Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that section Cal. Penal Code 459.5(b) prohibits charging shoplifting and theft of the same property, even in the alternative, and that, as a general rule, section 459.5(b) prohibits a prosecutor from charging theft when there is probable cause that a defendant has committed shoplifting of the same property.Defendant stole items worth $496.37. Defendant was charged with shoplifting and theft but was convicted solely of theft. Defendant appealed, arguing that he had been charged in violation of section 459.5(b), which provides that no person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property. The court of appeal concluded that Defendant had been improperly charged but that Defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to object to the charges because section 459.5(b) permitted the prosecutor to amend the information to charge shoplifting and theft in the alternative. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeal (1) correctly concluded that Defendant was charged in violation of section 459.5(b)'s prohibition on charging a person with shoplifting and theft of the same property; but (2) erred in concluding that section 459.5(b) would have permitted the prosecutor to charge Defendant with shoplifting and theft in the alternative. View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court decided in this case that when the government seeks civil penalties as well as an injunction or other equitable remedies under the unfair competition law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq., or the false advertising law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500 et seq., the causes of action are to be tried by the court rather than a jury.In the current writ proceeding in this case, the court of appeal concluded that the jury trial provision of the California Constitution should be interpreted to require a jury trial in any action brought under the UCL or FAL in which the government seeks civil penalties in addition to injunctive or other equitable relief. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the causes of action established by the UCL and FAL at issue in this case are equitable in nature and are properly tried by the court rather than by a jury; and (2) the United States Supreme Court decision in Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), relied upon by the court of appeal below, does not govern this case. View "Nationwide Biweekly Administration, Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal affirming the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's request for expungement of his misdemeanor conviction under Cal. Penal Code 1203.4a, subd. (a), holding that a person may live "an honest and upright life" even if that person has been in custody since completing the sentence imposed for the misdemeanor.Defendant completed his term of imprisonment for his misdemeanor conviction in 2012 and had been in federal immigration custody up until he brought his action. While in immigration custody, Defendant sought expungement of the conviction under section 1203.4a(a), alleging that he had obeyed all laws since being convicted and had participated in fire camp and Alcoholics Anonymous. The trial court denied the request, concluding that custodial time did not qualify as honest and upright living for expungement purposes. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that conduct while in custody is relevant to determining whether a defendant has satisfied the honest and upright life requirement of section 1203.4a. View "People v. Maya" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the sequence in which Montrose Chemical Corporation, which was sued by causing environmental damage in the Los Angeles area, may access its excess insurance policies covering the period from 1961 to 1985, the Supreme Court held that Montrose may seek indemnification under any excess policy once it has exhausted the underlying excess policies in the same policy period.Montrose purchased primary and excess comprehensive general liability insurance to cover its operations at its Torrance facility from defendant insurers between 1961 and 1985. Montrose's primary insurance was exhausted in litigation due to environmental contamination allegedly caused by Montrose's operation of this facility. At issue was whether Montrose was required to exhaust other insurance coverage from other policy periods. The Supreme Court held (1) Montrose was entitled to access otherwise available coverage under any excess policy once it has exhausted directly underlying excess policies for the same policy period; and (2) an insurer called on to provide indemnification may seek reimbursement from other insurers that would have been liable to provide coverage under excess policies for any period in which the injury occurred. View "Montrose Chemical Corp. of California v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in its entirety the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of first degree murder and of conspiracy to commit murder and sentencing Defendant to death, holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the admission of Defendant's surreptitiously recorded jailhouse statement did not violate Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, his Fifth Amendment right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination, his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable detention, his rights under the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause, or attendant protections under Evidence Code sections 352 and 1101; (2) one instance of prosecutorial misconduct committed at the guilt phase was not prejudicial; and (3) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining claims of guilt phase and penalty phase error. View "People