Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged by criminal complaint with unpermitted use of a suction dredge. Suction dredging is a technique used by miners to remove matter from the bottom of waterways, extract minerals, and return the residue to the water. Defendant demurred, arguing (1) state law aimed at environmental conservation effectively banned suction dredging in California, thereby preventing him from using the only commercially practicable method of extracting gold from his mining claim; and (2) because federal law promoted mining on federal land, the state’s contrary legislation should be preempted. The trial court overruled the demurrer. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for consideration of additional evidence and argument. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Congress did not guarantee miners a right to mine immunized from exercises of the states’ police powers. View "People v. Rinehart" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Bar Area Air Quality Management District passed a resolution adopting new thresholds of significance for air pollutants and published new California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) air quality guidelines. The California Building Industry Association (CBIA) filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging these thresholds. The superior court entered judgment in favor of CBIA, concluding that the District’s promulgation of the 2010 thresholds was a “project” subject to CEQA review, and the District was bound to evaluate the thresholds’ potential impact on the environment. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the promulgation of the 2010 thresholds was not a project subject to CEQA review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) CEQA does not generally require an agency to consider the effects of existing environmental conditions on a proposed project’s future users or residents except in specific instances; and (2) because the Court of Appeal’s analysis of CBIA’s petition for writ relief did not address potentially important arguments for and against such relief in light of CEQA’s requirements as interpreted in this opinion, this case is remanded so the court may have an opportunity to address those issues. View "Cal. Building Ind. Ass’n v. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the adequacy of an environment impact report certified by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (DFW) for a land development in northwest Los Angeles County. Plaintiffs challenged DFW’s actions by a petition for writ of mandate, raising several claims under the California Environmental Quality Act. The superior court granted the petition. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the environmental impact report did not validly determine that the development would not significantly impact the environment by its discharge of greenhouse gases; (2) the report’s mitigation measures adopted for protection of a freshwater fish, a fully protected species under the Fish and Game Code, constituted a prohibited taking of the fish under the Code; and (3) Plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies regarding certain claims of deficiency. Remanded. View "Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Cal. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife" on Justia Law

At dispute in this case was an environmental impact report (EIR) certified by the Board of Trustees (Board) of the California State University (CSU) that concerned the Board’s project to expand the campus of San Diego State University (SDSU) to accommodate more than 10,000 additional students. The SDSU project will contribute significantly to traffic congestion off-campus in the City of San Diego. The Board declined to use any of its budgeted funds, or any of CSU’s financial resources, for off-site environmental mitigation, finding that mitigation was infeasible. The Court of Appeal directed the Board to vacate its certification of the EIR. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the EIR in this case did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act where the Board erroneously assumed that a state agency may contribute funds for off-site environmental mitigation only through earmarked appropriations, to the exclusion of other available sources of funding. View "City of San Diego v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ." on Justia Law

The City of Berkeley approved a permit application to build a 6,478-square-foot house with an attached 3,394-square-foot garage. In approving the permit, the City relied on two class exemptions making the project exempt from the restrictions set forth in the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The Court of Appeal invalidated the permit approval, concluding that the proposed project may have a significant environmental impact, and therefore, the exemptions the City invoked did not apply under the Guidelines for Implementation of CEQA section 15300.2(c). Section 15300.2(c) provides: “A categorical exemption shall not be used for an activity where there is a reasonable possibility that the activity will have a significant effect on the environment due to unusual circumstances.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a proposed project’s potential significant effect on the environment is not alone sufficient to trigger the unusual circumstances exception; and (2) remand for application of the standards the Court announced today was necessary. View "Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (Expo Authority) approved a project to construct a light-rail line from Culver City to Santa Monica. Plaintiffs, Neighbors for Smart Rail, petitioned for a writ of mandate, alleging that Expo Authority's approval of the project violated CEQA in several respects. The superior court denied the petition, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Expo Authority abused its discretion by examining certain environmental impacts only on projected future conditions, and not on existing environmental conditions, but the abuse of discretion was non prejudicial; and (2) the Expo Authority's mitigation measure adopted for possible impacts on street parking near planned transit stations satisfied CEQA's requirements. View "Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Constr. Auth. " on Justia Law

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. sought to expand its store in the City of Sonora. The City Council postponed its vote on the project while a voter-sponsored initiative was circulated, which proposed to adopt a plan for the contemplated expansion. The Council subsequently adopted the ordinance. The Tuoloumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance sought a writ of mandate based on four causes of action, the first of which asserted that the Council violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by adopting the ordinance without first conducting a complete environmental review. The Court of Appeals granted the writ as to the first cause of action, concluding that when a land use ordinance is proposed in a voter initiative petition, full CEQA review is required if the city adopts the ordinance rather than submitting it to an election. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that CEQA review is not required before direct adoption of an initiative, just as it is not required before voters adopt an initiative at an election. View "Tuolumne Jobs & Small Bus. Alliance v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

This case considered complex questions of insurance policy coverage interpretation in connection with a federal court-ordered cleanup of the state's Stringfellow Acid Pits waste site. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's judgment, holding (1) the "continuous injury trigger" and "all sums" rule announced in Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co. and Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co. applied to the State's successive property or long-tail first party property loss, triggering the duty to indemnify here; and (2) the court of appeal correctly applied the "all-sums-with-stacking" allocation rule in allocating the indemnity duty among the insurers responsible for covering the property loss. View "State v. Cont'l Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The South Coast Air Quality Management District is charged with regulating nonvehicular air pollution emissions in regions that have some of the worst air pollution in the country. This case concerned the District's 2002 amendments to its Rule 1113, which limits certain pollution-causing substances in paints and coatings. The American Coatings Association challenged the amendments on the ground they exceeded the District's regulatory authority under statutes requiring the use of "best available retrofit control technology." At issue was whether the technology was "available" under the statute. The superior court held that the rule was within the District's authority. The court of appeal reversed in part, concluding that the statutory phrase "best available retrofit control technology" meant technology that was available or capable of being readily assembly when the amendments were promulgated. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the relevant statutes give the District the authority to promulgate pollution standards based on technologies that do not currently exist but are reasonably anticipated to exist by the compliance deadline; and (2) the District sufficiently demonstrated that its challenged emissions limits were achievable in each paint and coating category in Rule 1113 and that the categories were reasonably drawn. View "Am. Coatings Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Dist." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the county's determination that a proposed building project was categorically exempt from compliance with environmental law requirements. At issue was a statutory provision stating that a public agency's approval of a proposed project could be challenged in court only on grounds that were "presented to the public agency orally or in writing by any person during the public comment period...or prior to the close of the public hearing on the project before the issuance of the notice of determination." Pub. Resources Code, 21177, subd.(a). The court held that this exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies provision applied to a public agency's decision that a project was categorically exempt from environmental law requirements. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the matter was remanded to that court so it could address petitioners' remaining contentions that, although raised by petitioners, were not resolved by that court because of its conclusion that section 21177's exhaustion-of-administrative remedies requirement was inapplicable. View "Tomlinson v. Co. of Alameda" on Justia Law