Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, unless a plaintiff establishes a probability of prevailing on a cause of action arising from constitutionally protected speech or petitioning activity, the court must grant the defendant’s motion to strike the claim and, generally, must also award the defendant attorney’s fees. In the instant case, Plaintiff, an attorney, filed an action against the State Bar after she was disciplined for committing violations of the rules of professional conduct. The State Bar filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The superior court granted the motion and awarded attorney’s fees to the State Bar, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims arose from protected petitioning activity and that Plaintiff had not shown a likelihood of prevailing because, inter alia, a superior court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over attorney discipline matters. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that because the trial court had no jurisdiction to rule on the anti-SLAPP motion, it also lacked jurisdiction to award attorney fees under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim may grant a special motion to strike the claim under section 425.16 and thus may award attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant. View "Barry v. State Bar of California" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an inmate, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his criminal proceedings. One week later, Petitioner asked the court clerk for the name of the judge assigned to his petition. Superior Court Judge John M. Thompson subsequently summarily denied Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. Petitioner then filed a new petition for writ of habeas corpus, and, in addition, Petitioner alleged that he was denied his statutory right to peremptorily challenge Judge Thompson. The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to reassign the assessment of Maas’s petition for writ of habeas corpus to a judge other than Judge Thompson. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a petitioner who requests the name of the judge assigned to examine his habeas corpus petition is entitled to notice of that assignment and is entitled to peremptorily challenge the assigned judge, so long as all of the procedural requirements of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 170.6 have been satisfied. View "Maas v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of first degree murder and related crimes. After the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of death, remanded the matter for a new penalty determination and reconsideration of the question of a restitution fine under the currently applicable statute, and affirmed the judgment in all other respects, holding (1) no prejudicial error occurred during the guilt phase of trial; (2) the trial court erred in excusing a prospective juror for cause under Witt based solely on written questionnaire responses regarding his views on capital punishment, and therefore, the penalty judgment must be reversed for error under Wainwright v. Witt and Witherspoon v. Illinois; and (3) the question of Defendant’s restitution fine must be remanded for reconsideration because Defendant’s restitution fine was imposed pursuant to a statute that was subsequently repealed in its entirety and replaced by a statute lessening punishment. View "People v. Covarrubias" on Justia Law

