Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Roy Caputo, Wade Faerber, and Matthew Neel leased commercial space from DKN Holdings LLC and were each jointly and severally liable on this contract. Caputo later sued DKN for, inter alia, breach of contract. DKN cross-complained for monies due. The court rejected Caputo’s claims and awarded $2.8 million in DKN’s cross-complaint. Before the statement of decision in the Caputo action was filed, DKN sued Faerber and Neel for breach of the lease. Faerber demurred, arguing that suit against him was barred by the rule against splitting a cause of action because DKN’s rights under the lease had been adjudicated in the Caputo action. The trial court sustained the demurrer and entered judgment for Faerber. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that a second suit is barred after entry of judgment against one of the contracting parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) joint and several liability does not implicate the “primary rights” doctrine wherein a cause of action arises from the invasion of a primary right and gives rise to only one cause of action; (2) the facts of this case do not support preclusion; and (3) Plaintiff has separate breach of contract claims against each defendant alleged to be jointly and severally liable. View "DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber" on Justia Law

Under 28 U.S.C. 1367 federal courts may assume supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims that form part of the same case or controversy. If the federal basis for jurisdiction dissolves but supplemental claims remain, the federal court may dismiss the supplemental claims, requiring them to be refiled in state court. In this event, the limitations is “tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of thirty days after it is dismissed” pursuant to section 1367(d). At issue in this appeal was whether the statute affords parties a grace period or suspends the limitations clock. In the instant case, seventy-eight days after the plaintiff’s supplemental claims were dismissed by a federal court, the plaintiff refiled suit in state court. The court of appeal concluded that the suit was timely, reasoning that section 1367(d) suspended the statute of limitations and tacked on any unexpired time beginning thirty days after dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 1367(d) provides only a thirty-day grace period in which to refile otherwise expired claims. View "City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern" on Justia Law

Plaintiff prevailed at trial in an action for financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. After judgment, Plaintiff brought a separate action seeking to prevent or reverse Defendant’s transfer of real property to third persons. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed the fraudulent transfer action pursuant to an agreement with Defendant. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for costs and attorney fees incurred both on appeal from the elder abuse judgment and in the fraudulent transfer action. The court of appeals concluded that the fees and costs motion was untimely under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 685.040. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) as to attorney fees on appeal from the elder abuse judgment, the motion was not subject to section 685.080 because Plaintiff’s efforts in opposing Defendant’s appeal were not undertaken to enforce the judgment but to defend it against reversal or modification; and (2) Plaintiff’s motion was untimely as to fees incurred enforcing the judgment through the separate fraudulent transfer action because the fees incurred in that action could only be recovered under section 685.040. View "In re Conservatorship of McQueen" on Justia Law