Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeal concluding that the anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 425.16, cannot be used to judicially screen claims alleging discriminatory or retaliatory employment actions, holding that the statute contains no exception for discrimination or retaliation claims.Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, his employer, ultimately fired him for unlawful discriminatory and retaliatory reasons. Defendant, a news organization, filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Plaintiff had not shown any of his claims had minimal merit. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that discrimination and retaliation do not qualify as protected activity, and therefore, the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) in cases alleging discrimination or retaliation claims in the employment context, the plaintiff's allegations about the defendant's invidious motives will not shield the claim from the same preliminary screening for minimal merit that would apply to any other claim arising from protected activity; and (2) Defendant showed that Plaintiff's claims arose in limited part from protected activity, and therefore, Defendant was entitled to a determination of whether those limited portions of Plaintiff's claims had sufficient potential merit to proceed. View "Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc." on Justia Law

In this tort action arising out of a fatal tour bus accident in Arizona, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err by declining to reconsider its prior choice of law ruling after an Indiana defendant was dismissed from this case.The parties in this case initially included plaintiffs from China and defendants from both Indiana and California. The trial court conducted the governmental interest test and concluded that Indiana law governed. Before trial, Plaintiffs accepted a settlement offer from the Indiana defendant. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court should have reconsidered the initial choice of law ruling after the Indiana defendant was dismissed from the case. The court then applied the governmental interest test and concluded that California law governed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) given the importance of determining the choice of law early in a case, the circumstances in which trial courts are required to revisit a choice of law determination should be the exception and not the rule; and (2) the trial court in this case was not required to reconsider the prior choice of law ruling based on the Indiana defendant's settlement. View "Chen v. Los Angeles Truck Centers, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying Petitioner's request to release ballistics evidence for expert testimony in preparation for filing a habeas corpus petition, holding that the trial court erred in denying the request based solely in Petitioner's failure to establish good cause.Petitioner was sentenced to death for the first degree murders of two victims. In preparation for filing a habeas corpus petition, Petitioner filed his request for the ballistics evidence. The superior court denied Petitioner's request to release ballistics evidence for expert testimony under the authority of Cal. Penal Code 1054.9, which governs discovery in habeas corpus proceedings involving certain judgments, including a sentence of death. The court found specifically that Petitioner had failed to show good cause to believe his access to the evidence was reasonably necessary to obtain relief. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding that, under the statute, a threshold showing of good cause is not required. View "Satele v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

In this original habeas corpus action the Supreme Court granted Petitioner habeas corpus relief insofar as the petition sought relief from the judgment of death after accepting the finding of the referee that a prosecution witness had falsely identified Petitioner as the man who sexually assaulted her, holding that the false testimony was material.Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and second degree murder and sentenced to death. Petitioner later filed a habeas corpus petition alleging, among other things, that a penalty phase witness had misidentified him as the man who assaulted and raped her. The Supreme Court appointed a referee who conducted an evidentiary hearing, after which the referee found that, during the penalty phase, the witness had testified falsely when she identified Petitioner as her assailant. Noting that the Court generally accepts the referee's findings, the Supreme Court granted Petitioner relief on the basis of false evidence by overturning his sentence of death, holding that the false testimony undermined this Court's confidence in the outcome of the trial and that Petitioner was entitled to relief on this claim as to the penalty verdict. View "In re Rogers" on Justia Law

