Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An employee (Claimant) was asked by his employer to sign a written disciplinary notice regarding Claimant’s alleged misconduct. Claimant refused to sign the notice, claiming that he wished to consult with his union first and that he believed that signing would constitute an admission of guilt. Based on this incident, the employer terminated Claimant for insubordination. The Employment Development Department denied Claimant’s application for unemployment benefits, determining that Claimant’s refusal to sign the disciplinary notice constituted misconduct. The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board reversed, finding that Claimant’s failure to sign the notice was “an instance of poor judgment” that did not disqualify Claimant from receiving benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even if Claimant’s refusal to sign the disciplinary notice justified his termination, Claimant did not commit misconduct within the meaning of California’s Unemployment Insurance Code. View "Paratransit, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

The Los Angeles Times asked the City of Long Beach to release the names of the police officers involved in certain shootings. The Long Beach Police Officers Association (“Union”) sought injunctive relief against the City, attempting to prevent release of the names to the Times. The Times subsequently intervened, seeking disclosure of the names. The City supported the Union’s request for injunctive relief and opposed disclosure. The trial court denied the Union’s request for a preliminary or permanent injunction. The court of appeal upheld the denial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the particularized showing necessary to outweigh the public’s interest in the disclosure of the names of peace officers involved in the on-duty shootings was not made in this case. View "Long Beach Police Officers Ass’n. v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

The County Assessor reassessed two mobile home parks owned by resident-controlled nonprofit corporations after some residents sold both their mobile homes and their interests in the corporation. The mobile homes, classified as personal property, were assessed separately. The Assessor appraised the real property interest subject to reassessment by the extraction method of appraisal. The Appeal Board rejected the appraisals submitted by the Assessor and instead used those submitted by the corporations to calculate the value of the interests subject to reassessment. The Assessor filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate. The trial court denied the petition, and the court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the Assessor’s method for the taxation of changes in the mobile home ownership was not the method set out in Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 62.1(b). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 62.1(b) simply describes a unit of real property that is subject to reassessment and does not mandate any particular formula for appraising this unit; and (2) because the Appeal Board’s decisions were premised on an erroneously interpretation of section 62.1(b), the Appeal Board abused its discretion, and the Assessor’s petition for a writ of mandate should have been granted. View "Holland v. Assessment Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the section of the Labor Code (article 2.3) that establishes a process for employees who dispute the diagnosis or treatment provided by a medical provider network (MPN). Petitioner was injured when she fell at work. Petitioner began treatment with a physician in Employer's MPN, but later undertook treatment with a doctor outside the network, Dr. Nario. Thereafter, Petitioner applied for temporary disability benefits, relying on reports by Dr. Nario. Employer argued that reports from non-MPN doctors were inadmissible under Cal. Labor Code 4616.6, an article 2.3 provision, for purposes of the disability hearing. The workers' compensation judge (WCJ) overruled the objection, concluding that reports from all treating doctors were admissible. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Board) rescinded the WCJ's decision, holding that section 4616.6 precluded the admission of reports from any doctor outside the MPN. The court of appeal annulled the Board's decisions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 4616.6 restricts the admission of medical reports only in proceedings under article 2.3 to resolve disputes over diagnosis and treatment within an MPN. View "Valdez v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Developer sought to build ninety-six condominiums, but as a condition of obtaining a permit to do so, City required Developer to set aside ten condominium units as below market rate housing and make a substantial payment to a city fund. Developer challenged these requirements but did so while proceeding with construction. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Cal. Gov't Code 66020, which permits a developer to proceed with a project while also protesting the imposition of "fees, dedications, reservations, or other exactions," applied in this case. The lower courts held that section 66020 did not apply, and thus, the action was untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if the requirements at issue in this case were not "fees" under section 66020, they were "other exactions," and accordingly, Developer was permitted to challenge the requirements while the project proceeded. View "Sterling Park, LP v. City of Palo Alto" on Justia Law

Doctor applied for reappointment to Hospital's medical staff. Hospital denied the application. Doctor requested a review hearing to challenge the decision. Under Hospital's bylaws, Hospital's Medical Executive Committee (MEC) was responsible for selecting the hearing officer and panel members that would hear Doctor's claim. However, the MEC declined to exercise its authority, leaving the responsibility to Hospital's Governing Board. After a hearing, the Judicial Review Committee (JRC) concluded that the Governing Board's decision to deny Doctor's application for reappointment was reasonable. The Governing Board subsequently ordered that Doctor be terminated from the medical staff. Doctor filed an administrative mandate petition, asserting, among other claims, that he had been denied a fair proceeding because the Governing Board, rather than the MEC, had chosen the members of the JRC for his judicial review hearing. The court of appeal held that Doctor had been deprived of his right to a fair procedure and was entitled to a new judicial review hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that the MEC's delegation of the power to select the participants in the JRC was a material violation of Hospital's bylaws. Remanded. View "El-Attar v. Hollywood Presbyterian Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

This controversy arose after the City of Los Angeles refused to accept Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates's application to convert its 170-unit mobilehome park from tenant occupancy to resident ownership because Palisades Bowl had failed to include applications for a coastal development permit or for Mello Act approval. Palisades Bowl filed a petition for writ of mandate and a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief. The trial court granted the relief, commanding the City to evaluate the application for approval without considering whether it complied with either the California Coastal Act or the Mello Act. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the requirements of the Coastal Act and the Mello Act apply to a proposed conversion, within California's coastal zone, of a mobilehome park from tenant occupancy to resident ownership. In so holding, the Court rejected the argument that such a conversion is not a "development" for the purposes of the Coastal Act and that Cal. Gov't Code 66427.5 exempts such conversion from the need to comply with other state laws, or precludes local governmental agencies from exercising state-delegated authority to require compliance with state laws such as the Coastal Act or the Mello Act. View "Pac. Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between Los Angeles County (County) and forty-seven cities (Cities) within County regarding how County calculated and imposed property tax administration fees on Cities for their share of County's costs in administering the property tax system. Cities petitioned the trial court for a writ of administrative mandate ordering County and its auditor-controller to reimburse Cities for the amount disputed in fiscal year 2006-2007. Following a trial, the referee ruled that County's method of calculating the disputed fee was consistent with legislative intent and did not violate Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 97.75. The court of appeal reversed, relying almost exclusively on the plain meaning of section 97.75 to conclude that County's method of calculation was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that County's method of calculating property tax administration fees violated the statutory scheme. View "City of Alhambra v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Prison regulations promulgated by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) provide that validation of an inmate as a gang member or associate can result in the inmate's placement in a security housing unit. The current dispute arose when the CDCR validated Petitioner as a gang associate. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the superior court denied. The court of appeal granted relief based on a disagreement with the CDCR over the interpretation of the CDCR's regulation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeal failed to accord due deference to the CDCR's interpretation of its own regulations. View "In re Cabrera" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the county's determination that a proposed building project was categorically exempt from compliance with environmental law requirements. At issue was a statutory provision stating that a public agency's approval of a proposed project could be challenged in court only on grounds that were "presented to the public agency orally or in writing by any person during the public comment period...or prior to the close of the public hearing on the project before the issuance of the notice of determination." Pub. Resources Code, 21177, subd.(a). The court held that this exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies provision applied to a public agency's decision that a project was categorically exempt from environmental law requirements. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the matter was remanded to that court so it could address petitioners' remaining contentions that, although raised by petitioners, were not resolved by that court because of its conclusion that section 21177's exhaustion-of-administrative remedies requirement was inapplicable. View "Tomlinson v. Co. of Alameda" on Justia Law