Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Relying on its holding in Cameron v. State of California, 7.Cal.3d 318 (1972), the Supreme Court held that design immunity does not categorically preclude failure to warn claims that involve a discretionarily-approved element of a roadway and declined to overrule its prior precedent.At issue was whether design immunity is limited to claims alleging that a public entity created a dangerous roadway condition through a defective design or whether the statutory defense of design immunity also extends to claims alleging that a public entity failed to warn of a design element that resulted in a dangerous roadway condition. The Supreme Court held (1) the effect of Cameron is that, while Cal. Gov. Code 830.6 shields public entities from liability for injuries stemming from the design of a roadway's physical features, they nonetheless have a duty to warn of known dangers the roadway presents to the public; and (2) this Court declines the invitation of City of Rancho Palo Verdes to overrule Cameron. View "Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal in this action alleging that Defendants entered into a lease-leaseback construction agreement in violation of various statutes and common law rules, holding that the specific lease-leaseback arrangement at issue in this case was not a "contract" within the meaning of Cal. Gov. Code 53511.Plaintiff brought this action alleging that the Fresno Unified School District and Harris Construction Co. entered into an unlawful lease-leaseback construction agreement. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a lease-leaseback arrangement in which construction is financed through bond proceeds, rather than through the builder, is a "contract" within the meaning of section 53511. The Supreme Court held that the lease-leaseback arrangement in this case was not a "contract" under the statute because (1) the underlying project was fully funded by a prior sale of general obligation bonds and payment of the debt service on the bonds was from ad valorem property taxes; and (2) therefore, payment did not dependent on the lease-leaseback arrangement or on completion of the project. View "Davis v. Fresno Unified School District" on Justia Law

After determining that Father’s delusions and paranoia put A.G.(age 14) at risk of serious harm, the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction, ordered that A.G. be removed from Father’s custody, and ordered reunification services and a psychological evaluation. At the six-month hearing, the Agency reported that Father had received his case plan several months earlier but had not signed the plan nor engaged in recommended services. Father also resisted psychological evaluation. At the 12-month hearing, the Agency reported that Father had made moderate progress. The court granted an extension, finding that the Agency had provided reasonable services. At the 18-month hearing, the Agency reported that returning A.G. to Father’s custody still presented a substantial risk of detriment to her well-being and recommended a permanency planning hearing. The court found that the Agency had not provided reasonable services between the 12- and 18-month hearings but declined to exercise its discretion to continue the case, noting Father’s uneven progress.The California Supreme Court affirmed. Reasonable reunification services must be offered to qualifying parents for a minimum of six or 12 months, depending on the child’s age, and generally may be extended for up to 18 months. The court was not automatically required to grant a further extension based on its finding that reasonable services were not provided during the 12- to 18-month extension. Once a child has been out of the parent’s custody for 18 months, the law ordinarily requires the court to proceed to set a hearing to determine a permanent plan. View "Michael G. v. Superior Court of Orange County" on Justia Law

A gambling dispute incited a fistfight between gang subsets. Witnesses later testified that after they thought the fight was over, they saw Ferrell shoot a gun, then saw Rawlings, lying on the ground, bloodied. Ferrell dropped the gun and fled. Ferrell later claimed he had only shot once, into the air. The juvenile court transferred Ferrell, age 17, to a court of criminal jurisdiction, where he was charged with murder, with alleged sentencing enhancements for use of a firearm.The Court of Appeal affirmed Ferrell’s second-degree murder conviction and 40-year sentence. The California Supreme Court granted Ferrell habeas relief. The jury instructions erroneously permitted the conviction based on a felony-murder theory invalidated in 2009. The unadorned guilty verdict does not show that the jury avoided that theory. The court rejected an argument that the jury’s additional finding — that Ferrell intentionally discharged a firearm and caused death in committing his offense — along with other evidence, establish that any rational jury would have found Ferrell guilty under a valid theory of second-degree murder, implied malice. Even in light of the entire record, the jury’s additional finding fails to establish the mental component of implied malice, which requires a defendant to act with a conscious disregard for life, knowing his act endangers another’s life. The jury could have, consistent with its finding, concluded Ferrell shot Rawlings while trying to stop a fight without believing he was shooting toward any person. View "In re Ferrell" on Justia Law

