Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2006, the San Mateo Community College District and its Board of Trustees (collectively, District) proposed a district-wide facilities improvement plan that called for demolishing certain buildings and renovating others. The District approved the plan, determining that it would have no potentially significant, unmitigated effect on the environment. In 2011, the District proposed changes to the plan. The District approved the changes, determining that they did not require the preparation of a subsequent or supplemental environmental impact report under Public Resources Code section 21166 and CEQA Guidelines section 15162. The Court of Appeal invalidated the District’s decision, ruling that the District’s proposal was a new project altogether and, therefore, subject to the initial environmental review standards of Public Resources Code section 21151 rather than the subsequent review standards of section 21166 and section 15162. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeal erred in its application of the new project test. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Friends of College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo Cmty. College Dist." on Justia Law

The Regional Water Quality Control Board, Los Angeles Region, a state agency, issued a permit authorizing local agencies (collectively, Operators) to operate storm drain systems. Permit conditions required that the Operators take various steps to maintain the quality of California’s water and to comply with the federal Clean Water Act. Some Operators sought reimbursement for the cost of satisfying the conditions. The Commission on State Mandates concluded that each required condition was mandated by the state, rather than by federal law, and therefore, the Operators were entitled to reimbursement for the associated costs. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the permit conditions were federally mandated and thus not reimbursable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the permit conditions were imposed as a result of the state’s discretionary action, and therefore, the conditions were not federally mandated and were reimbursable. View "Dep’t of Fin. v. Comm’n on State Mandates" on Justia Law

The Legislature specified that any amendments to a measure submitted for comment must be “reasonably germane to the theme, purpose, or subject of the initiative measure as originally proposed.” At issue is the scope of Elections Code provisions enacted in 2014, which created a new process by which a proposed initiative measure is submitted for public comment. In this case, proponents decided to amend their measure, deleting some provisions and adding others that were supported by Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. Challengers sought a writ of mandate requiring the Attorney General to reject the amendments. The trial court granted the writ. The proponents, joined by the Governor, sought emergency relief in this court. The court granted the requested relief and directed the trial court to vacate its judgment. The court concluded that the legislative history and statutory language demonstrate that the Legislature intended the comment period to facilitate feedback, not to create a broad public forum. Nor did the Legislature preclude substantive amendments. The court concluded that, while the new process imposes time constraints on various governmental functions, the constraints are similar to those that existed under the former statutory scheme. In particular, the Legislature continued existing law relating to fiscal analyses of the impacts of proposed measures. View "Brown v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Monterey Peninsula Water Management District, a public agency, undertook work to mitigate environmental damage caused by California-American Water Co. (Cal-Am), a public utility, and then assessed a fee on the utility’s customers for the work. The fee was charged as a line item on Cal-Am’s bill and was collected by the Cal-Am on behalf of the District. In the underlying proceedings, Cal-Am filed an application with the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for authorization to collect the District user’s fee. Before the PUC responded, Cal-Am, the District, and the PUC’s Division of Ratepayer Advocates entered into a settlement agreement under which the parties agreed that the District’s requested user fee was appropriate. The PUC denied Cal-Am’s application and rejected the settlement agreement. The Supreme Court set aside the PUC decisions rejecting Cal-Am’s application for authorization to collect the District’s user fee, holding that the PUC did not have the power to regulate the District’s user fee. View "Monterey Peninsula Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Bar Area Air Quality Management District passed a resolution adopting new thresholds of significance for air pollutants and published new California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) air quality guidelines. The California Building Industry Association (CBIA) filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging these thresholds. The superior court entered judgment in favor of CBIA, concluding that the District’s promulgation of the 2010 thresholds was a “project” subject to CEQA review, and the District was bound to evaluate the thresholds’ potential impact on the environment. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the promulgation of the 2010 thresholds was not a project subject to CEQA review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) CEQA does not generally require an agency to consider the effects of existing environmental conditions on a proposed project’s future users or residents except in specific instances; and (2) because the Court of Appeal’s analysis of CBIA’s petition for writ relief did not address potentially important arguments for and against such relief in light of CEQA’s requirements as interpreted in this opinion, this case is remanded so the court may have an opportunity to address those issues. View "Cal. Building Ind. Ass’n v. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of petty theft with a prior-theft related conviction. Before Defendant was released from prison, the Board of Parole Hearings found that Defendant met the criteria for commitment as a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) under Cal. Penal Code 2969(d)(1) and (e)(2)(Q). Defendant petitioned for a hearing to challenge the Board’s determination. The court eventually concluded that Defendant met all the necessary MDO Act criteria specified in section 2962. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a mental health expert’s opinion testimony in support of a defendant’s commitment under the MDO Act may not be used to prove the defendant committed a qualifying offense for commitment involving one of the offenses specified in section 2962(e)(2)(A) through (O) or involved behavior described in subdivision (e)(2)(P) or (Q); (2) mental health experts may not testify about a topic that is not sufficiently beyond common experience; and (3) the prosecution failed to present evidence other than its mental health expert’s opinion testimony and supporting foundational facts, and that expert improperly opined on a topic that is not beyond common experience, and therefore, substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding on the MDO commitment. Remanded. View "People v. Stevens" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the adequacy of an environment impact report certified by the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (DFW) for a land development in northwest Los Angeles County. Plaintiffs challenged DFW’s actions by a petition for writ of mandate, raising several claims under the California Environmental Quality Act. The superior court granted the petition. The Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the environmental impact report did not validly determine that the development would not significantly impact the environment by its discharge of greenhouse gases; (2) the report’s mitigation measures adopted for protection of a freshwater fish, a fully protected species under the Fish and Game Code, constituted a prohibited taking of the fish under the Code; and (3) Plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies regarding certain claims of deficiency. Remanded. View "Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Cal. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife" on Justia Law

