Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an environmental organization, filed this administrative mandamus action to challenge the issuance of a federally required permit authorizing the Moss Landing Powerplant (MLPP) to draw cooling water from the adjacent Moss Landing Harbor and Elkhorn Slough. This case presented issues concerning the technological and environmental standards, and the procedures for administrative and judicial review, that apply when a thermal powerplant, while pursuing the issuance or renewal of a cooling water intake permit from a regional board, also sought necessary approval from the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission), of a plan to add additional generating units to the plant, with related modifications to the cooling intake system. The court held that the superior court had jurisdiction to entertain the administrative mandamus petition here under review. The court also held that the trial court erred when it deferred a final judgment, ordered an interlocutory remand to the board for further "comprehensive" examination of that issue, then denied mandamus after determining that the additional evidence and analysis considered by the board on remand supported the board's reaffirmed findings. The court further held that recent Supreme Court authority confirmed that, when applying federal Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1326(b), standards for the issuance of this permit, the Regional Water Board properly utilized cost-benefit analysis. The court declined to address several other issues discussed by the parties. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Voices of the Wetlands v. CA State Water Resources Control Bd., et al." on Justia Law

In this case, the court construed Labor Code section 4659(c), which provided for the annual indexing of two categories of workers' compensation benefits, total permanent disability and life pension payments, to yearly increases in the state's average weekly wage (SAWW), so that lifetime disability payments made to the most seriously injured workers would keep pace with inflation. The indexing procedure was sometimes referred to as an "escalator," or one providing for "cost of living adjustments" (COLA's). At issue was whether the operative language of section 4659(c) required the annual COLA's for total permanent disability and life pension payments to be calculated (1) prospectively from the January 1 following the year in which the worker became "entitled to receive a life pension or total disability indemnity," (when the payments actually commenced); (2) retroactively to January 1 following the year in which the worker sustained the industrial injury; or (3) retroactively to January 2004, in every case involving a qualifying industrial injury, regardless of the date of injury or the date the first benefit payment became due. Applying fundamental rules of statutory construction, the court held that the Legislature intended that COLA's be calculated and applied prospectively commencing on the January 1 following the date on which the injured worker first became entitled to receive, and actually began receiving, such benefits payments, i.e., the permanent and stationary date in the case of total permanent disability benefits, and the date on which partial permanent disability benefits became exhausted in the case of life pension payments. View "Baker v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder of Brenda Gail Kenny with the personal use of a deadly weapon. The jury concluded, as special circumstances, that the murder was committed in the course of burglary and rape. Defendant was also convicted of first degree burglary and assault with a deadly weapon on Colleen Cliff, first degree burglary and two rapes of Regina M., first degree burglary and false imprisonment of Regenia Griffin, first degree burglary and two rapes of Julia K., first degree robbery of Joseph C., attempted murders of Phillip Courtney and Howard Long, and prowling. The jury also made numerous findings supporting weapon enhancements. Defendant was sentenced to death. On appeal, the court addressed pretrial, guilt phase, and penalty phase issues and affirmed the judgment and sentence. View "People v. Scott" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating a state statute that prohibited "willfully" threatening violence against a crime witness or victim, Pen. Code 140(a), where defendant, in a recorded telephone conversation with his incarcerated wife, said that he would kill an 88-year-old man who had accused the couple of stealing money from his mobile home. At issue was whether the statute violate defendant's free speech under the First Amendment. The court construed section 140(a) as requiring proof that a reasonable person would understand the allegedly threatening statements, when considered in their context and surrounding circumstances, "to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence," the high court's definition of a "true threat." Thus, section 140(a) did not violate the First Amendment. The court held that, although the appeals court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, it did so on grounds different from the reasonable person standard the court articulated. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the appeals court and remanded to that court to consider whether the court's holding affected defendant's judgment of conviction. View "The People v. Lowery" on Justia Law

