Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Decedent was already married when he and Plaintiff obtained a marriage license and held their wedding ceremony. Three years later, Decedent was killed in an accident at a construction site. Plaintiff filed this wrongful death action against Defendant, claiming she was the putative spouse of Decedent. Defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff lacked standing to sue in this case because she did not have the requisite "good faith belief" under Cal. Civ. P. Code 377.60 that her marriage to Decedent was valid. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant after applying an objective test for putative spouse status. The court of appeal reversed, holding that Plaintiff's subjective state of mind, if found credible by the trial court, could support a finding of good faith belief and establish putative spouse status. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 377.60 contemplates a subjective standard that focuses on the alleged putative spouse's state of mind to determine whether she had a genuine belief in the validity of the marriage; and (2) the trial court erred in applying a reasonable person test that required Plaintiff's belief in the validity of the marriage to be objectively reasonable. View "Ceja v. Rudolph & Sletten, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Raymond and Gloria Martinez, sued Defendant for damages arising out of an electrical explosion that severely injured Raymond. Before trial, Plaintiffs served on Defendant two successive settlement offers pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 998. Defendant failed to accept or reject the offers within the statutory thirty-day period. After a trial, judgments were entered in favor of Plaintiffs that were not more favorable to Defendant than either offer. Plaintiffs sought costs pursuant to section 998, including expert fees. Section 998 encourages the settlement of lawsuits prior to rial by providing that a defendant cover the plaintiff's postoffer costs of expert witness services when the judgment is not more favorable than the plaintiff's settlement offer. However, the statute is silent as to the effect of a party's multiple offers. The trial court disallowed the expert fees incurred by Gloria after her first settlement offer but before her second offer, finding that the most recently rejected offer is the only pertinent offer. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances presented here, allowing the recovery of expert fees incurred from the date of the first offer is consistent with section 998's language and purpose. View "Martinez v. Brownco Constr. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, including a California corporation (Corporation), filed a lawsuit for property damage against Defendants. Before trial, Defendants learned the state had suspended Corporation's corporate powers for nonpayment of taxes. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. Plaintiffs, including Corporation, appealed. On December 1, 2011, Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss Corporation's appeals because its corporate powers were still suspended. Corporation presented documentation showing its corporate powers had been revived on December 8, 2011 and argued that this revival made its appeal effective. The court of appeals denied the motions. Defendants petitioned for review. At issue was whether a corporation that files notices of appeal while its corporate powers are suspended may proceed with the appeals after those powers have been revived, even if the revival occurs after the time to appeal has expired. Relying on precedent, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals may proceed. View "Bourhis v. Lord" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint for personal injuries and loss of consortium against Defendant corporation and other entities, alleging injuries from exposure to asbestos. Defendant demurred, alleging that more than three years before Plaintiffs filed their complaint, it had obtained a corporate dissolution pursuant to the laws of Delaware, Defendant's state of incorporation. Accordingly, Defendant argued, it lacked the capacity to be sued pursuant to Delaware's three-year survival statute. In opposition, Plaintiffs argued their action was permitted under California's own survival statute, which they asserted took precedence over Delaware law in this situation. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint, ruling that California's survival statute did not apply to foreign corporations, and hence Delaware's corresponding statute applied to Defendant. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) California's survival statute does not apply to foreign corporations; and (2) North American Asbestos Corp. v. Superior Court was disapproved of to the extent it held otherwise. View "Greb v. Diamond Int'l Corp." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the scope of the primary assumption of risk doctrine, under which participants in, and operators of, certain activities have no duty of ordinary care to protect other participants from risks inherent in the activity. Here, Plaintiff fractured her wrist on a bumper car ride at an amusement park. Plaintiff sued the park owner for negligence. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendant on the basis of the primary assumption of risk doctrine. The court of appeal reversed, concluding the doctrine did not apply to bumper car rides. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the primary assumption of risk doctrine applies to recreational activities such as bumper car rides; (2) the doctrine applied to the ride here; and (3) Defendant's limited duty of care under the doctrine, the duty not to unreasonably increase the risk of injury over and above that inherent in the low-speed collisions essential to bumper car rides, did not extend to preventing head-on collisions between the cars. View "Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, a hospital and doctors, alleging negligence. The hospital was owned by the County. The County filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Plaintiff failed to comply with the Government Claims Act (Act) because her claim was never presented to or received by a statutorily designated recipient. Plaintiff responded by arguing that she had substantially complied with the Act by delivering a letter of intent to the risk management department of the hospital and that the letter was received by the County risk management department. The trial court granted the County's summary judgment motion, holding that the County made a sufficient showing of noncompliance. The court of appeal reversed, holding (1) a claim may substantially comply with the Act, notwithstanding failure to deliver it to one of the statutorily specified recipients, if it is given to a department whose functions include the management or defense of claims against the defendant entity, and (2) Plaintiff had "substantially complied" with the presentation requirements of the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by judicially expanding the statutory requirements; and (2) a claim must satisfy the express delivery provisions language of the statute. View "DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara" on Justia Law

