Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of both conspiracy to murder and the first-degree murder of her husband. The jury set the penalty at death after weighing aggravating and mitigating evidence presented by the parties. The Supreme Court affirmed the guilt and penalty judgments in their entirety, holding (1) the trial court’s determinations that seven jurors were all substantially impaired and subsequent exclusion of the jurors due to their views on the death penalty was adequately supported by the record; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motions to sever her trial from that of her codefendant; (3) the trial court did not commit reversible error in its rulings regarding several discovery issues; (4) the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings; (4) the jury instructions were proper; and (5) no prejudicial error occurred during the penalty phase of trial. View "People v. Thompson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. The jury also found true the special circumstance allegations that Defendant committed multiple murders and that the murders were committed while lying in wait. The jury was unable to reach a penalty verdict, and a second penalty phase was held. The jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial court entered a judgment of death. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the lying-in-wait special-circumstance, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support the inference that Defendant arrived at the murder scene before the victims arrived; (2) reversed the penalty judgment and remanded for retrial of the penalty phase, holding that the trial court’s investigation into the penalty phase retrial jury’s announce deadlock was so intrusive that it prejudicially invaded the deliberations and created a coercive effect on those deliberations; and (3) otherwise affirmed the convictions. View "People v. Nelson" on Justia Law

This dispute concerned a 1.66-acre strip of Defendants’ land that the City of Perris condemned in order to build a road. The City offered to pay Defendants the agricultural value of the strip, relying on City of Porterville v. Young. The trial court agreed with the City, concluding that Porterville applied in this case and that Defendants were entitled to a stipulated agricultural value of $44,000 for the taking. In so deciding, the trial judge concluded that the City’s dedication requirement was lawful under Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard. The Court of Appeal remanded the case to revisit the legality of the dedication requirement, concluding that the lawfulness of the dedication and requirement under Nollan and Dolan should have been decided by a jury, not a judge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the constitutionality of a dedication requirement under Nollan and Dolan is a question for a court, rather than a jury; and (2) the project effect rule generally applies, and the Porterville doctrine does not apply, to situations when it is probable at the time a dedication requirement is put in place that the property designated for public use will be included in the project for which the condemnation is sought. Remanded. View "City of Perris v. Stamper" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to second degree burglary and having served a prior prison term for vehicle theft. Defendant was sentenced to probation on conditions including a year in jail and a condition that he not enter the premises or adjacent parking lot of any Home Depot store in California. The appellate court struck the challenged probation condition, concluding that the condition was unconstitutionally overbroad. The court also suggested that the condition violated Defendant’s constitutional right to travel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the probation condition at issue was reasonably related to Defendant’s crime and to preventing future criminality, rendering it permissible under state law; and (2) the condition did not implicate Defendant’s right to travel and thus was constitutionally permissible. View "People v. Moran" on Justia Law

California’s anti-SLAPP statute provides that a cause of action against a person arising from allegations of certain activity shall be subject to a special motion to strike unless the court determines there is a probability that the plaintiffs will prevail on the claim. At issue here was how a special motion to strike operates against a “mixed caused of action” that combines allegations of activity unprotected by the statute with allegations of protected activity. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint pleading four causes of action against Defendant. Defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion seeking to strike allegations within a certain cause of action. The trial court denied the motion without deciding whether the complaint contained allegations of protected activity, ruling that the motion applied to the complaint as a whole, not to isolated allegations. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding (1) an anti-SLAPP motion must be brought against a mixed cause of action in its entirety; and (2) Plaintiff established a probability of succeeding on claims based on allegations of activity not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Legislature’s choice of the term “motion to strike” reflects the understanding that an anti-SLAPP motion may be used to attack parts of a count as pleaded. View "Baral v. Schnitt" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, first degree burglary, and first degree robbery. The jury was unable to reach a penalty verdict, and after the penalty phase was retried with a new jury, the trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the murder conviction and to 212 years to life on the remaining counts. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to recalculate the noncapital portion of Defendant’s sentence but affirmed the judgment in all other respects, holding (1) there was no prejudicial error in the trial court’s pretrial rulings; (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for certain sex crimes because they were committed against a single victim on a single occasion; and (3) no other prejudicial error occurred during the guilt phase and penalty phase of trial. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The California Department of Water Resources (Department) sought to conduct environmental and geological studies and testing on over 150 privately-owned parcels of property that the state, in the future, might seek to acquire. Proceeding through the procedure established by the California Eminent Domain Law relating to precondemnation entry and testing, the Department sought a court order granting it authority to enter the properties to undertake environmental and geological testing activities. The trial court authorized the Department to enter the private properties and conduct environmental activities but denied the Department’s request to conduct geological testing. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of the Department’s proposed geological testing and reversed the trial court’s authorization of environmental testing, concluding that the procedure established by the precondemnation entry and testing statutes did not satisfy the demands of the California Constitution’s takings clause with regard to both the geological and environmental testing sought by the Department. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, assuming, without deciding, that the environmental and geological activities amount to a taking or damaging of property, the procedure established by the precondemnation entry and testing statutes satisfies the requirements of the California takings clause when the procedure is reformed to comply with the jury trial requirement of that clause. View "Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder with the personal use of a firearm, among other crimes. A mistrial was declared after the first penalty trial. After a second penalty trial, the jury fixed the penalty as death. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in its entirety, holding that there was no prejudicial error during the guilt phase of trial or the penalty phase of trial, and Defendant’s challenges to California’s death penalty scheme were unavailing. View "People v. Simon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and robbery. The jury returned a verdict of death following the penalty phase trial. The Supreme Court reversed the death judgment but otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s request to subpoena Defendant’s brother, who was originally charged together with Defendant; (3) the trial court did not err in excluding a segment from Defendant’s brother’s videotaped interview; (4) the prosecution did not violate its statutory or constitutional discovery violations; (5) the trial court did not err in instructing the jury, and even if error occurred, the error was not prejudicial; (6) the trial court did not err in failing to suppress Defendant’s statements to police; (7) the trial court did not err by failing to discharge a certain juror at the guilt phase; but (8) there was error in the death-qualification of the jury. View "People v. Zaragoza" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with a number of criminal violations. Defendant was represented by seven different appointed counsel over the course of approximately two years and made repeated requests for continuances. When his trial finally commenced, Defendant moved to dismiss his public defender and represent himself pursuant to Faretta v. California. The trial court granted the request but did not grant Defendant’s motion for a one-day continuance. Defendant failed to appear in court for the next day of trial. The trial court chose not to revoke Defendant’s status as his own counsel and did not reappoint counsel to represent him. The court then proceeded with the trial in Defendant’s absence. The jury convicted Defendant of some of the charges. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the trial court erred by proceeding with trial in Defendant’s absence and without the reappointment of defense counsel and abused its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion for a one-day continuance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) acted within its discretion in proceeding with the trial after Defendant waived his constitutional right to counsel and his constitutional right to be present; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s request for a one-day continuance. View "People v. Espinoza" on Justia Law