Eight separate complaints were filed in San Francisco Superior Court by or on behalf of 678 individuals. Eighty-six of those individuals were California residents and the remainder were nonresidents. All of the plaintiffs were allegedly prescribed Plavix, a drug created and marketed by Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMS), and allegedly suffered adverse consequences. BMS, which conducts significant business and research activities in California but is neither incorporated nor headquartered in the state, moved to quash service of summons on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over it to adjudicate the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs. The superior court denied BMS’s motion. BMS petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, naming the nonresident plaintiffs as real parties in interest. The Court of Appeal denied the writ, concluding that BMS was subject to the personal jurisdiction of the California courts on the basis of specific jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of BMS’s extensive contacts with California, courts may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims in this action, which arise from the same course of conduct that gave rise to the California plaintiffs’ claims. View "Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of San Francisco County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated an unlawful detainer action against Defendant. The jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. Defendant’s attorney then substituted out of the case, and Defendant proceeded with self-representation. Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees. Defendant’s appeals from the underlying judgment and from the attorney fees award were consolidated. In a separately filed action in which Defendant was the plaintiff, the Court of Appeal declared Defendant a vexatious litigant plaintiff. Consequently, the presiding judge in the instant case directed Defendant to obtain permission to continue the Chan v. John consolidated appeal or to file a substitution of attorney before proceeding further. Defendant sought to vacate the prefiling order. The presiding judge declared that the court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the prefiling motion and dismissed Defendant’s consolidated appeals. The Court of Appeal vacated the appellate division’s order, holding that a defendant’s status as a vexatious litigant plaintiff in one matter cannot limit the same defendant’s ability to pursue her appeal in an action she did not initiate as a plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 391.7’s prefiling requirements do not apply to a self-represented vexatious litigant’s appeal of a judgment or interlocutory order in an action in which she was the defendant. View "John v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles challenging the validity of a certain tax and seeking a refund of taxes. In 2007, during discovery proceedings in the underlying litigation, the trial court determined that certain documents the City possessed were privileged under either the the attorney-client privilege or the privilege for attorney work product. In 2013, Plaintiff filed a request under the California Public Records Act seeking to obtain copies of documents relating to the tax at issue. The City’s administrative office, in response, inadvertently provided Plaintiff with some of the privileged documents. The City filed a motion for an order compelling the return of the privileged material. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the production of the documents under the Public Records Act had waived any privilege. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cal. Gov’t Code 6254.5, which generally provides that “disclosure” of a public record waives any privilege, applies to an intentional, not an inadvertent, disclosure. Remanded. View "Ardon v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses an action after entering into a monetary settlement is a “prevailing party” for purposes of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1032(a)(4) and thus entitled to recover costs in an action or proceeding. After the parties in this case entered into a settlement, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed two causes of action against Defendant. The trial court adjudged that Plaintiff recover nothing from Defendant. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that Plaintiff had obtained a “net monetary recovery” under section 1032(a)(4) and was therefore the prevailing party. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a dismissal pursuant to a monetary settlement is not a dismissal in the defendant’s “favor” as that term is used in section 1032(a)(4); and (2) a plaintiff that enters into a stipulated judgment to be paid money in exchange for a dismissal has obtained a “net monetary recovery” within the meaning of section 1032(a)(4), regardless of whether the judgment mentions the settlement. View "DeSaulles v. Cmty. Hosp. of the Monterey Peninsula" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants for breach of contract and related claims. Defendants failed to file a responsive pleading, and the clerk entered Defendants’ default. The court then entered a default judgment. Defendants filed an application for relief from default under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 473(b) based on their attorney’s “sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” The superior court denied the motion. Thereafter, Defendants filed a renewed application for relief from default. Accompaying both applications were affidavits submitted by Defendants’ attorney explaining his reasons for the default. Although Defendants had not satisfied the requirements of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1008, the superior court granted their renewed application for relief from default, concluding that section Cal. Code Civ. P. 473(b) takes precedence over section 1008, and relief under section 473(b) based on an attorney’s affidavit of fault is mandatory where no part of the fault is shown to be attributable to the attorney’s clients. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that Defendants’ failure to comply with section 1008 required the trial court to reject their renewed application for relief from default. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 1008 governs renewed applications under section 473(b) for relief from default; and (2) Defendants’ renewed application did not satisfy section 1008. View "Even Zohar Constr. & Remodeling v. Bellaire Townhouses" on Justia Law

Roy Caputo, Wade Faerber, and Matthew Neel leased commercial space from DKN Holdings LLC and were each jointly and severally liable on this contract. Caputo later sued DKN for, inter alia, breach of contract. DKN cross-complained for monies due. The court rejected Caputo’s claims and awarded $2.8 million in DKN’s cross-complaint. Before the statement of decision in the Caputo action was filed, DKN sued Faerber and Neel for breach of the lease. Faerber demurred, arguing that suit against him was barred by the rule against splitting a cause of action because DKN’s rights under the lease had been adjudicated in the Caputo action. The trial court sustained the demurrer and entered judgment for Faerber. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that a second suit is barred after entry of judgment against one of the contracting parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) joint and several liability does not implicate the “primary rights” doctrine wherein a cause of action arises from the invasion of a primary right and gives rise to only one cause of action; (2) the facts of this case do not support preclusion; and (3) Plaintiff has separate breach of contract claims against each defendant alleged to be jointly and severally liable. View "DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber" on Justia Law

Under 28 U.S.C. 1367 federal courts may assume supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims that form part of the same case or controversy. If the federal basis for jurisdiction dissolves but supplemental claims remain, the federal court may dismiss the supplemental claims, requiring them to be refiled in state court. In this event, the limitations is “tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of thirty days after it is dismissed” pursuant to section 1367(d). At issue in this appeal was whether the statute affords parties a grace period or suspends the limitations clock. In the instant case, seventy-eight days after the plaintiff’s supplemental claims were dismissed by a federal court, the plaintiff refiled suit in state court. The court of appeal concluded that the suit was timely, reasoning that section 1367(d) suspended the statute of limitations and tacked on any unexpired time beginning thirty days after dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 1367(d) provides only a thirty-day grace period in which to refile otherwise expired claims. View "City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern" on Justia Law