In this negligence case, the Supreme Court held that the immunity provision of the Government Claims Act (GCA) that bars any statutory liability that might otherwise exist for injuries resulting from the condition of firefighting equipment or facilities, Cal. Gov't Code 850.4, does not deprive a court of fundamental jurisdiction but, rather, operates as an affirmative defense to liability.Plaintiff sued the Chester Fire Protection District and the Garden Valley Fire Protection District alleging that Defendants created a "dangerous condition" of public property for which public entities may be held liable under Cal. Gov't Code 835. Defendants did not allege the immunity conferred by section 850.4. After trial began, defense counsel presented a written motion for nonsuit in which Defendants for the first time invoked section 850.4. Plaintiff objected on the ground that Defendants waived section 850.4 immunity by failing to invoke the immunity in their answer. The trial court overruled the objection, concluding that governmental immunity is jurisdictional and can't be waived. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 850.4 immunity operates as an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional bar. The Court remanded the case so the court of appeal may address the parties' remaining arguments in the first instance. View "Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal reversing the ruling of the trial court denying Defendants' motion for dismiss this breach of contract suit under the anti-SLAPP statutes, holding that Plaintiff met its burden of showing its breach of contract claim had "minimal merit" sufficient to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion.The parties to a tort action agreed to settle their lawsuit. The agreement, which was reduced to writing, included provisions purporting to impose confidentiality obligations on the parties and their counsel. All parties signed the agreement, and the parties' lawyers signed under a notation that they approved the agreement. Plaintiff brought this suit against Defendants, counsel in the tort action, alleging that Defendants violated the agreement by making public statements about the settlement. Defendants moved to dismiss the suit under the anti-SLAPP statutes. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that the notation meant only that counsel recommended their clients sign the document. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it would be reasonable to argue that Defendants' signature on the agreement evinced a willingness to be bound by its terms. View "Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the determination of the California Department of Social Services (the Department) that a household member's income that is used to pay child support for a child living in another household counts as income "reasonably anticipated" to be "received" by the paying household within the meaning of Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 11265.2 for the purposes of determining eligibility for state welfare benefits was reasonable and therefore valid.Plaintiff applied for California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids (CalWORKs) aid to support herself and her family. The Director of the Department denied the claim, concluding that child support payments garnished from Plaintiff's husband's earned income and unemployment insurance benefits was correctly included as nonexempt available income in determining eligibility for CalWORKs benefits. The superior court declared the department's policy of counting court-ordered child support payments as available income of CalWORKs applicants invalid. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department’s determination that funds garnished to pay child support for the benefit of a child living in another household are not exempt from the paying household’s income for purposes of determining its eligibility for or amount of CalWORKs aid was a reasonable exercise of its lawmaking authority and was therefore valid. View "Christensen v. Lightbourne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of two counts of first degree murder and his sentence of death, holding that none of Defendant's challenges to his convictions and death sentence warranted reversal.Defendant was one of three members of a gang who were charged with the murders of Michael Faria and Jessica Salazar. This automatic appeal concerned only Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of two counts of first degree murder and death sentence, holding (1) any error in allowing a gang expert to testify was harmless; (2) the trial court did not err in declining to exclude two portions of a jailhouse conversation Defendant had with a friend; (3) there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Defendant shot Faria; (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of a certain witness; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a photograph depicting Faria's body; (6) the victim impact evidence admitting in this case was within the bounds of what precedents permit; and (7) Defendant's constitutional challenges to California's death penalty scheme failed. View "People v. Mendez" on Justia Law

In this case concerning whether a certified class of state correctional employees is entitled to additional compensation for time spent on pre- and postwork activities, the Supreme Court held that the represented plaintiffs' claims failed insofar as they sought additional compensation for either "duty-integrated walk time" or "entry-exit walk time" and that, as to the subclass of unrepresented plaintiffs, they may be entitled to additional compensation for duty-integrated walk time.The Supreme Court referred to the time the employees spent traveling from the outermost gate of the prison facility to their work posts within the facility as "entry-exit walk time" and the time the employees spent after beginning the first activity they were assigned to but before arriving at their assigned work post the "duty-integrated walk time." The trial court divided the plaintiff class into two subclasses: one for supervisory employees who were not represented by a union and the other for represented employees. The Court concluded (1) the subclass of represented plaintiffs expressly agreed to a specific amount of compensation for duty-integrated walk time; and (2) the collective bargaining agreements precluded other forms of compensation, and therefore, the represented plaintiffs' claims failed insofar as they sought additional compensation for either duty-integrated walk time or entry-exit walk time. View "Stoetzl v. Department of Human Resources" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first degree murder, with the special circumstance that the murder was committed during a rape, and Defendant's sentence of death holding that there was no prejudicial error in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the victim's brother testified at the penalty phase in contravention of a court order, but any prejudice was cured by the trial court's admonition and by other evidence undermining the significance of Defendant's assertions; (2) any assumed error in failing to instruct at the guilt phase on a good faith but unreasonable belief in consent to intercourse was not prejudicial; and (3) Defendant offered no compelling reasons for the Court to reconsider its precedent rejecting Defendant's constitutional challenges to California's death penalty scheme. View "People v. Molano" on Justia Law