Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

William Cannon was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape and dissuading a witness, after attacking a 16-year-old girl and confessing to other attempted sexual assaults. Near the end of his prison sentence, the district attorney petitioned to commit him under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), which allows for the civil commitment of certain sex offenders after their sentences if they are found to be sexually violent predators. During pretrial proceedings, Cannon’s attorney, without Cannon’s personal attendance or express waiver, waived his right to a jury trial. The trial court did not advise Cannon of his jury trial rights or seek his personal waiver, as the SVPA does not require these steps. Following a bench trial, Cannon was found to be a sexually violent predator and was committed.On appeal, Cannon argued for the first time that the SVPA’s procedures violated his state and federal equal protection rights because, unlike other civil commitment schemes for individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) or those with mental health disorders (OMHD), the SVPA does not require a judicial advisement of the right to a jury trial or a personal waiver from the defendant. The Court of Appeal considered the equal protection claim despite it not being raised below, found that rational basis review was the appropriate standard, and remanded the case to the trial court to allow the parties to develop a fuller record and litigate the equal protection issue.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine the appropriate standard of scrutiny for Cannon’s equal protection challenge. The court held that rational basis review, not strict scrutiny, applies to the SVPA’s jury trial demand and waiver procedures. The court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s remand order, directing the trial court to determine whether the legislative choice of procedures is constitutionally justified under rational basis review and whether Cannon knowingly waived his right to a jury trial. The order of commitment is conditionally affirmed pending the outcome of those proceedings. View "P. v. Cannon" on Justia Law

The case concerns the death of Skyler A. Womack, a dependent adult with disabilities who resided at a 24-hour skilled nursing facility operated by Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. After Skyler’s death, his parents filed suit against the facility, alleging that neglect—including understaffing, failure to maintain the facility, and inadequate provision of basic needs—led to his injuries and death. The claims included survivor actions and a wrongful death claim. Notably, Skyler had signed an arbitration agreement upon admission, which stated that any medical malpractice disputes would be subject to arbitration and purported to bind his heirs.In the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Silverscreen moved to compel arbitration of all claims based on the arbitration agreement and the California Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz v. Podolsky. The trial court compelled arbitration of the survivor claims but denied arbitration for the parents’ wrongful death claim, reasoning that the claim was based on neglect under the Elder Abuse Act, not professional negligence. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the wrongful death claim was subject to arbitration because it was based on professional negligence as defined by the agreement and relevant statutes.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision. The Court held that the exception recognized in Ruiz v. Podolsky applies only to wrongful death claims that are based on medical malpractice as defined by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), specifically disputes about whether medical services were improperly rendered. The Court clarified that not all wrongful death claims against health care providers fall within this exception—claims based on custodial neglect, as opposed to professional negligence in medical care, are not subject to arbitration under section 1295 and Ruiz. The Court remanded the case to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint to clarify the basis of their wrongful death claim. View "Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

An employee was hired by a company and, as a condition of employment, signed an agreement requiring all employment-related claims to be resolved through arbitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The agreement specified that the employer would pay all arbitration costs except for certain fees. After the employee reported alleged workplace harassment and was subsequently terminated, he sued the employer in California Superior Court for retaliation and other violations. The employer moved to compel arbitration, which the court granted, and arbitration commenced. After about a year, the arbitrator issued invoices for fees, which the employer failed to pay within 30 days of receipt, as required by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. The employee then sought to withdraw from arbitration and proceed in court, arguing the employer’s late payment constituted a material breach under section 1281.98.The Superior Court denied the employee’s motion, reasoning that the arbitrator had set a new due date for payment and the employer paid within 30 days of that date. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statutory 30-day deadline applied from the original invoice date and that the employer’s late payment resulted in a material breach, allowing the employee to withdraw from arbitration. The Court of Appeal also held that section 1281.98 was not preempted by the FAA.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine whether section 1281.98 is preempted by the FAA. The court held that section 1281.98 is not preempted, but clarified that the statute does not abrogate longstanding contract principles allowing relief from forfeiture for non-willful, non-grossly negligent, or non-fraudulent breaches. The court reversed the Court of Appeal’s order lifting the stay and remanded for the trial court to determine whether the employer’s late payment was excusable and whether the employee suffered compensable harm. View "Hohenshelt v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the compensation structure for utility customers who generate their own electricity, such as through rooftop solar panels, and export excess energy to the power grid. The California Legislature has required utilities to compensate these “customer-generators” since 1995, but concerns arose that the original compensation method overpaid such customers and shifted costs to those without solar systems. In 2013, the Legislature directed the Public Utilities Commission to reassess the compensation framework, resulting in a 2022 tariff that significantly reduced payments for customer-generated power. Environmental groups challenged the new tariff, arguing it failed to account for all societal benefits of renewable energy and did not adequately promote growth among disadvantaged communities.The First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the challenge after the petitioners sought a writ of review. The Court of Appeal affirmed the Commission’s decision, applying a highly deferential standard from Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com., which upheld Commission interpretations unless they lacked a reasonable relation to statutory purposes and language. The appellate court concluded that the Commission’s approach met this deferential standard and declined to engage in further inquiry.The Supreme Court of California granted review to determine whether the deferential Greyhound standard remains appropriate following legislative amendments to the Public Utilities Code. The Supreme Court held that, due to statutory changes in the 1990s and 2000s, the Greyhound standard no longer applies to most Commission decisions, including those involving energy. Instead, courts must now independently review the Commission’s statutory interpretations, consistent with the approach outlined in Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings under the correct standard of review. View "Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com." on Justia Law

