Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants were convicted of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and the jury also found true an enhancement allegation that defendants committed the assault for the benefit of the Tiny Oriental Crips (TOC), a criminal street gang. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in permitting the expert to respond to hypothetical questions the prosecutor asked because the questions closely tracked the evidence in a manner that was only thinly disguised. The court disagreed that the trial court erred and held that it was required, not prohibited, that hypothetical questions be based on the evidence. The questioner was not required to disguise the fact the questions were based on that evidence. Although the Court of Appeal erroneously found error, it also found the error harmless. Accordingly, it reached the correct result and the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Vang" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first degree murder, premeditated attempted murder, two counts of robbery, attempted rape, assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury, and false imprisonment and kidnapping. The jury subsequently returned a verdict of death and defendant's appeal was automatic. The court concluded, or assumed for argument, that six instances of nonprejudicial error occurred during the course of defendant's trial. The court held that, given the strong evidence of defendant's guilt of first degree murder and the aggravating circumstances attending that crime, none of the trial court's missteps amounted to substantial error and there was no prejudicial cumulative effect warranting reversal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Clark" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of crimes stemming from two home invasions committed the night before Mother's Day 1993, in the same neighborhood in Torrance. The most serious incident, in which the victims, - a married couple with children - were home during the burglary, resulted in convictions for first degree murder of the husband and attempted premeditated murder of the wife. Related convictions involved burglary, attempted forcible rape, and forcible oral copulation. The jury also sustained special circumstances providing that the husband's murder occurred in the commission of burglary, robbery, attempted rape, and oral copulation. Additional findings were that defendant was armed with and personally used a handgun and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the wife. In the other incident, defendant was convicted of burglarizing the home of a second couple who were vacationing out of town. The defendant was subsequently sentenced to death and the trial court declined to grant a new trial, denying the automatic motion to modify the death verdict. On automatic appeal, the court found no prejudicial error at defendant's trial and affirmed the judgment in its entirety. View "People v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty by a jury of the first degree murder of his nephew, the second degree murder of his sister, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury also found true the firearm-use allegations and the special circumstances of multiple murder. The jury concluded that defendant was sane and returned a verdict of death. On automatic appeal, the court considered pretrial issues, guilt phase issues, sanity phase issues, penalty phase issues, and presentencing issues. The court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Blacksher" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from injuries Anthony Verdon Lujan sustained when his arm got caught on a luggage conveyor when he was inspecting the conveyor as an employee of Lloyd W. Aubry Co. (Aubrey), an independent contractor hired by US Airways to maintain and repair the conveyor. Aubry's workers' compensation insurer paid Verdon benefits based on the injury and subsequently sued US Airways seeking what it paid in benefits. Verdon intervened as plaintiff in the action, alleging causes of action for negligence and premises liability. At issue was whether the Privette v. Superior Court rule applied when the party that hired the contractor (the hirer) failed to comply with workplace requirements concerning the precise subject matter of the contract and the injury was alleged to have occurred as a consequence of that failure. The court held that the Privette rule did apply in that circumstance. The court concluded that, by hiring an independent contractor, the hirer implicitly delegated to the contractor any tort law duty it owed to the contractor's employees to ensure the safety of the specific workplace that was the subject of the contract. That implicit delegation included any tort law duty the hirer owed to the contractor's employees to comply with applicable statutory or regulatory safety requirements. Accordingly, plaintiffs here could not recover in tort from US Airways on a theory that Verdon's workplace injury resulted from defendant's breach of what plaintiffs described as a nondelegable duty under California Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973 (OSHA), Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, sections 3999, 4002, regulations to provide safety guards on the conveyor. Therefore, the court erred in reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendant. View "Seabright Ins. v. US Airways" on Justia Law

