Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
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At issue in this case was the section of the Labor Code (article 2.3) that establishes a process for employees who dispute the diagnosis or treatment provided by a medical provider network (MPN). Petitioner was injured when she fell at work. Petitioner began treatment with a physician in Employer's MPN, but later undertook treatment with a doctor outside the network, Dr. Nario. Thereafter, Petitioner applied for temporary disability benefits, relying on reports by Dr. Nario. Employer argued that reports from non-MPN doctors were inadmissible under Cal. Labor Code 4616.6, an article 2.3 provision, for purposes of the disability hearing. The workers' compensation judge (WCJ) overruled the objection, concluding that reports from all treating doctors were admissible. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (Board) rescinded the WCJ's decision, holding that section 4616.6 precluded the admission of reports from any doctor outside the MPN. The court of appeal annulled the Board's decisions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 4616.6 restricts the admission of medical reports only in proceedings under article 2.3 to resolve disputes over diagnosis and treatment within an MPN. View "Valdez v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

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Developer sought to build ninety-six condominiums, but as a condition of obtaining a permit to do so, City required Developer to set aside ten condominium units as below market rate housing and make a substantial payment to a city fund. Developer challenged these requirements but did so while proceeding with construction. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Cal. Gov't Code 66020, which permits a developer to proceed with a project while also protesting the imposition of "fees, dedications, reservations, or other exactions," applied in this case. The lower courts held that section 66020 did not apply, and thus, the action was untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if the requirements at issue in this case were not "fees" under section 66020, they were "other exactions," and accordingly, Developer was permitted to challenge the requirements while the project proceeded. View "Sterling Park, LP v. City of Palo Alto" on Justia Law

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Doctor applied for reappointment to Hospital's medical staff. Hospital denied the application. Doctor requested a review hearing to challenge the decision. Under Hospital's bylaws, Hospital's Medical Executive Committee (MEC) was responsible for selecting the hearing officer and panel members that would hear Doctor's claim. However, the MEC declined to exercise its authority, leaving the responsibility to Hospital's Governing Board. After a hearing, the Judicial Review Committee (JRC) concluded that the Governing Board's decision to deny Doctor's application for reappointment was reasonable. The Governing Board subsequently ordered that Doctor be terminated from the medical staff. Doctor filed an administrative mandate petition, asserting, among other claims, that he had been denied a fair proceeding because the Governing Board, rather than the MEC, had chosen the members of the JRC for his judicial review hearing. The court of appeal held that Doctor had been deprived of his right to a fair procedure and was entitled to a new judicial review hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that the MEC's delegation of the power to select the participants in the JRC was a material violation of Hospital's bylaws. Remanded. View "El-Attar v. Hollywood Presbyterian Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

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This controversy arose after the City of Los Angeles refused to accept Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates's application to convert its 170-unit mobilehome park from tenant occupancy to resident ownership because Palisades Bowl had failed to include applications for a coastal development permit or for Mello Act approval. Palisades Bowl filed a petition for writ of mandate and a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief. The trial court granted the relief, commanding the City to evaluate the application for approval without considering whether it complied with either the California Coastal Act or the Mello Act. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the requirements of the Coastal Act and the Mello Act apply to a proposed conversion, within California's coastal zone, of a mobilehome park from tenant occupancy to resident ownership. In so holding, the Court rejected the argument that such a conversion is not a "development" for the purposes of the Coastal Act and that Cal. Gov't Code 66427.5 exempts such conversion from the need to comply with other state laws, or precludes local governmental agencies from exercising state-delegated authority to require compliance with state laws such as the Coastal Act or the Mello Act. View "Pac. Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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This case involved a dispute between Los Angeles County (County) and forty-seven cities (Cities) within County regarding how County calculated and imposed property tax administration fees on Cities for their share of County's costs in administering the property tax system. Cities petitioned the trial court for a writ of administrative mandate ordering County and its auditor-controller to reimburse Cities for the amount disputed in fiscal year 2006-2007. Following a trial, the referee ruled that County's method of calculating the disputed fee was consistent with legislative intent and did not violate Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 97.75. The court of appeal reversed, relying almost exclusively on the plain meaning of section 97.75 to conclude that County's method of calculation was unlawful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that County's method of calculating property tax administration fees violated the statutory scheme. View "City of Alhambra v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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Prison regulations promulgated by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) provide that validation of an inmate as a gang member or associate can result in the inmate's placement in a security housing unit. The current dispute arose when the CDCR validated Petitioner as a gang associate. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the superior court denied. The court of appeal granted relief based on a disagreement with the CDCR over the interpretation of the CDCR's regulation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeal failed to accord due deference to the CDCR's interpretation of its own regulations. View "In re Cabrera" on Justia Law