In October 2021, five children were removed from their home under a protective custody warrant and placed into the temporary custody of San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the Department). Dependency petitions were filed for all five children. At the detention hearing, the mother denied Indian ancestry, and the father of two of the children also denied Indian ancestry but indicated potential Indian heritage on an ICWA form. The juvenile court found ICWA did not apply and took jurisdiction over the children, removing them from parental custody and ordering reunification services for the mother.The mother appealed, arguing the Department failed to fulfill its duty to inquire about the children's potential Indian ancestry from extended family members, as required by former section 224.2, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal held that the extended-family inquiry duty did not apply because the children were placed into temporary custody pursuant to a warrant under section 340, not section 306, and thus rejected the mother's argument.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to resolve the conflict regarding the scope of the initial inquiry duty under former section 224.2. The court concluded that the county welfare department has an extended-family inquiry duty in all cases where a child is placed into temporary custody, regardless of whether the child was removed from the home with or without a warrant. The court held that Assembly Bill 81, which clarified this duty, applies retroactively as it merely clarified existing law.The Supreme Court of California reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the matter to the juvenile court for compliance with the inquiry requirements of section 224.2. If the juvenile court finds the inquiry duty has been satisfied and ICWA does not apply, it shall reinstate the jurisdiction and disposition order. If ICWA applies, the court shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and California implementing provisions. View "In re Ja. O." on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 2019 of home invasion robbery, burglary, assault with a firearm, kidnapping, and false imprisonment. The jury also found that a principal in the offense was armed with a firearm. The trial court found that the defendant had two prior strikes based on 2006 and 2007 convictions for felony active participation in a criminal street gang. The defendant filed a Romero motion to dismiss the prior strikes, which the trial court initially denied, citing his criminal history and the nature of his current offenses. The defendant was sentenced to a determinate prison term of 30 years and a consecutive indeterminate term of 27 years to life.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s findings regarding the prior strikes, noting that recent judicial authority had narrowed the scope of the offense. At the 2023 resentencing, the District Attorney conceded that the 2007 conviction did not qualify as a strike, and the trial court found the 2006 conviction did qualify. The defendant filed a new Romero motion, which the trial court granted, citing recent legislative changes and the remoteness of the 2006 strike. The trial court dismissed the strike and imposed a reduced sentence.The California Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the Court of Appeal erred in directing the trial court to reinstate the strike and resentence the defendant under the Three Strikes law. The Supreme Court held that the proper remedy was to remand the case to the trial court to allow it to exercise its discretion based on a correct understanding of the law. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the case was remanded for resentencing in accordance with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "P. v. Dain" on Justia Law