v. Fayed" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Convention) does not apply when parties have agreed to waive formal service of process in favor of a specified type of notification.Defendant, a company based in China, and Plaintiff entered into a contract providing that the parties would submit to the jurisdiction of California courts and to resolve disputes between them through California arbitration. The parties further agreed to provide notice and service of process to each other through Federal Express or a similar courier. Plaintiff later sought arbitration. Defendant neither responded nor appeared for the arbitration, and the arbitrator awarded Plaintiff $414,601,200. Defendant moved to set aside default judgment for insufficiency of service of process, arguing that Plaintiff's failure to comply with the Convention rendered the judgment confirming the arbitration award void. The motion was denied. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Convention applies only when the law of the forum state requires formal service of process to be sent abroad; and (2) because the parties' contract constituted a waiver of formal service under California law in favor of an alternative form of notification, the Convention does not apply. View "Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia VII) v. Changzhou SinoType Technology Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeal ruling that Proposition 47's revision to Cal. Penal Code 496, making the offense of receiving stolen property a misdemeanor when the value of the property is $950 or less, does not extend to convictions for receiving a stolen vehicle under section 496d, holding that Proposition 47's amendment to section 496(a) did not affect convictions for receiving stolen property under section 496d.Proposition 47 amended section 496, the general statute criminalizing receipt of stolen property, by making the offense a misdemeanor if the value of the property does not exceed $950. Proposition 47, however, did not amend 496d. Defendant pleaded guilty to unlawfully buying, receiving, concealing, selling or withholding a stolen vehicle in violation of section 496d. Defendant filed a motion under Proposition 47 to reduce his convictions to misdemeanors. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Proposition 47's revision to section 496 does not extend to convictions under section 496d. View "People v. Orozco" on Justia Law

In this case involving whether Proposition 47 requires a court to draw a distinction under Cal. Veh. Code 10851 between permanent and temporary vehicle takings, the Supreme Court held that a person who has unlawfully taken a vehicle in violation of section 10851 is not disqualified from Proposition 47 relief because the person cannot prove he or she intended to keep the vehicle away from the owner indefinitely.Proposition 47 reduced felony offenses consisting of theft of property worth $950 or less to misdemeanors. While liability for theft generally requires that the defendant have an intent permanently to deprive the owner of possession, section 10581 does not distinguish between temporary takings and permanent ones. At issue in this case was whether Proposition 47 grant sentencing relief to people who take vehicles permanently but denies relief to people who take vehicles temporarily. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative and reversed the superior court's denial of resentencing for Defendant's 10851 conviction, holding that Proposition is neither categorically inapplicable to section 10851 convictions nor is a defendant not entitled to resentencing because he lacked the intent permanently to deprive the vehicle's owner of its possession. View "People v. Bullard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal affirming the judgment entered for Employer in this labor dispute, holding that employees do not lose standing to pursue a claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), Cal. Lab. Code 2698 et seq., if they settle and dismiss their individual claims for Labor Code violations.Employee sued Employer in a putative class action alleging several causes of action and seeking civil penalties under PAGA. Employer successfully moved to compel arbitration of the "individual claims" for Employee's own damages. The court dismissed Employee's class claims. After arbitration was complete, Employee accepted Employer's statutory offer to settle Employee's individual claims. Employee then dismissed his individual claims, leaving only the PAGA claim for resolution. Employer then moved for summary adjudication. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Employee was no longer an "aggrieved employee" with PAGA standing because his rights had been "completely redressed" by the settlement and dismissal of his own claims. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff's settlement of individual Labor Code claims did not extinguish his PAGA standing; and (2) claim preclusion did not apply under these circumstances. View "Kim v. Reins International California, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal concluding that a felony for misuse of personal identifying information under Cal. Penal Code 530.5, subdivision (a) can be reduced to misdemeanor shoplifting under Proposition 47, holding that a conviction for misuse of identifying information is not subject to reclassification as misdemeanor shoplifting.Defendant was convicted of two felony counts of misusing personal identifying information in violation of section 530.5, subdivision (a). Defendant later moved to reclassify his felony convictions to misdemeanors under Proposition 47. The trial court granted Defendant's motion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that misuse of personal identifying information is not a "theft" offense under Cal. Penal Code 459.5, subdivision (b). View "People v. Jimenez" on Justia Law