A private citizen called a 911 operator to report an incident of suspected child abuse during the child’s visit with his father. A deputy sheriff, who was dispatched to investigate the report, determined that the child was not a victim of child abuse. Neither the officer nor the Sheriff’s Department cross-reported the initial 911 report to the child welfare agency. Less than four weeks later, the child suffered extensive head injuries during a visit with his father. The child, through a guardian ad litem, sued the county and the deputy sheriff for failing to cross-report the initial child abuse allegations to the county child welfare agency, in violation of the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the Sheriff’s Department had a mandatory and ministerial duty to cross-report the child abuse allegations made to the 911 operator to the child welfare agency, and the failure to cross-report can support a finding of breach of a mandatory duty; but (2) the officer had no duty to report the child abuse allegations and her investigative findings to the child welfare agency. View "B.H. v. County of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Cal. Labor Code 4458.2, which provides workers’ compensation benefits to certain peace officers injured in the line of duty, applies to both volunteer peace officers and to regularly sworn, salaried officers. While employed as a police officer by the City of Marysville, John Larkin sustained injuries in the course of duty. A workers’ compensation judge determined that Larkin was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits but not to the maximum indemnity levels available under section 4458.2 because section 4458.2 did not apply to regularly sworn, salaried officers like Larkin. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board denied Larkin’s petition for reconsideration. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a review of the legislative history governing the relevant statutory provisions of section 4458.2 leads to the conclusion that the statute does not extend maximum disability indemnity levels to regularly sworn, salaried peace officers. View "Larkin v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

In 2008, Brandon Clark fell ten feet while working as a carpenter for Employer. Clark’s workers’ compensation doctor prescribed various drugs to treat Clark’s injuries, and Clark’s personal doctor prescribed additional drugs. In 2009, Clark died from the “combined toxic effects of the four sedating drugs detected in his blood with associated early pneumonia.” Clark’s family sought workers’ compensation death benefits, arguing that the medications Clark was prescribed for his work-related injuries caused his death. The workers’ compensation judge awarded death benefits to the family. The Court of appeal reversed, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that the drugs Clark was prescribed for his work injuries contributed to his death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Court of Appeal wrongly applied a higher proximate cause standard to this wrongful death case than the Legislature intended; and (2) substantial evidence supported the WCJ’s finding that two drugs, prescribed by the workers’ compensation doctor for Clark’s industrial injury, contributed to his death. View "South Coast Framing v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law