the children might be Indian children.The California Supreme Court reviewed the case to resolve the conflict among lower courts regarding the standard for assessing prejudice from an inadequate ICWA inquiry. The Court held that an inadequate Cal-ICWA inquiry requires conditional reversal of the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights. The Department must conduct an adequate inquiry and document it properly. If the juvenile court finds the inquiry proper and concludes ICWA does not apply, the termination order will be reinstated. If ICWA applies, the court must proceed accordingly. The Court emphasized the importance of protecting tribal rights and ensuring compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA to determine whether a child is an Indian child. View "In re Dezi C." on Justia Law