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This case stemmed from the county's determination that a proposed building project was categorically exempt from compliance with environmental law requirements. At issue was a statutory provision stating that a public agency's approval of a proposed project could be challenged in court only on grounds that were "presented to the public agency orally or in writing by any person during the public comment period...or prior to the close of the public hearing on the project before the issuance of the notice of determination." Pub. Resources Code, 21177, subd.(a). The court held that this exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies provision applied to a public agency's decision that a project was categorically exempt from environmental law requirements. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the matter was remanded to that court so it could address petitioners' remaining contentions that, although raised by petitioners, were not resolved by that court because of its conclusion that section 21177's exhaustion-of-administrative remedies requirement was inapplicable. View "Tomlinson v. Co. of Alameda" on Justia Law

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The Enterprise Zone Act, Gov. Code, 7070 et seq., was enacted "to stimulate business and industrial growth" in "areas within the state that are economically depressed due to a lack of a private sector." Among the incentives available to businesses that operated within an enterprise zone was a hiring tax credit in the amount of a percentage of the wages paid to a "qualified employee." Rev. & Tax. Code, 23622.7, subd. (a). The Franchise Tax Board conducted an audit and refused to accept some of the certifications that Dicon claimed for a hiring tax credit. The Board found that the documents Dicon produced to establish that workers were "qualified employees" were insufficient and denied the requested tax credit in part. The court reversed the appellate court's holding that a certification issued by a governmental agency for purposes of the hiring tax credit under section 23622.7 constituted "prima facie proof a worker is a 'qualified employee,'" which shifted to the Board the "burden of demonstrating an employee is not a qualified worker for which no voucher should have issued." In all other respects, the Board did not challenge the appellate court's judgment and the judgment was affirmed. View "Dicon Fiberoptics v. Franchise Tax Bd." on Justia Law

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This case arose from litigation challenging the validity, under the United States Constitution, of the initiative measure (Proposition 8) that added a section to the California Constitution providing that "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California" (Cal. Const., art. I, section 7.5). The Ninth Circuit posed the following procedural issue to the court, "[w]hether under article II, section 8 of the California Constitution, or otherwise under California law, the official proponents of an initiative measure possess either a particularized interest in the initiative's validity or the authority to assert the State's interest in the initiative's validity, which would enable them to defend the constitutionality of the initiative upon its adoption or appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative, when the public officials charged with that duty refused to do so." In response, the court concluded that when the public officials who ordinarily defended a challenged state law or appealed a judgment invalidating the law declined to do so, under article II, section 8 of the California Constitution and the relevant provisions of the Election Code, the official proponents of a voter-approved initiative measure were authorized to assert the state's interest in the initiative's validity, enabling the proponents to defend the constitutionality of the initiative and to appeal a judgment invalidating the initiative. View "Perry v. Brown" on Justia Law

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This case stemmed from the taking of property in downtown Los Angeles to comply with a federal court order to improve the quality of bus services and involved California's "quick-take" eminent domain procedure, Code of Civil Procedure 1255.010, 1244.410, where a public entity filing a condemnation action could seek immediate possession of the condemned property upon depositing with the court the probable compensation for the property. At issue was Section 1255.260's proper interpretation. The court of appeals in this case held that, under the statute, if a lender holding a lien on condemned property applied to withdraw a portion of the deposit, and the property owner did not object to the application, the lender's withdrawal of a portion of the deposit constituted a waiver of the property owner's claims and defenses, except a claim for greater compensation. The court found the court of appeal's conclusion was inconsistent with the relevant statutory language and framework. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "L.A. Cty. Metro. Trans. v. Alameda Produce Market, LLC, et al." on Justia Law