Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff initiated an unlawful detainer action against Defendant. The jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. Defendant’s attorney then substituted out of the case, and Defendant proceeded with self-representation. Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees. Defendant’s appeals from the underlying judgment and from the attorney fees award were consolidated. In a separately filed action in which Defendant was the plaintiff, the Court of Appeal declared Defendant a vexatious litigant plaintiff. Consequently, the presiding judge in the instant case directed Defendant to obtain permission to continue the Chan v. John consolidated appeal or to file a substitution of attorney before proceeding further. Defendant sought to vacate the prefiling order. The presiding judge declared that the court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the prefiling motion and dismissed Defendant’s consolidated appeals. The Court of Appeal vacated the appellate division’s order, holding that a defendant’s status as a vexatious litigant plaintiff in one matter cannot limit the same defendant’s ability to pursue her appeal in an action she did not initiate as a plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 391.7’s prefiling requirements do not apply to a self-represented vexatious litigant’s appeal of a judgment or interlocutory order in an action in which she was the defendant. View "John v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles challenging the validity of a certain tax and seeking a refund of taxes. In 2007, during discovery proceedings in the underlying litigation, the trial court determined that certain documents the City possessed were privileged under either the the attorney-client privilege or the privilege for attorney work product. In 2013, Plaintiff filed a request under the California Public Records Act seeking to obtain copies of documents relating to the tax at issue. The City’s administrative office, in response, inadvertently provided Plaintiff with some of the privileged documents. The City filed a motion for an order compelling the return of the privileged material. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the production of the documents under the Public Records Act had waived any privilege. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cal. Gov’t Code 6254.5, which generally provides that “disclosure” of a public record waives any privilege, applies to an intentional, not an inadvertent, disclosure. Remanded. View "Ardon v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses an action after entering into a monetary settlement is a “prevailing party” for purposes of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1032(a)(4) and thus entitled to recover costs in an action or proceeding. After the parties in this case entered into a settlement, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed two causes of action against Defendant. The trial court adjudged that Plaintiff recover nothing from Defendant. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that Plaintiff had obtained a “net monetary recovery” under section 1032(a)(4) and was therefore the prevailing party. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a dismissal pursuant to a monetary settlement is not a dismissal in the defendant’s “favor” as that term is used in section 1032(a)(4); and (2) a plaintiff that enters into a stipulated judgment to be paid money in exchange for a dismissal has obtained a “net monetary recovery” within the meaning of section 1032(a)(4), regardless of whether the judgment mentions the settlement. View "DeSaulles v. Cmty. Hosp. of the Monterey Peninsula" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants for breach of contract and related claims. Defendants failed to file a responsive pleading, and the clerk entered Defendants’ default. The court then entered a default judgment. Defendants filed an application for relief from default under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 473(b) based on their attorney’s “sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” The superior court denied the motion. Thereafter, Defendants filed a renewed application for relief from default. Accompaying both applications were affidavits submitted by Defendants’ attorney explaining his reasons for the default. Although Defendants had not satisfied the requirements of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1008, the superior court granted their renewed application for relief from default, concluding that section Cal. Code Civ. P. 473(b) takes precedence over section 1008, and relief under section 473(b) based on an attorney’s affidavit of fault is mandatory where no part of the fault is shown to be attributable to the attorney’s clients. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that Defendants’ failure to comply with section 1008 required the trial court to reject their renewed application for relief from default. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 1008 governs renewed applications under section 473(b) for relief from default; and (2) Defendants’ renewed application did not satisfy section 1008. View "Even Zohar Constr. & Remodeling v. Bellaire Townhouses" on Justia Law

Roy Caputo, Wade Faerber, and Matthew Neel leased commercial space from DKN Holdings LLC and were each jointly and severally liable on this contract. Caputo later sued DKN for, inter alia, breach of contract. DKN cross-complained for monies due. The court rejected Caputo’s claims and awarded $2.8 million in DKN’s cross-complaint. Before the statement of decision in the Caputo action was filed, DKN sued Faerber and Neel for breach of the lease. Faerber demurred, arguing that suit against him was barred by the rule against splitting a cause of action because DKN’s rights under the lease had been adjudicated in the Caputo action. The trial court sustained the demurrer and entered judgment for Faerber. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that a second suit is barred after entry of judgment against one of the contracting parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) joint and several liability does not implicate the “primary rights” doctrine wherein a cause of action arises from the invasion of a primary right and gives rise to only one cause of action; (2) the facts of this case do not support preclusion; and (3) Plaintiff has separate breach of contract claims against each defendant alleged to be jointly and severally liable. View "DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber" on Justia Law

Under 28 U.S.C. 1367 federal courts may assume supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims that form part of the same case or controversy. If the federal basis for jurisdiction dissolves but supplemental claims remain, the federal court may dismiss the supplemental claims, requiring them to be refiled in state court. In this event, the limitations is “tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of thirty days after it is dismissed” pursuant to section 1367(d). At issue in this appeal was whether the statute affords parties a grace period or suspends the limitations clock. In the instant case, seventy-eight days after the plaintiff’s supplemental claims were dismissed by a federal court, the plaintiff refiled suit in state court. The court of appeal concluded that the suit was timely, reasoning that section 1367(d) suspended the statute of limitations and tacked on any unexpired time beginning thirty days after dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 1367(d) provides only a thirty-day grace period in which to refile otherwise expired claims. View "City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern" on Justia Law

Plaintiff prevailed at trial in an action for financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. After judgment, Plaintiff brought a separate action seeking to prevent or reverse Defendant’s transfer of real property to third persons. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed the fraudulent transfer action pursuant to an agreement with Defendant. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for costs and attorney fees incurred both on appeal from the elder abuse judgment and in the fraudulent transfer action. The court of appeals concluded that the fees and costs motion was untimely under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 685.040. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) as to attorney fees on appeal from the elder abuse judgment, the motion was not subject to section 685.080 because Plaintiff’s efforts in opposing Defendant’s appeal were not undertaken to enforce the judgment but to defend it against reversal or modification; and (2) Plaintiff’s motion was untimely as to fees incurred enforcing the judgment through the separate fraudulent transfer action because the fees incurred in that action could only be recovered under section 685.040. View "In re Conservatorship of McQueen" on Justia Law