Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Chavez pleaded no contest to charges that he offered to sell a controlled substance and failed to appear after being released on his own recognizance. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Chavez on probation for four years, a term he successfully completed in 2009. In 2013, Chavez, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, asked the court to exercise its authority under Penal Code section 1385 to dismiss his previous convictions in the interests of justice. He did not seek relief under section 1203.4, which permits eligible defendants to obtain dismissal of accusations after completing probation. The trial court, court of appeal, and California Supreme Court denied him relief. A trial court would exceed the authority conferred by section 1385 if it dismissed an action after the probation period expires; a court may exercise that dismissal power before judgment is pronounced but not after judgment is final. In the case of a successful probationer, final judgment is never pronounced, and after the expiration of probation, may never be pronounced; section 1385’s power may be exercised until a judgment is pronounced or when the power to pronounce judgment runs out. View "People v. Chavez" on Justia Law

Daveggio and Michaud were each convicted of one count of first-degree murder (Pen. Code 187(a)), two counts of oral copulation in concert by force (section 288a(d)), and one count of oral copulation on a person under 18 years of age (288a(b)(1)). The jury also found true two special circumstances, kidnapping, and rape by instrument (190.2(a)(17)(B), (K)), and returned verdicts of death. The trial court denied the automatic motions to modify the verdicts and sentenced defendants to death. On automatic appeal (section1239(b)), the Supreme Court of California affirmed after recounting numerous uncharged crimes. The court upheld the denial of the defendants’ severance motions, the admission of the evidence of uncharged incidents, and evidentiary rulings concerning fingerprint evidence, carpeting in Michaud’s van, and certain weaponry. View "People v. Daveggio & Michaud" on Justia Law

The Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a petition (Welf. & Inst. Code 300) to have I.C., age three, and her brother, age five, declared dependents of the court, alleging that I.C. had been sexually abused by Father. In a juvenile dependency proceeding, a child’s out-of-court reports of parental abuse are admissible in evidence regardless of whether the child is competent to testify in court (section 355.) but the court may not base its findings solely on the hearsay statements of a child who may not testify because she is too young to separate truth from falsehood unless the child’s statements bear “special indicia of reliability.” The juvenile court found I.C.’s statements to be unclear, confusing, not credible, and unreliable in significant respects but concluded that the indicia of reliability outweighed the indicia of unreliability. The court adjudged her a dependent of the court and ordered her father removed from the home. The Supreme Court of California reversed. The court failed to take adequate account of the confounding role of I.C.’s prior molestation and her subsequent encounter with the prior molester. The timing and content of I.C.’s allegations concerning Father strongly suggested a relationship to her earlier molestation. The court noted that some of I.C.’s allegations were actually false. View "In re I.C." on Justia Law

A-1 Self Storage Inc.’s alternative indemnity agreement was not subject to regulation under the Insurance Code because (1) A-1 was not acting as an agent for an insurer, and (2) the indemnification agreement was incidental to the principal object and purpose of renting storage space. See Cal. Ins. Code 1758.7 et seq.In its rental agreements with tenants, A-1 required the tenant to obtain insurance for loss of or damage to a tenant’s stored property, stating that A-1 shall not be liable for such losses. A-1 also offered an alternative to the requirement that the tenant obtain insurance. In exchange for an additional amount in rent per month, A-1 provided that it would reassume the risk of such losses, up to $2,500. Plaintiff brought this putative class action arguing that the alternative constituted an insurance policy, which A-1 was not licensed to sell, and therefore, A-1’s sale of this indemnity agreement violated the Insurance Code. The trial court concluded that the alternative indemnity agreement was not insurance and entered judgment for Defendants. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the alternative indemnity agreement did not constitute insurance subject to regulation under the Insurance Code. View "Heckart v. A-1 Self Storage, Inc." on Justia Law

The collection requirement of Proposition 69, known as the “DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act” (DNA Act), is constitutional as applied to an individual who, like Defendant, was validly arrested on “probable cause to hold for a serious offense” and who was required to swab his cheek as part of a “routine booking procedure” at county jail.Defendant was arrested for arson and related felonies and transported to jail. At booking, Defendant was informed that he was required to provide a DNA sample by swabbing the inside of his cheek. Defendant refused and was later convicted of both the arson-related felonies and the misdemeanor offense of refusing to provide a specimen required by the DNA Act. After the case was remanded, the Court of Appeal reversed Defendant’s misdemeanor refusal conviction on the ground that the DNA Act violates the state Constitution’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was reasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and Cal. Const. art. I, 13 to require Defendant to swab his cheek as part of a routine jail booking procedure following a valid arrest for felony arson; and (2) therefore, Defendant was subject to the statutory penalties prescribed in Cal. Penal Code 298.1. View "People v. Buza" on Justia Law

