Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of first degree murder and sentencing him to death, holding that there were four possible errors during the penalty phase of trial, but none of those errors was prejudicial.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, and the jury found true the special circumstance allegation that Defendant committed the murder while engaged in a home invasion robbery. The prosecution retried the penalty phase, and, after a second penalty phase, the trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence, holding that the trial court's errors regarding the admission of certain testimony regarding Defendant's remorselessness, the admission of hearsay testimony, an erroneous instruction, and the failure to transfer a certain exhibit to the jury were not prejudicial. The dissent would have reversed on the grounds that the prosecution disproportionately excused black prospective jurors during the jury selection process. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Defendant was convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances of murder in the commission of forcible sodomy, murder in the commission of a lewd act on a child, and murder by torture. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. On appeal, Defendant asserted multiple claims of error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no prejudicial error during the guilt phase of trial; and (2) the only errors committed during the penalty phase were two instances of prosecutorial misconduct in argument to the jury, and these errors were not prejudicial either individually or cumulatively. View "People v. Rhoades" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeal reversing the judgment of the trial court ruling that the search of Defendant's car was invalid on the basis that the search was authorized under In re Arturo D., 27 Cal.4th 60 (Cal. 2002), holding that the desire to obtain a driver's identification following a traffic stop does not constitute an independent, categorical exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, and to the extent Arturo D. held otherwise it should no longer be followed.Acting on a tip about Defendant's erratic driving, a police officer approached Defendant after she parked and exited her car. The police detained Defendant for unlicensed driving and, without asking her name, searched the car for Defendant's personal identification. The trial court held that the search was invalid under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the search was authorized under the Supreme Court's pre-Gant decision in Arturo D. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the warrantless search of Defendant's vehicle in this case violated the Fourth Amendment. View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in its entirety the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of two counts of first-degree murder and related crimes and sentencing Defendant to death for each of the murder convictions, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's denial of Defendant's Batson/Wheeler challenge; (2) as to the admission of Defendant's confession, the investigator should have stopped the interrogation on April 21, 1999 sooner than he did, but the error did not compel the exclusion of the confession obtained on April 22, 1999 or thereafter; (3) Defendant's arguments involving testimony of Defendant's volitional impairment did not require reversal of the death sentence; (4) the trial court did not err in admitting testimony by Defendant's former girlfriend, a photograph of Defendant, and evidence that Defendant lied about shooting a person; and (5) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "People v. Krebs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeal affirming in part and reversing in part the trial court's denial of Defendant's Proposition 47 petition, holding that the court of appeals did not properly apply this Court's decision in People v. Romanowski, 2 Cal.5th 903 (2017).At issue in this case was how to assess the value of stolen access card information. Defendant was convicted of five counts theft of access card information. Defendant petitioned for Proposition 47 relief seeking resentencing on her convictions on the basis that the value of the property she obtained was not more than $950. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeal reversed as to two convictions and affirmed as to the other three. The court did not engage in the Romanowski inquiry but instead assumed that the value of what Defendant obtained using the stolen information set a floor on the fair market value of the information she unlawfully used. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to send the case back to the trial court for further fact-finding as to the reasonable and fair market value of the access card information at issue, holding that the court of appeal's reasoning fell short of what Romanowski required. View "People v. Liu" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction to entertain an emergency petition for a writ of mandate that would forbid the Secretary of State from enforcing portions of the recently enabled Presidential Tax Transparency and Accountability Act, Cal. Elec. Code 6880 et seq. The Supreme Court granted that writ, holding that portions of the Act conflict with Cal. Const. art. II, 5(c) and are therefore invalid.Specifically, the Court held that Elections Code sections 6883 and 6884 are invalid under article II, section 5(c) insofar as they require someone who is recognized as a candidate for the office of President of the United States to file with the Secretary of State federal income tax returns for the five most recent taxable years as a necessary condition for appearing on the primary election ballot of a qualified political party. The Court held that this additional prerequisite conflicts with the California Constitution's specification of an inclusive open presidential primary ballot and therefore cannot lawfully be enforced. View "Patterson v. Padilla" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question requested by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by holding that the provision in Cal. Civ. Code 1916-2 prohibiting lenders from assessing compound interest "unless an agreement to that effect is clearly expressed in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith" does not apply to lenders exempt under article XV of the California Constitution.Article XV sets the maximum interest rates lenders may charge but exempts specified classes of lenders from those rate restrictions and authorizes the Legislature to regulate the compensation these exempt lenders may receive. At issue was whether exempt lenders are required to obtain a borrower's signed agreement in order to charge compound interest on a loan. The Supreme Court held that exempt lenders are not required to obtain a borrower's signed agreement in order to charge compound interest on a loan. View "Wishnev v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), Cal. Lab. Code 2698 et seq., action seeking civil penalties under Cal. Labor Code 558 the Supreme Court held that the civil penalties a plaintiff may seek under section 558 through the PAGA do not include the "amount sufficient to recover underpaid wages."Real party in interest Kalethia Lawson brought this action naming as Defendants her employer and its parent company (collectively, ZB). Lawson had agreed to arbitrate all employment claims and forego class arbitration with her employer. The court of appeals ordered the trial court to deny ZB's motion to arbitrate that portion of Lawson's claim for unpaid wages, concluding that section 558's civil penalty encompassed the amount for unpaid wages and that Lawson's unpaid wages claim could not be compelled to arbitration under Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal.4th 348 (2014). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the amount for unpaid wages is not recoverable under the PAGA, and section 558 does not otherwise permit a private right of action; and (2) therefore, the trial court should have denied ZB's motion. View "ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a definitive resolution of the question of whether an arbitral scheme resembling civil litigation can constitute a sufficiently accessible and affordable process was unnecessary in this case because the facts involved an unusually high degree of procedural unconscionability, rendering the arbitration agreement in this case unenforceable.During his employment Employee signed an arbitration clause grafted onto an acknowledgment of at-will employment. After his employment ended Employee filed a complaint with the Labor Commissioner for unpaid wages. Employer filed a petition to compel arbitration. The Labor Commissioner proceeded to the hearing without Employer and awarded Employee unpaid wages and liquidated damages. The trial court vacated the award, concluding that the hearing should not have proceeded in Employer's absence. The court, however, did not compel arbitration, finding that the agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) even if a litigation-like arbitration procedure may be an acceptable substitute for the Berman process, an employee may not be coerced or misled into accepting this trade; and (2) under the oppressive circumstances of this case, the agreement was unconscionable, rendering it unenforceable. View "OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court considered two questions from the federal court of appeals regarding California's common-law notice-prejudice rule and held (1) the notice-prejudice rule is a fundamental public policy of the state in the insurance context, and (2) the rule generally applies to consent provisions in the context of first party liability policy coverage and not to consent provisions in third party liability policies.The insurance policy in this case contained a choice of law provision designating that New York law should govern all matters arising under the policy. Under section 187 of the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws the parties' choice of law generally governs unless it conflicts with a state's fundamental public policy. The party opposing the application of the choice of law provision sought to establish that California's notice-prejudice rule was a fundamental public policy for the purpose of choice-of-law analysis. The federal court of appeals issued certified questions to the Supreme Court, which answered as set forth above. The Court left it to the federal court of appeals to decide whether the consent provision at issue in this case was a consent provision contemplated first party or third party coverage. View "Pitzer College v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co." on Justia Law