Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of seven felony sex offenses related to the molesting of his two stepdaughters, including one count of oral copulation of Jane Doe 1 in violation of Penal Code 288.7. Defendant claimed on appeal, among other things, that his section 288.7(b) conviction must be reversed and the count dismissed because Jane Doe 1 - who was 10 years and approximately 11 months old at the time of the molestation - was not "10 years of age or younger" within the meaning of section 288.7. The court concluded that the interpretation of the statutory phrase "10 years of age or younger" included children younger than 10 years of age and children who have reached their 10th birthday but who have not yet reached their 11th birthday. That is, "10 years of age or younger" as expressed by the Legislature in section 288.7 was another means of saying "under 11 years of age." Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent it concluded defendant was improperly convicted of violating section 288.7(b) with respect to Jane Doe 1. View "People v. Cornett" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued IFP and multiple DOE defendants for violating various labor laws as well as the unfair competition law (UCL)(Bus. & Prof. Code, 17200 et seq.). The amended complaint stated seven claims, the sixth of which alleged the failure to provide rest breaks as required by Labor Code 226.7. Plaintiffs ultimately dismissed this claim with prejudice after settling with the DOE defendants. IFP subsequently moved for attorney's fees under Labor Code 218.5. The trial court awarded fees and the Court of Appeal affirmed. The court concluded, in light of the relevant statutory language and legislative history, that neither Labor Code 1194 nor 218.5 authorized an award of attorney's fees to a party that prevailed on a section 226.7 claim. Accordingly, the court reversed on this claim and affirmed the judgment on plaintiffs' other claims. View "Kirby, et al. v. Imoos Fire etc." on Justia Law

Defendant and co-defendant were convicted of murder and the jury found true the special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed while defendant and co-defendant were engaged in the commission of a robbery. The jury also convicted defendant of the second degree robbery of two other victims and unlawful possession of a firearm. In connection with the murder and robbery counts, the jury found true allegations that defendant personally used a handgun. In a separate, subsequent proceeding, the same jury convicted defendant of the first degree murder of Harry "Ricky" Byrd, and found true the special circumstance allegation that defendant had been convicted of more than one murder and the allegation that defendant personally used a handgun in the murder. Defendant was sentenced to death and this appeal was automatic. The court ordered that the abstract of judgment be corrected to conform to the trial court's oral pronouncement that the Penal Code section 12022.5, subd. (a), gun use enhancement relating to count 1 (murder of Byrd) was 10 years, and the Penal Code section 12022.5, subd. (a), gun use enhancement relating to count 3 (robbery of Krystal Anderson) was stayed. The judgment was affirmed as so corrected. View "People v. Myles" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the first degree murders of two victims under the special circumstance of multiple murder and lying in wait, of three counts of premeditated attempted murder, and of possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant was sentenced to death. On automatic appeal, the court considered several guilt phase issues and penalty phase issues, and ultimately affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Livingston" on Justia Law

The Enterprise Zone Act, Gov. Code, 7070 et seq., was enacted "to stimulate business and industrial growth" in "areas within the state that are economically depressed due to a lack of a private sector." Among the incentives available to businesses that operated within an enterprise zone was a hiring tax credit in the amount of a percentage of the wages paid to a "qualified employee." Rev. & Tax. Code, 23622.7, subd. (a). The Franchise Tax Board conducted an audit and refused to accept some of the certifications that Dicon claimed for a hiring tax credit. The Board found that the documents Dicon produced to establish that workers were "qualified employees" were insufficient and denied the requested tax credit in part. The court reversed the appellate court's holding that a certification issued by a governmental agency for purposes of the hiring tax credit under section 23622.7 constituted "prima facie proof a worker is a 'qualified employee,'" which shifted to the Board the "burden of demonstrating an employee is not a qualified worker for which no voucher should have issued." In all other respects, the Board did not challenge the appellate court's judgment and the judgment was affirmed. View "Dicon Fiberoptics v. Franchise Tax Bd." on Justia Law

Petitioner faced charges of first degree murder with a special circumstance. In compliance with his statutory pretrial discovery obligations, he notified the prosecution of his intent to introduce evidence, through designated expert witnesses, that he suffered from neurocognitive deficits as a result of childhood brain trauma or congenital brain dysfunction. In response, the prosecution obtained an order for his examination by a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a neurologist chosen by the prosecution. Invoking his federal constitutional rights to counsel and against self-incrimination, petitioner sought various protective orders as conditions of his submission to court-ordered mental examinations. The court held that, by forcing the trial court to resolve defense claims of privilege prior to trial, without prosecutorial access to the evidence in dispute, the Court of Appeal majority has imposed procedures that were neither required nor justified by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and were manifestly unfair to the prosecution. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment with directions to deny the petition for mandamus. View "Maldonado v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder and contended that the trial court violated his right to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment by barring his attorney from discussing with him the existence or contents of a sealed transcript of a witness's part of those proceedings. The court held that defendant could obtain relief on that claim only by establishing that the trial court's order affected the reliability of the trial process, a question not addressed by the Court of Appeal. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

After defendant waived a jury trial, the court found him guilty of first degree murder under the special circumstances of robbery and burglary murder, of robbery, and of burglary. The court also found defendant personally used a firearm in committing each of the offenses and personally inflicted great bodily injury in committing the robbery and murder. Defendant was sentenced to death and this automatic appeal followed. The court affirmed the judgment after addressing issues related to the jury trial waiver; alleged prosecutorial misconduct; cumulative guilt phase error; victim-impact evidence; testimony that defendant displayed hatred; considering mitigating evidence as aggravating evidence; cumulative error affecting the penalty; automatic application to modify the verdict; and challenges to California's Death Penalty Law. View "People v. Weaver" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the DLSE's investigation into whether Brinker was complying with its obligations to provide rest and meal breaks to its employees, maintain proper records, and pay premium wages in the event required breaks were not provided. The court considered on appeal issues of significance to class actions generally and to meal and rest break class actions in particular. The court concluded that the trial courts were not obligated as a matter of law to resolve threshold disputes over the elements of a plaintiff's claims, unless a particular determination was necessarily dispositive of the certification question. Because the parties have so requested, however, the court nevertheless addressed several threshold disputes. In regards to the nature of an employer's duty to provide meal periods, the court concluded that an employer's obligation was to relieve its employee of all duty, with the employee thereafter at liberty to use the meal period for whatever purpose he or she desired, but the employer need not ensure that no work was done. Further, in light of the substantial evidence submitted by plaintiffs of defendants' uniform policy, the court concluded that the trial court properly certified a rest break subclass. On the question of meal break subclass certification, the court remanded to the trial court for reconsideration. With respect to the third contested subclass, covering allegations that employees were required to work "off-the-clock," no evidence of common policies or means of proof was supplied, and the trial court therefore erred in certifying a subclass. View "Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Super. Ct. of San Diego Cty" on Justia Law

These consolidated cases raised the following question: Under the statutes and regulations applicable here, what showing must be made to postpone the filing of a sexually violent predator (SVP) petition beyond the inmate's scheduled release date to allow for the completion of a full SVP evaluation? Reading Welf. & Inst. Code 6601.3, the court concluded that the statute provided that, to be timely, a petition must be filed while the inmate was in lawful custody. The lawful custody period extended to the release date. However, an inmate could be held for up to 45 days beyond the release date upon a showing of good cause. Petitioners argued that the regulation's definition of good cause was inadequate because it did not require a showing that the need for the requested delay was justified. The court held that the regulation was invalid, but that the Board's reliance upon it was excusable as a good faith mistake of law. View "In re Lucas" on Justia Law