The collection requirement of Proposition 69, known as the “DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act” (DNA Act), is constitutional as applied to an individual who, like Defendant, was validly arrested on “probable cause to hold for a serious offense” and who was required to swab his cheek as part of a “routine booking procedure” at county jail.Defendant was arrested for arson and related felonies and transported to jail. At booking, Defendant was informed that he was required to provide a DNA sample by swabbing the inside of his cheek. Defendant refused and was later convicted of both the arson-related felonies and the misdemeanor offense of refusing to provide a specimen required by the DNA Act. After the case was remanded, the Court of Appeal reversed Defendant’s misdemeanor refusal conviction on the ground that the DNA Act violates the state Constitution’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was reasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and Cal. Const. art. I, 13 to require Defendant to swab his cheek as part of a routine jail booking procedure following a valid arrest for felony arson; and (2) therefore, Defendant was subject to the statutory penalties prescribed in Cal. Penal Code 298.1. View "People v. Buza" on Justia Law

Statutory developments warranted modification of a settlement order between Petitioner and the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) to relieve the Board of any obligation to calculate “base terms” of an inmate serving an indeterminate sentence for use at the inmate’s initial parole hearing.Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in December 2012 against the Board seeking to avoid parole determinations leading to grossly disproportionate prison terms. An ensuing settlement agreement required the Board to calculate “base terms” under the agreement. At the time of the agreement, “base terms” governed the earliest possible release date for inmates serving indeterminate sentences. Since then, statutory developments altered the statutory landscape such that “base terms” no longer governed the release dates of inmates subject to indeterminate sentences. The Court of Appeal concluded that the settlement order could remain in force despite the statutory changes. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the elimination of “base term” calculations from any statutory role in determining release dates for those sentenced to indeterminate terms was a sufficiently material change that it required modification of the settlement by the Court of Appeal; and (2) the Board was not constitutionally required to continue calculating base terms as required in the settlement order. View "In re Butler" on Justia Law

Statutory developments warranted modification of a settlement order between Petitioner and the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) to relieve the Board of any obligation to calculate “base terms” of an inmate serving an indeterminate sentence for use at the inmate’s initial parole hearing.Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in December 2012 against the Board seeking to avoid parole determinations leading to grossly disproportionate prison terms. An ensuing settlement agreement required the Board to calculate “base terms” under the agreement. At the time of the agreement, “base terms” governed the earliest possible release date for inmates serving indeterminate sentences. Since then, statutory developments altered the statutory landscape such that “base terms” no longer governed the release dates of inmates subject to indeterminate sentences. The Court of Appeal concluded that the settlement order could remain in force despite the statutory changes. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the elimination of “base term” calculations from any statutory role in determining release dates for those sentenced to indeterminate terms was a sufficiently material change that it required modification of the settlement by the Court of Appeal; and (2) the Board was not constitutionally required to continue calculating base terms as required in the settlement order. View "In re Butler" on Justia Law

Defendant was not eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47 because if Proposition 47 had been in effect when Defendant committed his offense in 2007, he would still be guilty of a felony not covered by Proposition 47.Proposition 47, enacted in 2014, reduced certain drug- and theft-related offenses from felonies to misdemeanors and authorized inmates currently serving sentences for a reclassified crime to petition the court for resentencing. As relevant to this appeal, Defendant filed a petition for resentencing on a felony conviction of transportation of methamphetamine. The trial court found Defendant ineligible for resentencing on the transportation offense. On appeal, the court of appeal held, among other things, that only offenders convicted of a felony offense enumerated in Proposition 47’s resentencing provision may have their crimes reduced to misdemeanors. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the mere fact that former Cal. Health & Safety Code 11379 is not one of the code sections enumerated in Cal. Penal Code 1170.18(a) is not fatal to Defendant’s petition for resentencing on his transportation offense; but (2) the court of appeals correctly found that Defendant was ineligible for resentencing because if Proposition 47 had been in effect when he committed his offense in 2007, he would still be guilty of a felony not covered by Proposition 47. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Universities have a special relationship with their students and a duty to protect them from foreseeable violence during curricular activities.Damon Thompson, a student at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), stabbed fellow student Katherine Rosen during a chemistry lab. Thompson was experiencing auditory hallucinations, and school administrators had attempted to provide him with mental health treatment. Rosen sued UCLA and several of its employees (collectively, UCLA), alleging negligence for UCLA’s failure to protect her from Thompson’s foreseeable violent conduct. UCLA moved for summary judgment, arguing that colleges have no duty to protect their adult students from criminal acts. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeal granted UCLA’s petition for writ of mandate, ruling that UCLA owed no duty to protect Rosen. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that universities owe a duty to protect students from foreseeable violence during curricular activities. View "Regents of University of California v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law