This case involved serious allegations against Robert E. Stark, the auditor-controller of Sutter County where the Sutter County District Attorney's Office claimed that Stark violated statutes, county rules, and Sutter County Board of Supervisors (Board) resolutions detailing the requirements of his office. At issue were four provisions of Penal Code section 424, all of which proscribe general intent offenses. Three of those provisions criminalize acting without authority or failing to act as required by law or legal duty. The court held that those offenses additionally required that defendant knew, or was criminally negligent in failing to know, the legal requirements that governed the act or omission. The court also held that a claim of misinstruction on the mens rea of a crime could be challenged under Penal Code section 995, subdivision (a)(1)(B) where it raised the possibility that, as instructed, the grand jury could have indicted on less than reasonable or probable cause. The court further held that based on the record, the court need not decide the question of whether willful misconduct under Government Code section 3060 required a knowing and purposeful refusal to follow the law. Stark did not disagree with the instruction on mental state given by the district attorney and accompanying PowerPoint slides invalidated the instruction on mental state, requiring that the accusation be set aside. The court addressed these claims as to the district attorney's argument and PowerPoint slides and concluded that it was without merit. The court finally held that, in a motion to set aside an indictment or accusation, a defendant claiming that the district attorney suffered from a conflict of interest during the grand jury proceeding must establish that his right to due process was violated. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Stark v. Superior Court of Sutter County" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of the first degree murder of Creed Grote and the attempted murder of Troy Ortiz. Defendant was also convicted of the second degree murder of Ricky McDonald. As special circumstances of the Grote murder, the jury found that defendant laid in wait, discharged a firearm from a vehicle with intent to inflict death, and committed multiple murders. The jury also found that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the Grote/Ortiz crimes, and that he thereby intended to inflict great bodily injury or death upon Grote. Finally, the jury found that defendant had two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law and therefore, defendant was sentenced to death. On automatic appeal, the court considered numerous guilt phase issues and penalty phase issues and ultimately affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Defendants, John Anthony Gonzales and Michael Soliz, members in a Hispanic street gang in the City of La Puente, were convicted of first degree murder of Lester Eaton (count 1), Elijah Skyles (count 2), and Gary Price (count 5). The jury found true the special circumstance allegations of multiple murder and murder during the commission of robbery. At the penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict for life without the possibility of parole for Gonzales for counts 4 and 5 and hung on all other penalty phase verdicts. At the penalty phase retrial, a new jury returned a verdict of death for Gonzales on count 1, a verdict of life without the possibility of parole for Soliz on count 1, and a verdict of death for Soliz on counts 4 and 5. Numerous issues were raised on automatic appeal. The court addressed pretrial issues, guilt phase issues, and penalty phase issues and ultimately affirmed Gonzalez's and Soliz's convictions and sentences. View "People v. Gonzales, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a resident of Los Angeles, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals challenging the city's telephone users tax (TUT) and seeking refund of funds collected under the TUT over the previous two years. At issue was whether the Government Code section 910 allowed taxpayers to file a class action claim against a municipal government entity for the refund of local taxes. The court held that neither Woosley v. State of California, which concerned the interpretation of statutes other than section 910, nor article XIII, section 32 of the California Constitution, applied to the court's determination of whether section 910 permitted class claims that sought the refund of local taxes. Therefore, the court held that the reasoning in City of San Jose v. Superior Court, which permitted a class claim against a municipal government in the context of an action for nuisance under section 910, also permitted taxpayers to file a class claim seeking the refund of local taxes under the same statute. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Ardon v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a petition concerning placement of K.C., the youngest of eight children born to father (appellant) and mother, and the judgment terminating the parental rights of father and mother. At issue was whether father, who did not challenge the termination of his parental rights, had standing to appeal an order entered at the same hearing denying a petition by the dependent child's grandparents to have the child placed with them. The court held that a parent's appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights conferred standing to appeal an order concerning the dependent child's placement only if the placement order's reversal advanced the parent's argument against terminating parental rights. Therefore, the court held that the father did not have standing to challenge the order concerning placement where father had no remaining, legally cognizable interest in K.C's affairs, including his placement, because father did not appeal the judgment terminating his parental rights. View "In re K.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the City seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Grocery Worker Retention Ordinance, L.A. Ord. No. 177, 231, adding ch. XVIII, 181.00 et seq. to L.A. Mun. Code. The ordinance vested current grocery store employees with certain individual rights during a 90-day transition period. At issue was whether the worker retention ordinance was preempted as intruding upon either matters of health and safety already regulated by the state or matters of employee organization and collective bargaining fully occupied by federal law. The court held that the challenged ordinance was fully consistent with both the state and federal equal protection clauses and reversed the court of appeal's judgment. View "California Grocers Assoc. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law