Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the City of San Jose enacted an inclusionary housing ordinance that requires all new residential development projects of twenty or more units to sell at least fifteen percent of the for-sale units at a price affordable to low or moderate income households. California Building Industry Association (CBIA) filed this lawsuit, arguing that the San Jose ordinance was invalid on its face because the conditions imposed by the ordinance constituted “exactions” under the takings clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. The superior court agreed with CBIA and enjoined the City from enforcing the ordinance. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the superior court erred in interpreting the controlling constitutional principles and the decision in San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco as limiting the conditions that may be imposed by such an ordinance to only those conditions that are reasonably related to the adverse impact the development projects that are subject to the ordinance themselves impose on the City’s affordable housing problem. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the conditions that the San Jose ordinance imposes on future developments do not impose “exactions” upon the developers’ property. View "Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

A homeowners association and some of its individual members (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this suit against a homeowner alleging (1) their housing development tract, which included the homeowner’s property, was a common interest development within the meaning of the Davis-Sterling Common Interest Development Act (“CID Act”); and (2) pursuant to the CID Act, the homeowner violated valid applicable restrictions through his ongoing remodeling. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that the tract did not constitute a common interest development. The court awarded awarded attorney fees to Defendants. The Court of Appeal (1) affirmed the judgment in favor of Defendants on the merits; but (2) reversed the award of attorney fees, concluding that because the courts had found the CID Act was not applicable, attorney fees were improperly awarded under former Cal. Civil Code 1354(c), a provision of the CID Act. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the Court of Appeal’s judgment insofar as it reversed the attorney fee award, holding (1) the award of attorney fees was supported by the language of the statute; and (2) denying Defendants an award under the statute when they were the prevailing party would defeat the legislative intent underlying the statute. View "Tract 19051 Homeowners Ass’n v. Kemp" on Justia Law

The City of Berkeley approved a permit application to build a 6,478-square-foot house with an attached 3,394-square-foot garage. In approving the permit, the City relied on two class exemptions making the project exempt from the restrictions set forth in the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The Court of Appeal invalidated the permit approval, concluding that the proposed project may have a significant environmental impact, and therefore, the exemptions the City invoked did not apply under the Guidelines for Implementation of CEQA section 15300.2(c). Section 15300.2(c) provides: “A categorical exemption shall not be used for an activity where there is a reasonable possibility that the activity will have a significant effect on the environment due to unusual circumstances.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a proposed project’s potential significant effect on the environment is not alone sufficient to trigger the unusual circumstances exception; and (2) remand for application of the standards the Court announced today was necessary. View "Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley" on Justia Law

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. sought to expand its store in the City of Sonora. The City Council postponed its vote on the project while a voter-sponsored initiative was circulated, which proposed to adopt a plan for the contemplated expansion. The Council subsequently adopted the ordinance. The Tuoloumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance sought a writ of mandate based on four causes of action, the first of which asserted that the Council violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by adopting the ordinance without first conducting a complete environmental review. The Court of Appeals granted the writ as to the first cause of action, concluding that when a land use ordinance is proposed in a voter initiative petition, full CEQA review is required if the city adopts the ordinance rather than submitting it to an election. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that CEQA review is not required before direct adoption of an initiative, just as it is not required before voters adopt an initiative at an election. View "Tuolumne Jobs & Small Bus. Alliance v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff prevailed at trial in an action for financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. After judgment, Plaintiff brought a separate action seeking to prevent or reverse Defendant’s transfer of real property to third persons. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed the fraudulent transfer action pursuant to an agreement with Defendant. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for costs and attorney fees incurred both on appeal from the elder abuse judgment and in the fraudulent transfer action. The court of appeals concluded that the fees and costs motion was untimely under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 685.040. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) as to attorney fees on appeal from the elder abuse judgment, the motion was not subject to section 685.080 because Plaintiff’s efforts in opposing Defendant’s appeal were not undertaken to enforce the judgment but to defend it against reversal or modification; and (2) Plaintiff’s motion was untimely as to fees incurred enforcing the judgment through the separate fraudulent transfer action because the fees incurred in that action could only be recovered under section 685.040. View "In re Conservatorship of McQueen" on Justia Law