Six days after his birth, Plaintiff suffered irreversible brain damage. Through his mother as guardian ad litem, Plaintiff sued his pediatrician and the hospital in which he was born. Before trial, Plaintiff and the pediatrician agreed to settlement of $1 million. At a jury trial, Plaintiff was awarded both economic and noneconomic damages. The jury found the pediatrician was fifty-five percent at fault and the hospital forty percent at fault. The court of appeal reversed the portion of the trial court's judgment awarding Plaintiff economic damages against the hospital after applying the common law "release rule," under which Plaintiff's settlement with the pediatrician also released the nonsettling hospital from liability for Plaintiff's economic damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the common law release rule is no longer to be followed in California; and (2) therefore, the defendant hospital remained jointly and severally liable for Plaintiff's economic damages. View "Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hosp." on Justia Law

Cal. Lab. Code 4558 contains a power press exception to the general rule that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy of an injured worker against the employer. Employee was injured while operating a power press without a point of operation guard. Employee and his wife (Spouse) brought a civil suit against Employer under the power press exception that included a claim for loss of consortium on behalf of Spouse, predicated on the facts allegedly establishing a section 4558 violation. The trial court sustained Employer's demurrer to all of Spouse's causes of action except her claim for loss of consortium. The court of appeal disagreed with the trial court, concluding Spouse could plead a claim for damages for loss of consortium because such a claim fell outside the workers' compensation laws and hence was not barred by the exclusivity rule. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the judgment of the court of appeal as to Spouse's consortium claim, holding that where the worker's power press injuries do not prove fatal, the Legislature has restricted standing to bring the action at law authorized under section 4558 to the injured worker alone; and (2) affirmed in all other respects. Remanded. View "LeFiell Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was what attorney work product production, if any, should be accorded (1) recordings of witness interviews conducted by investigators employed by defendant's counsel, and (2) information concerning the identity of witnesses from whom defendant's counsel was obtained statements. Defendant objected to Plaintiff's request for discovery of these items, invoking the work product privilege. The trial court sustained the objection, concluding as a matter of law that the recorded witness interviews were entitled to absolute work product protection and that the other information sought was work product entitled to qualified protection. A court of appeals reversed, concluding that work product protection did not apply to any of the disputed items. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the recorded witness statements were entitled as a matter of law to at least qualified work product protection; and (2) information concerning the identity of witnesses from whom Defendant's counsel has obtained statements is entitled to protection if (a) Defendant can persuade the trial court that disclosure would reveal the attorney's tactics, impressions, or evaluation of the case (absolute privilege); or (b) disclosure would result in opposing counsel taking undue advantage of the attorney's industry or efforts (qualified privilege). View "Coito v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

C.A., a minor, sued his public high school guidance counselor and the school district for damages arising out of sexual harassment and abuse by the counselor. At issue was whether the district court could be found vicariously liable for the acts of its employees - not for the acts of the counselor, which were outside the scope of her employment, but for the negligence of supervisory or administrative personnel who allegedly knew, or should have known, of the counselor's propensities and nevertheless hired, retained, and inadequately supervised her. The court concluded that plaintiff's theory of vicarious liability for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision was a legally viable one. Ample case authority established that school personnel owed students under their supervision a protective duty of ordinary care, for breach of which the school district could be held vicariously liable. If a supervisory or administrative employee of the district was proven to have breached that duty by negligently exposing plaintiff to a foreseeable danger of molestation by his guidance counselor, resulting in his injuries, and assuming no immunity provision applied, liability fell on the school district. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School, et al. " on Justia Law