Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue was what standard applies in determining whether workers should be classified as employees or as independent contract for purposes of California wage orders.Two drivers filed this purported class action alleging that Dynamex Operations West, Inc. had misclassified its delivery drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. The trial court ultimately certified a class action embodying a class of Dynamex drivers who, during a pay period, did not themselves employ other drivers and did not do delivery work for other delivery businesses or for the drivers’ own personal customers. The court of appeal upheld the trial court’s class certification order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly concluded that the “suffer or permit to work” definition of “employ” contained in the wage order may be relied upon in evaluating whether a worker is an independent contractor; (2) in determining whether, under the suffer or permit to work definition, a worker is properly considered the type of independent contractor to whom the wage order does not apply, it is appropriate to look to the so-called “ABC” test utilized in other jurisdictions; and (3) the trial court’s certification order was correct as a matter of law under a proper understanding of the suffer or permit to work standard. View "Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

At issue was what standard applies in determining whether workers should be classified as employees or as independent contract for purposes of California wage orders.Two drivers filed this purported class action alleging that Dynamex Operations West, Inc. had misclassified its delivery drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. The trial court ultimately certified a class action embodying a class of Dynamex drivers who, during a pay period, did not themselves employ other drivers and did not do delivery work for other delivery businesses or for the drivers’ own personal customers. The court of appeal upheld the trial court’s class certification order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly concluded that the “suffer or permit to work” definition of “employ” contained in the wage order may be relied upon in evaluating whether a worker is an independent contractor; (2) in determining whether, under the suffer or permit to work definition, a worker is properly considered the type of independent contractor to whom the wage order does not apply, it is appropriate to look to the so-called “ABC” test utilized in other jurisdictions; and (3) the trial court’s certification order was correct as a matter of law under a proper understanding of the suffer or permit to work standard. View "Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

In deciding whether a defendant is guilty of murder, the jury is permitted to consider evidence of voluntary invocation on the question of whether the defendant intended to kill but not on the question of whether he believed he needed to act in self-defense.Defendant was charged with first degree murder and first degree burglary. Defendant claimed he was guilty of, at most, voluntary manslaughter because he killed in “unreasonable self-defense” - that is, he actually believed he needed to act in self-defense even if that belief was unreasonable. The jury acquitted Defendant of first degree murder but found him guilty of second degree murder and first degree burglary. On appeal, the court of appeal concluded that the trial court erred in prohibiting the jury from considering evidence of voluntary intoxication on the question of whether Defendant believe he needed to act in self-defense, but the error was harmless. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on how it could consider Defendant’s evidence of voluntary intoxication. View "People v. Soto" on Justia Law

In 2005, Chavez pleaded no contest to charges that he offered to sell a controlled substance and failed to appear after being released on his own recognizance. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Chavez on probation for four years, a term he successfully completed in 2009. In 2013, Chavez, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, asked the court to exercise its authority under Penal Code section 1385 to dismiss his previous convictions in the interests of justice. He did not seek relief under section 1203.4, which permits eligible defendants to obtain dismissal of accusations after completing probation. The trial court, court of appeal, and California Supreme Court denied him relief. A trial court would exceed the authority conferred by section 1385 if it dismissed an action after the probation period expires; a court may exercise that dismissal power before judgment is pronounced but not after judgment is final. In the case of a successful probationer, final judgment is never pronounced, and after the expiration of probation, may never be pronounced; section 1385’s power may be exercised until a judgment is pronounced or when the power to pronounce judgment runs out. View "People v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Daveggio and Michaud were each convicted of one count of first-degree murder (Pen. Code 187(a)), two counts of oral copulation in concert by force (section 288a(d)), and one count of oral copulation on a person under 18 years of age (288a(b)(1)). The jury also found true two special circumstances, kidnapping, and rape by instrument (190.2(a)(17)(B), (K)), and returned verdicts of death. The trial court denied the automatic motions to modify the verdicts and sentenced defendants to death. On automatic appeal (section1239(b)), the Supreme Court of California affirmed after recounting numerous uncharged crimes. The court upheld the denial of the defendants’ severance motions, the admission of the evidence of uncharged incidents, and evidentiary rulings concerning fingerprint evidence, carpeting in Michaud’s van, and certain weaponry. View "People v. Daveggio & Michaud" on Justia Law

The Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a petition (Welf. & Inst. Code 300) to have I.C., age three, and her brother, age five, declared dependents of the court, alleging that I.C. had been sexually abused by Father. In a juvenile dependency proceeding, a child’s out-of-court reports of parental abuse are admissible in evidence regardless of whether the child is competent to testify in court (section 355.) but the court may not base its findings solely on the hearsay statements of a child who may not testify because she is too young to separate truth from falsehood unless the child’s statements bear “special indicia of reliability.” The juvenile court found I.C.’s statements to be unclear, confusing, not credible, and unreliable in significant respects but concluded that the indicia of reliability outweighed the indicia of unreliability. The court adjudged her a dependent of the court and ordered her father removed from the home. The Supreme Court of California reversed. The court failed to take adequate account of the confounding role of I.C.’s prior molestation and her subsequent encounter with the prior molester. The timing and content of I.C.’s allegations concerning Father strongly suggested a relationship to her earlier molestation. The court noted that some of I.C.’s allegations were actually false. View "In re I.C." on Justia Law

A-1 Self Storage Inc.’s alternative indemnity agreement was not subject to regulation under the Insurance Code because (1) A-1 was not acting as an agent for an insurer, and (2) the indemnification agreement was incidental to the principal object and purpose of renting storage space. See Cal. Ins. Code 1758.7 et seq.In its rental agreements with tenants, A-1 required the tenant to obtain insurance for loss of or damage to a tenant’s stored property, stating that A-1 shall not be liable for such losses. A-1 also offered an alternative to the requirement that the tenant obtain insurance. In exchange for an additional amount in rent per month, A-1 provided that it would reassume the risk of such losses, up to $2,500. Plaintiff brought this putative class action arguing that the alternative constituted an insurance policy, which A-1 was not licensed to sell, and therefore, A-1’s sale of this indemnity agreement violated the Insurance Code. The trial court concluded that the alternative indemnity agreement was not insurance and entered judgment for Defendants. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the alternative indemnity agreement did not constitute insurance subject to regulation under the Insurance Code. View "Heckart v. A-1 Self Storage, Inc." on Justia Law

The collection requirement of Proposition 69, known as the “DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act” (DNA Act), is constitutional as applied to an individual who, like Defendant, was validly arrested on “probable cause to hold for a serious offense” and who was required to swab his cheek as part of a “routine booking procedure” at county jail.Defendant was arrested for arson and related felonies and transported to jail. At booking, Defendant was informed that he was required to provide a DNA sample by swabbing the inside of his cheek. Defendant refused and was later convicted of both the arson-related felonies and the misdemeanor offense of refusing to provide a specimen required by the DNA Act. After the case was remanded, the Court of Appeal reversed Defendant’s misdemeanor refusal conviction on the ground that the DNA Act violates the state Constitution’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was reasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and Cal. Const. art. I, 13 to require Defendant to swab his cheek as part of a routine jail booking procedure following a valid arrest for felony arson; and (2) therefore, Defendant was subject to the statutory penalties prescribed in Cal. Penal Code 298.1. View "People v. Buza" on Justia Law

The collection requirement of Proposition 69, known as the “DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act” (DNA Act), is constitutional as applied to an individual who, like Defendant, was validly arrested on “probable cause to hold for a serious offense” and who was required to swab his cheek as part of a “routine booking procedure” at county jail.Defendant was arrested for arson and related felonies and transported to jail. At booking, Defendant was informed that he was required to provide a DNA sample by swabbing the inside of his cheek. Defendant refused and was later convicted of both the arson-related felonies and the misdemeanor offense of refusing to provide a specimen required by the DNA Act. After the case was remanded, the Court of Appeal reversed Defendant’s misdemeanor refusal conviction on the ground that the DNA Act violates the state Constitution’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was reasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and Cal. Const. art. I, 13 to require Defendant to swab his cheek as part of a routine jail booking procedure following a valid arrest for felony arson; and (2) therefore, Defendant was subject to the statutory penalties prescribed in Cal. Penal Code 298.1. View "People v. Buza" on Justia Law

Statutory developments warranted modification of a settlement order between Petitioner and the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) to relieve the Board of any obligation to calculate “base terms” of an inmate serving an indeterminate sentence for use at the inmate’s initial parole hearing.Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in December 2012 against the Board seeking to avoid parole determinations leading to grossly disproportionate prison terms. An ensuing settlement agreement required the Board to calculate “base terms” under the agreement. At the time of the agreement, “base terms” governed the earliest possible release date for inmates serving indeterminate sentences. Since then, statutory developments altered the statutory landscape such that “base terms” no longer governed the release dates of inmates subject to indeterminate sentences. The Court of Appeal concluded that the settlement order could remain in force despite the statutory changes. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the elimination of “base term” calculations from any statutory role in determining release dates for those sentenced to indeterminate terms was a sufficiently material change that it required modification of the settlement by the Court of Appeal; and (2) the Board was not constitutionally required to continue calculating base terms as required in the settlement order. View "In re Butler" on Justia Law