In 2005, a jury convicted Lopez and three others of Gomez’s first-degree premeditated murder and found true the gang-murder special circumstance and the criminal street gang sentencing enhancement. Lopez was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Lopez sought habeas relief, alleging his jury had been instructed on the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting first-degree murder, found invalid in the California Supreme Court's 2014 "Chiu" decision. In 2019, the Court of Appeal held that the Chiu error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the gang-murder special circumstance, which required the jury to find that an aider and abettor acted with intent to kill, and the “overwhelming” evidence against Lopez generally. The court discounted the prosecutor’s discussion of the natural and probable consequences theory in his closing argument and found a jury note referencing that theory inconsequential under the circumstances.The California Supreme Court reversed. The gang-murder special circumstance here does not necessarily render the Chiu error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt but indications that the jury may have relied on an invalid theory, such as a prosecutor’s closing argument or a jury note, do not preclude a finding of harmlessness. The court must rigorously review the evidence to determine whether any rational juror who found the defendant guilty based on an invalid theory and made the factual findings reflected in the verdict, would necessarily have found the defendant guilty based on a valid theory. View "In re Lopez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal affirming the trial court's judgment convicting Defendant of loitering for purposes of prostitution, holding that the court of appeal erred in ruling that trial courts retain authority to deny a continuance unsupported by good cause even if the decision will foreseeably result in the case's dismissal for lack of evidence.Defendant filed a motion to suppress, but the prosecutor orally requested a continuance on the date of the suppression hearing due to the unavailability of a witness. The trial court denied the motion for a continuance for lack of good cause and then granted Defendant's motion to suppress. Upon reconsideration, however, the trial court vacated its prior orders and denied the suppression motion. Defendant ultimately agreed to a "slow plea." The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in reconsidering its continuance and suppression rulings. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's decision but affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) the principles set forth in People v. Ferguson, 218 Cal.App.3d 1173 (1990), apply when the People are unable to proceed with a hearing on a suppression motion; and (2) the trial court's denial of Defendant's suppression motion "reposed within the court's sound discretion." View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal denying Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the Attorney General has both a constitutional and an ethical duty to disclose evidence in response to a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging a Brady violation under certain circumstances.In her habeas petition, Petitioner asserted that the People had suppressed evidence at trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that would have supported her claim of self-defense. The court of appeal concluded that the evidence was not material under Brady and denied the habeas petition. In her petition for review, Petitioner argued that the Attorney General violated her due process rights by suppressing the same evidence that had formed the basis of her Brady claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the respondent to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging a Brady violation has a duty to disclose evidence forming the basis of the Brady claim under certain circumstances; and (2) remand for further proceedings was appropriate in this case. View "In re Jenkins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of the first-degree murder of her newborn daughter by poison, holding that the jury instructions were erroneous and that the error was prejudicial.At issue was whether there is a mental state component of first degree poison murder when there is no question that the defendant acted with willfulness, deliberation, and premeditation. The Supreme Court held (1) to prove first degree murder by means of poison, the prosecution must show that the defendant deliberately gave the victim poison with the intent to kill the victim or inflict injury likely to cause death; and (2) the trial court's instructions erroneously did not include this element of first degree poison murder, and the error was prejudicial, requiring remand. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case to the circuit court after the court found that Defendant inflicted "great bodily injury," holding that the sentencing court's finding of great bodily injury violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment jury trial rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).Defendant was charged with assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and other related crimes. The jury found Defendant guilty of assault, battery, and participating in a street gang and deadlocked on the remaining counts. During sentencing, the court imposed a five-year enhancement, concluding that Defendant's charges were serious felonies because there was "great bodily injury." After he appealed, Defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the great bodily injury finding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the sentencing court's finding of great bodily injury did not violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Apprendi in light of the jury's failure to reach a verdict on great bodily injury allegations. View "In re Cabrera" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal in this criminal case, holding that the evidence a law enforcement officer found after his illegal detention of Defendant was not admissible.The officer in this case was responding to a report of suspicious activity in the area when he unlawfully detained Defendant, who was "hanging out" in his car reclining in the passenger seat. The officer ran a records check and learned that Defendant was on active and searchable parole. The officer proceeded to search Defendant and his vehicle, finding firearm- and drug-related evidence. Defendant moved to suppress the ensuing charges against him, arguing that his detention violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officer's discretionary decision to conduct the parole search of Defendant did not sufficiently attenuate the connection between the officer's initial unlawful decision to detain Defendant and the later discovery of contraband. View "People v. McWilliams" on Justia Law