In 2016, a trial court found Jerry Anthony Faial guilty of petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction, two counts of making criminal threats, and first-degree burglary. The court imposed a 12-year sentence but suspended its execution, placing Faial on four years of probation. In 2019, the court revoked and terminated Faial’s probation due to violations and ordered the execution of the suspended sentence. Faial appealed the decision.The Court of Appeal concluded that Assembly Bill 1950, which limits probation terms for most felonies to two years, did not apply to Faial because his probation had been revoked and terminated before the legislation became operative on January 1, 2021. The court reasoned that the legislation was intended to apply only to defendants whose probation had not been revoked and terminated.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and concluded that Assembly Bill 1950 applies retroactively to shorten Faial’s probation term to two years, as his case was not yet final. The court held that the ameliorative changes of Assembly Bill 1950 could be applied to Faial’s case, meaning his probation term expired by operation of law two years after it was imposed. Consequently, the orders revoking and terminating his probation and executing his suspended sentence were invalid. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "P. v. Faial" on Justia Law

On January 20, 2018, Francisco Gutierrez was driving his truck on a California highway when an ambulance driven by Uriel Tostado, an EMT employed by ProTransport-1, LLC, rear-ended his vehicle. At the time, Tostado was transporting a patient between medical centers. Gutierrez filed a lawsuit on January 7, 2020, claiming the collision caused him neck and back injuries. He framed his complaint as a general negligence action. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was time-barred under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA)’s one-year statute of limitations for medical professional negligence. Gutierrez opposed, asserting his claim was timely under the two-year statute of limitations for general negligence.The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that MICRA’s statute of limitations applied because Tostado was rendering professional medical services at the time of the accident. Gutierrez appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, reasoning that MICRA applied as long as the plaintiff was injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and held that MICRA’s statute of limitations does not apply to Gutierrez’s claim. The court concluded that the applicable statute of limitations depends on the nature of the right being sued upon. Since Gutierrez’s claim was based on a breach of a duty owed to the public generally, rather than a professional obligation owed to a patient, the two-year statute of limitations for general negligence claims applied. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Gutierrez v. Tostado" on Justia Law

The defendant, high on methamphetamine and upset over his marriage's end, drove through Elk Grove, California, and shot bystanders with a shotgun, killing two men and injuring two others. He was convicted of two counts of murder and five counts of attempted murder, with special circumstances and firearm enhancements. The jury sentenced him to death, and the court denied his motions for a new trial and to modify the death verdict.The Sacramento County Superior Court oversaw the trial. The defense argued for a change of venue due to pretrial publicity, which was denied. The court also denied the defense's request to exclude Elk Grove residents from the jury pool. The defense's challenges to certain jurors for cause were mostly denied, and the court allowed the use of physical restraints on the defendant during the trial. The court admitted the defendant's statements made in the hospital and allowed cross-examination of the defense expert on the defendant's lack of remorse and possession of a Satanic Bible.The California Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the trial court's decisions, including the denial of the change of venue, the use of physical restraints, and the admission of the defendant's statements. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's handling of jury selection, the admission of victim impact evidence, and the cross-examination of the defense expert. The court also upheld the constitutionality of California's death penalty statutes and found no cumulative error that would warrant reversing the judgment. The judgment of death was affirmed. View "People v. Dunn" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of three first-degree murders and several related offenses, including rape and sexual penetration with a foreign object, committed between 1988 and 1998 in Stockton and Oakland, California. The prosecution’s case relied heavily on DNA evidence linking the defendant to the victims, as well as ballistics evidence connecting the same firearm to multiple murders. The victims were found in isolated areas, often bound, and killed by gunshots to the head. The defendant was also convicted of the rape and kidnapping of another woman, Yvette R., who survived and testified. The defense presented no evidence at the guilt phase but, during the penalty phase, offered expert testimony about the defendant’s abusive childhood and mental health issues, including sexual sadism.The San Joaquin County Superior Court jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, found true the special circumstance allegations (multiple murders and murder during rape), and returned death verdicts for each murder. The court imposed a death sentence and additional terms for the noncapital offenses. The defendant’s appeal to the Supreme Court of California was automatic.The Supreme Court of California reviewed numerous claims, including alleged instructional errors, challenges to the constitutionality of special circumstances, claims of prosecutorial misconduct, and issues related to victim impact evidence and penalty phase instructions. The court held that there was no substantial evidence to support instructions on voluntary manslaughter or that the victims were dead at the time of sexual assault, and found no reversible error in the instructions given. The court also rejected challenges to the constitutionality of California’s death penalty scheme and the admission of victim impact evidence. The court found harmless any error in failing to redefine reasonable doubt at the penalty phase and in the response to a jury question about parole eligibility. The judgment was affirmed in its entirety, with a minor correction to the firearm enhancement terms. View "People v. Choyce" on Justia Law