Defendant, a member of the Crips street gang, was found guilty by a jury of the first degree murders of Perry Coder and Gregory Martin and two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of the murders and the multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation. After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. On automatic appeal, the court addressed numerous pretrial issues, guilt phase issues, and penalty phase issues and subsequently affirmed the judgment. View "People v. McKinnon" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff was seriously injured in an automobile accident negligently caused by a driver for defendant. At issue was whether an injured person could recover from the tortfeasor, as economic damages for past medical expenses, the undiscounted sum stated in the medical care provider's bill but never paid by or on behalf of the injured person. The court held that the collateral source rule, which precluded deduction of compensation the plaintiff had received from sources independent of the tortfeasor from damages the plaintiff "would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor" ensured that plaintiff here could recover in damages the amounts her insurer paid for her medical care. The rule, however, had no bearing on amounts that were included in a provider's bill but for which the plaintiff never incurred liability because the provider, by prior agreement, accepted a lesser amount as full payment. Such sums were not damages the plaintiff would otherwise have collected from the defendant and were neither paid to the providers on the plaintiff's behalf nor paid to the plaintiff in indemnity of his or her expenses. Therefore, because they did not represent an economic loss for the plaintiff, they were not recoverable in the first instance. The collateral source rule precluded certain deductions against otherwise recoverable damages, but did not expand the scope of economic damages to include expenses the plaintiff never incurred. View "Howell v. Hamilton Meats" on Justia Law

Defendant attacked another inmate and was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon or by means likely to inflict great bodily injury by a prisoner serving a life sentence (aggravated assault by a life prisoner) and assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm or by means likely to inflict great bodily injury (aggravated assault). On appeal, defendant argued that the conviction for aggravated assault must be reversed because that offense was lesser than, and necessarily included within, the offense of aggravated assault by a life prisoner. The court agreed and reversed the judgment because the Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion. View "People v. Milward" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an environmental organization, filed this administrative mandamus action to challenge the issuance of a federally required permit authorizing the Moss Landing Powerplant (MLPP) to draw cooling water from the adjacent Moss Landing Harbor and Elkhorn Slough. This case presented issues concerning the technological and environmental standards, and the procedures for administrative and judicial review, that apply when a thermal powerplant, while pursuing the issuance or renewal of a cooling water intake permit from a regional board, also sought necessary approval from the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission), of a plan to add additional generating units to the plant, with related modifications to the cooling intake system. The court held that the superior court had jurisdiction to entertain the administrative mandamus petition here under review. The court also held that the trial court erred when it deferred a final judgment, ordered an interlocutory remand to the board for further "comprehensive" examination of that issue, then denied mandamus after determining that the additional evidence and analysis considered by the board on remand supported the board's reaffirmed findings. The court further held that recent Supreme Court authority confirmed that, when applying federal Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1326(b), standards for the issuance of this permit, the Regional Water Board properly utilized cost-benefit analysis. The court declined to address several other issues discussed by the parties. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Voices of the Wetlands v. CA State Water Resources Control Bd., et al." on Justia Law

In this case, the court construed Labor Code section 4659(c), which provided for the annual indexing of two categories of workers' compensation benefits, total permanent disability and life pension payments, to yearly increases in the state's average weekly wage (SAWW), so that lifetime disability payments made to the most seriously injured workers would keep pace with inflation. The indexing procedure was sometimes referred to as an "escalator," or one providing for "cost of living adjustments" (COLA's). At issue was whether the operative language of section 4659(c) required the annual COLA's for total permanent disability and life pension payments to be calculated (1) prospectively from the January 1 following the year in which the worker became "entitled to receive a life pension or total disability indemnity," (when the payments actually commenced); (2) retroactively to January 1 following the year in which the worker sustained the industrial injury; or (3) retroactively to January 2004, in every case involving a qualifying industrial injury, regardless of the date of injury or the date the first benefit payment became due. Applying fundamental rules of statutory construction, the court held that the Legislature intended that COLA's be calculated and applied prospectively commencing on the January 1 following the date on which the injured worker first became entitled to receive, and actually began receiving, such benefits payments, i.e., the permanent and stationary date in the case of total permanent disability benefits, and the date on which partial permanent disability benefits became exhausted in the case of life pension payments. View "Baker v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law