Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held in this criminal proceeding that a prosecutor’s dismissal of a grand juror violates Cal. Penal Code 939.5 because only the grand jury foreperson may dismiss a grand juror and that a defendant may seek dismissal of an indictment on the ground that the prosecutor violated section 939.5 by filing a pretrial motion under Cal. Penal Code 995(a)(1)(A), but the defendant must show that the error reasonably might have had an adverse effect on the impartiality or independence of the grand jury.A prosecutor dismissed a grand juror outside the presence of other jurors and the trial court. Thereafter, the grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant. Defendant moved to set aside the indictment under section 995, arguing that the prosecutor’s dismissal of the juror violated his rights to an impartial and independent grand jury. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant failed to show that the prosecutor’s error in dismissing the juror reasonably might have had an adverse effect on the impartiality or independence of the grand jury, the motion failed on the facts before the Court. View "Avitia v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

At issue was the timing of the notice that must precede an unlawful detainer action where the action is not brought by a landlord but by a new owner who has acquired title to the property under a power of sale contained in a deed of trust.The Supreme Court held that perfection of title, which includes recording the trustee’s deed, is necessary before the new owner serves a three-day written notice to quit on the possessor of the property. The Court thus reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal concluding that perfection of title need only precede the filing of the unlawful detainer action and that the new owner may serve the notice to quit immediately after acquiring ownership. View "Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the district attorney prosecuting a civil commitment petition under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), Cal. Well. & Inst. Code 660-6609.3, may obtain copies of the treatment records supporting updated or replacement evaluators’ opinions about an individual’s suitability for designation as an SVP and whether those records may be shared with a mental health expert retained by the district attorney to assist in the prosecution of the SVP petition.The Orange County District Attorney filed a petition to commit Richard Anthony Smith as an SVP. The SDSH performed updated and replacement evaluations and concluded that Smith no longer qualified as an SVP. Ultimately, the trial court denied the request of the district attorney asking for an order permitting his retained expert to review the SDSH evaluations. The Court of Appeals, however, directed the trial court to vacate its order and enter a new order granting the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a recent amendment to the SVPA allows the district court to obtain otherwise confidential records, and the district court may then disclose those records to its retained expert, subject to an appropriate protective order, to assist in the cross-examination of the SDSH evaluators or mental health professionals retained by the defense and in prosecuting the SVP petition. View "People v. Superior Court of Orange County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal that a wage order of the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) permitting Plaintiffs to waive a second meal period for shifts greater than twelve hours does not violate the Labor Code.The Labor Code provides that employees who work more than five hours must be provided with a meal period and employees who work more than ten hours must be provided with a second meal period. Under the Labor Code, an employee who works no more than six hours may waive the first meal period, and an employee who works no more than twelve hours may waive the second meal period. At issue was a IWC wage order permitting health care employees to waive the second meal per even if they have worked more than twelve hours. Plaintiffs were employees of a hospital who worked shifts longer than twelve hours and waived their second meal periods. After analyzing the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions the Supreme Court held that the IWC order does not violate the Labor Code. View "Gerard v. Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal concluding that the value of a forged instrument under Cal. Penal Code 473 subdivision (b) is its face value and not the intrinsic value of the instrument itself, holding that because forgery requires the intent to defraud and the stated value of the forged check indicates the severity of the intended fraud, when the check contains a stated value, that amount is its value for this purpose.The recent initiative measure, Proposition 47, makes specified types of forgery misdemeanors if the value of the forged instrument does not exceed $950. Defendant pleaded guilty to forgery under section 475, subdivision (a) for forging a signature on a check made out in the amount of $1,500 and was placed on probation. When Defendant later violated the terms of his probation he requested the court to resentence him as a misdemeanant under the recently enacted Proposition 47, arguing that the check’s value was less than $950. The court denied the request, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “value” means stated value. View "People v. Franco" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment convicting Defendant of the first degree murders of her three children, vacated two of the jury’s three multiple-murder special-circumstance findings, reversed Defendant’s sentence of death, and remanded the matter for a new penalty determination.The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not commit reversible error in denying Defendant’s request for self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and no other prejudicial error occurred during the guilt phase proceedings; (2) two of the three multiple-murder special-circumstance allegations were erroneously charged and found true in this case; and (3) the trial court erred in excusing a prospective juror for cause based solely on her written questionnaire responses concerning her personal views on the death penalty, requiring reversal of Defendant’s penalty judgment. View "People v. Buenrostro" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of first-degree murder and sentencing him to death, holding that Defendant suffered no prejudice in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant’s guilty plea was valid because Cal. Penal Code 1018 allows advisory counsel to satisfy the statutory requirements imposed on counsel in the case of a defendant who has exercised the right to self-representation; (2) the restraints placed on Defendant during the penalty trial and the denial of any writing instrument did not violate Defendant’s right to participate in his own defense or any other constitutional rights; and (3) Defendant’s challenges to California’s death penalty scheme and standard jury instructions were unavailing. View "People v. Miracle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in its entirety the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of four counts of first degree murder and sentencing him to death for two of the murders and to life without parole for the double murder of the other victims, holding that no reversible error occurred in the proceedings below.On appeal, Defendant raised a number of allegations of error regarding pretrial issues, the guilt phase of trial, and the penalty phase. In affirming the judgment, the Supreme Court held that the trial court committed several harmless errors and that, considered cumulatively, there was no reasonable possibility that these errors affected the jury’s verdicts. View "People v. Gomez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded with directions to reverse Defendant’s judgment of conviction, holding that the trial court erred in failing to suspend the criminal trial and initiate competency proceedings when defense counsel declared a doubt about her client’s competence.Here, Defendant, a formerly incompetent defendant, was restored to competence primarily through administration of medication. At the start of Defendant’s jury trial, Defendant began exhibiting signs of incompetence, and the trial court learned that Defendant had stopped taking his medication. After counsel declared a doubt as to Defendant’s competence the trial court conducted a brief colloquy with Defendant. The court then ruled that the trial could proceed. Defendant was ultimately convicted on several counts and sentenced to multiple life terms. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court’s failure to suspend proceedings and conduct a formal investigation into Defendant’s incompetence violated Defendant’s constitutional guarantee of due process. View "People v. Rodas" on Justia Law

In this case centering around who pays for the duties the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 6600 et seq., imposes on county governments, the Supreme Court held that the Commission on State Mandates erred when it treated The Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act: Jessica’s Law (Proposition 83) as a basis for terminating the State’s obligation to reimburse county governments for the costs of implementing the SVPA.Originally, the State was obligated to reimburse county governments for the costs of implementing the SVPA. In 2011, the Commission identified six county duties that no longer constituted reimbursable state mandates. Six counties (the Counties) filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate and a complaint for declaratory relief challenging this decision. The superior court denied relief, but the Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that simply because certain provisions of the SVPA had been restated without substantive change in Proposition 83, the Commission erred when it treated the initiative as a basis for terminating the State’s obligation to reimburse the Counties. The Court remanded the matter for the Commission to determine how the initiative’s expanded definition of an SVP may affect the State’s obligation to reimburse the Counties. View "County of San Diego v. Commission on State Mandates" on Justia Law