Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When Plaintiff was hired by Defendants, he signed multiple arbitration agreements as a condition of employment. Plaintiff later sued Defendant, alleging racial discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. The complaint sought to bring claims on behalf of a “class of current and former employees of color.” Defendants filed a motion to compel individual arbitration based on the arbitration agreements. The trial court granted the motion but struck the class allegations, concluding that the agreements did not permit class arbitration. The court of appeal reversed in part, ruling (1) the trial court erred in concluding that existing precedent compelled the court to determine whether class arbitration was available; and (2) the availability of class proceedings under an arbitration agreement is for an arbitrator to decide in the first instance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there is no universal rule allocating the decision of whether an arbitration agreement permits or prohibits classwide arbitration to a court or an arbitrator, but rather, who decides is in the first instance a matter of agreement with the parties’ agreement subject to interpretation under state contract law; and (2) under state law, the arbitration agreement in this case allocates the decision to the arbitrator. View "Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc." on Justia Law

As a condition of her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff signed an agreement to resolve any employment-related disputes through arbitration. After Plaintiff resigned, she filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging that she suffered harassment, discrimination, and retaliation during the course of her employment. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that it was unconscionable. The trial court agreed with Plaintiff and denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court of appeal reversed. The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because of a clause in the agreement providing that, in the event a claim proceeds to arbitration, the parties are authorized to seek preliminary injunctive relief in the superior court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable because the clause did no more that restate existing law. View "Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc." on Justia Law

As a condition of her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff signed an agreement to resolve any employment-related disputes through arbitration. After Plaintiff resigned, she filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging that she suffered harassment, discrimination, and retaliation during the course of her employment. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that it was unconscionable. The trial court agreed with Plaintiff and denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court of appeal reversed. The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because of a clause in the agreement providing that, in the event a claim proceeds to arbitration, the parties are authorized to seek preliminary injunctive relief in the superior court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable because the clause did no more that restate existing law. View "Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc." on Justia Law

In this dispute over the sale of a car, Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against Defendant, alleging, inter alia, that Defendant violated the Consumer Legal Remedies Act by making false representations about the condition of the automobile. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the sale contract that had a class action waiver. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the class waiver was unenforceable, and therefore, the entire arbitration agreement was unenforceable. After the trial court’s decision was filed, the United States Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts California’s unconscionability rule prohibiting class waivers in consumer arbitration agreements. On appeal, the Court of Appeal declined to address whether the class waiver at issue was enforceable and instead held that the arbitration appeal provision and the arbitration agreement as a whole were unconscionably one-sided in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeal erred as a matter of state law in finding the agreement unconscionable, as, in light of Concepcion, the FAA preempts the trial court’s invalidation of the class waiver on unconscionability grounds. View "Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC" on Justia Law

An Employee was terminated for engaging in outside employment in violation of company policy during his absence on approved medical leave. The Employee sued, arguing that the Employer violated his right to reinstatement under the Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (CFRA) and the federal Family and Medical Leave Act. The trial court granted the Employer’s motion to compel arbitration. The arbitrator relied on the federal “honest belief” defense and rejected Plaintiff’s contentions. The Court of Appeals vacated the award in the Employer’s favor, concluding that the arbitrator violated Plaintiff’s right to reinstatement under the CFRA when he applied the honest belief defense to Plaintiff’s claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although the arbitrator may have committed error in adopting the honest belief defense, any error did not deprive the Employee of an unwaivable statutory right because the arbitrator relied on the substantial evidence that the Employee violated his Employer’s written policy prohibiting outside employment while he was on medical leave. View "Richey v. Autonation, Inc." on Justia Law

The Riverside County Sheriff’s Department fired Deputy Kristy Drinkwater for falsifying her payroll forms. On administrative appeal, Drinkwater sought discovery of redacted records from personnel investigations of eleven other Department employees who were disciplined, but not fired, for similar acts of misconduct. The administrative hearing officer granted the motion. The Department sought a writ of administrative mandate, arguing that only judicial officers could grant Pitchess motions, which are discovery motions for officer personnel records. The superior court agreed and granted mandate. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when hearing an administrative appeal from discipline imposed on a correction officer, an arbitrator may rule upon a Pitchess motion. View "Riverside County Sheriff's Dep’t v. Stiglitz" on Justia Law

After declaring a fiscal emergency, the City of Los Angeles adopted a mandatory furlough program for its civilian employees. Many of those employees that were represented by a union (Union) filed grievances against the City, contending that the furloughs violated memorandums of understanding (MOUs) governing the terms and conditions of their employment. The grievances were denied, and the City denied the employees' request to arbitrate. The superior court subsequently granted the Union's petition for an order compelling the City to arbitrate the dispute. The court of appeal granted the City's petition for a writ of mandate, concluding that the City could not be compelled to arbitrate under the terms of the MOUs because arbitration would constitute an unlawful delegation to the arbitrator of discretionary policymaking powers that the City's charter vested in its city council. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) arbitration of the employee furlough dispute did not constitute an unlawful delegation of discretionary authority to the arbitrator; and (2) the City was contractually obligated to arbitrate the dispute. View "City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

An owners association for a construction defect action against a condominium developer, seeking recovery for damage to its property and damage to the separate interests of the condominium owners who composed its membership. In response, the developer filed a motion to compel arbitration based on a clause in the recorded declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions providing that the association and the individual owners agreed to resolve any construction dispute with the developer through binding arbitration. The trial court determined that the clause embodied an agreement to arbitrate between the developer and the association but invalidated the agreement upon finding it marked by slight substantive unconscionability and a high degree of procedural unconscionability. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration clause bound the association and was not unconscionable. View "Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass'n v. Pinnacle Market Dev." on Justia Law

After a school district (District) approved the conversion of an existing public school into a charter school, a union (UTLA) claimed that the District failed to comply with collective bargaining agreement provisions (CBPs) concerning charter school conversion. UTLA petitioned to compel arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the collective bargaining provisions (CBPs) regulating charter school conversion were unlawful because they conflicted with the Education Code, and therefore, arbitration of those unlawful provisions should not be compelled. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the court's function in adjudicating a petition to compel arbitration was limited to determining whether there was a valid arbitration agreement that had not been waived. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a court faced with a petition to compel arbitration to enforce CBPs between a union and a school district should deny the petition if the CBPs at issue directly conflict with provisions of the Education Code; and (2) because UTLA had not identified with sufficient specificity which CBPs the District allegedly violated, the case was remanded for identification of those specific provisions and to address whether the provisions conflicted with the Education Code. View "United Teachers of L.A. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law