The County Assessor reassessed two mobile home parks owned by resident-controlled nonprofit corporations after some residents sold both their mobile homes and their interests in the corporation. The mobile homes, classified as personal property, were assessed separately. The Assessor appraised the real property interest subject to reassessment by the extraction method of appraisal. The Appeal Board rejected the appraisals submitted by the Assessor and instead used those submitted by the corporations to calculate the value of the interests subject to reassessment. The Assessor filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate. The trial court denied the petition, and the court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the Assessor’s method for the taxation of changes in the mobile home ownership was not the method set out in Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 62.1(b). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 62.1(b) simply describes a unit of real property that is subject to reassessment and does not mandate any particular formula for appraising this unit; and (2) because the Appeal Board’s decisions were premised on an erroneously interpretation of section 62.1(b), the Appeal Board abused its discretion, and the Assessor’s petition for a writ of mandate should have been granted. View "Holland v. Assessment Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Developer sought to build ninety-six condominiums, but as a condition of obtaining a permit to do so, City required Developer to set aside ten condominium units as below market rate housing and make a substantial payment to a city fund. Developer challenged these requirements but did so while proceeding with construction. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Cal. Gov't Code 66020, which permits a developer to proceed with a project while also protesting the imposition of "fees, dedications, reservations, or other exactions," applied in this case. The lower courts held that section 66020 did not apply, and thus, the action was untimely. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if the requirements at issue in this case were not "fees" under section 66020, they were "other exactions," and accordingly, Developer was permitted to challenge the requirements while the project proceeded. View "Sterling Park, LP v. City of Palo Alto" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action to quiet title to a parcel of real property, alleging he owned the property because he had been the highest bidder at a trustee's sale. After Plaintiff gave the auctioneer his cashier's check at the sale, the trustee told Plaintiff the sale was void. The trustee based its refusal on its discovery that it had mistakenly communicated to the auctioneer an incorrect opening bid by the lender that was less than ten percent of the actual amount of the bid. After the trustee refused to tender the deed to Plaintiff, Plaintiff filed this action. The trustee moved for summary judgment on the ground that it had properly set aside the foreclosure sale due to a significant procedural irregularity in the statutory foreclosure process coupled with an inadequate sales price. The trial court ultimately granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trustee's error was not a procedural irregularity in the statutory foreclosure process and that the trustee therefore had no discretionary authority to void the foreclosure sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances here, the trustee acted within its discretion authority in declaring the sale void. View "Biancalana v. T.D. Serv. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, including a California corporation (Corporation), filed a lawsuit for property damage against Defendants. Before trial, Defendants learned the state had suspended Corporation's corporate powers for nonpayment of taxes. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. Plaintiffs, including Corporation, appealed. On December 1, 2011, Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss Corporation's appeals because its corporate powers were still suspended. Corporation presented documentation showing its corporate powers had been revived on December 8, 2011 and argued that this revival made its appeal effective. The court of appeals denied the motions. Defendants petitioned for review. At issue was whether a corporation that files notices of appeal while its corporate powers are suspended may proceed with the appeals after those powers have been revived, even if the revival occurs after the time to appeal has expired. Relying on precedent, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appeals may proceed. View "Bourhis v. Lord" on Justia Law

This controversy arose after the City of Los Angeles refused to accept Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates's application to convert its 170-unit mobilehome park from tenant occupancy to resident ownership because Palisades Bowl had failed to include applications for a coastal development permit or for Mello Act approval. Palisades Bowl filed a petition for writ of mandate and a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief. The trial court granted the relief, commanding the City to evaluate the application for approval without considering whether it complied with either the California Coastal Act or the Mello Act. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the requirements of the Coastal Act and the Mello Act apply to a proposed conversion, within California's coastal zone, of a mobilehome park from tenant occupancy to resident ownership. In so holding, the Court rejected the argument that such a conversion is not a "development" for the purposes of the Coastal Act and that Cal. Gov't Code 66427.5 exempts such conversion from the need to comply with other state laws, or precludes local governmental agencies from exercising state-delegated authority to require compliance with state laws such as the Coastal Act or the Mello Act. View "Pac. Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law