Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Leticia Flethez, a former employee of San Bernardino County, filed an application with San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Association (SBCERA) for a service-related disability retirement and allowance. In 2010, SBCERA granted Flethez’s application for service-related disability retirement benefits, effective as of the date of his initial application in 2008. Flethez challenged the starting date for his benefits. An administrative hearing was held, but SBCERA maintained the original 2008 date as the effective date of Flethez’s disability retirement benefits. Flethez filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking a writ ordering SBCERA to grant him service-related disability retirement benefits effective as of his last day of work with the County. The superior court issued a peremptory writ ordering SBCERA to grant Flethez a service-connected disability retirement allowance retroactive to 2000. As part of Flethez’s damages, the superior court awarded Flethez prejudgment interest under Cal. Civil Code 3287(a), to be retroactively calculated from the same starting date. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment to the extent it awarded section 3287(a) interest on all of Flethez’s retroactive disability retirement benefits starting from the first date of those benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court erred in its award of prejudgment interest. View "Flethez v. San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Ass’n" on Justia Law

Petitioner requested disclosure of thirty-two categories of public records from the City of San Jose, its redevelopment agency and executive director, and other elected officials and their staffs, seeking documents concerning redevelopment efforts in downtown San Jose. Included in the request was emails and text messages sent or received on private electronic devices used by the mayor, two city council members, and their staffs. The City disclosed certain communications but did not disclose communications made suing the individuals’ personal accounts. Petitioner sued for declaratory relief under the California Public Records Act (CPRA), arguing that messages communicated through personal accounts are public records. The trial court granted summary judgment for Petitioner and ordered disclosure. The Court of Appeal, however, issued a writ of mandate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a city employee’s writings about public business are not excluded from CPRA simply because they have been sent, received, or stored in a personal account. Remanded. View "City of San Jose v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of assault by a life prisoner with malice aforethought, and possession of a sharp instrument by a prisoner. The jury also found that Defendant had suffered two prior felony convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law. The jury returned a death verdict. The trial court sentenced Defendant accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) no reversible error occurred during either the guilt phase or penalty phase of trial; and (2) Defendant’s attacks on the constitutionality of California’s death penalty statute and related standard jury instructions were unavailing. View "People v. Delgado" on Justia Law

In 1995, the Fish and Game Commission added to the list of endangered species coho salmon in streams south of San Francisco. In 2004, it joined this coho population with coho from San Francisco north to Punta Gorda. Since then, the Commission has included coho salmon south of Punta Gorda in its endangered species list. In this case, Plaintiffs filed a petition asking the Commission to delist coho salmon south of San Francisco from the list of endangered species, arguing that these fish did not qualify for listing because they were not “native” within the meaning of the California Endangered Species Act. The court of appeal denied relief on a procedural basis, concluding that Plaintiffs’ argument attacked the Commission’s final listing decisions in 1995 and 2004 as having no basis and that a petition to delist a species may not be employed to challenge a final determination of the Commission. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a delisting petition may, based upon new evidence, challenge an earlier listing decision; and (2) therefore, the court of appeal incorrectly limited the scope of the delisting petition. View "Central Coast Forest Ass’n v. Fish & Game Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Bakewell Hawthorne, LLC and JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, claiming that he fell and was injured on property owned by Bakewell and leased by Chase. Plaintiff made no disclosure of expert witnesses, but in response to Bakewell’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff submitted the declarations of two experts. Bakewell objected to the introduction of these declarations. The trial court sustained the objection because Plaintiff had failed to disclose the experts. The court then granted summary judgment for Bakewell. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when the time of exchanging expert witness information has expired before a party moves for summary judgment, and a party objects to a declaration from an undisclosed expert, the admissibility of the expert’s opinion must be determined before the summary judgment motion is resolved. View "Perry v. Bakewell Hawthorne, LLC" on Justia Law

Johnny Morales was sentenced to death. Appellate counsel filed in the superior court a “Motion to Preserve Files, Records, Evidence and Other Items Related to Automatic Appeal” seeking an order seeking preservation of several types of materials. Appellate counsel cited in support her responsibilities under a Supreme Court policy that, until habeas corpus counsel is appointed, Appellate counsel’s responsibilities include “preserv[ing] evidence that comes to the attention of appellate counsel if that evidence appears relevant to a potential habeas corpus investigation.” The superior court granted the motion in its entirety. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ directing the superior court to vacate its preservation order and enter a new order denying the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a superior court has jurisdiction to grant a motion to preserve evidence relating to a capital case then pending review on automatic appeal to the Supreme Court, limited to evidence potentially discoverable under Cal. Penal Code 1054.9. View "People v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County" on Justia Law

During a three-year period, Defendant outbid Plaintiffs on twenty-three public works contracts to apply a slurry seal coating on various roadways in California. Plaintiffs jointly sued Defendant in five counties for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The Riverside complaint - the only tort action at issue in this appeal - alleged that Defendant won six public works contracts on which either plaintiff was the second lowest bidder and that Plaintiffs’ bids would have been accepted but for Defendant’s wrongful conduct during the bidding process. The trial court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to the entire cause of action. The appellate court reversed as to the tortious interference claim, determining that Plaintiffs’ pleading was adequate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the demurrer was properly sustained because, under the highly regulated circumstances regarding these public works contracts, Plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficient. View "Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possessing cocaine base for sale and placed on three years of probation. The terms of Defendant’s probation barred him from possessing firearms or illegal drugs. Defendant offered no objection to either condition. Defendant appealed, arguing that these conditions were unconstitutionally vague on their face because they did not explicitly define the mens rea required to sustain a violation of probation. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the firearms and narcotics conditions did not need to be modified to bar “knowing” possession. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the probation conditions afford Defendant fair notice of the conduct required of him because they already include an implicit requirement of knowing possession. View "People v. Hall" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the course of a robbery with personal use of a deadly weapon. Defendant was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no Pitchess error; (2) the trial court did not err in its jury selection rulings; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting Defendant’s incriminating recorded statements, as the statements were voluntarily given; (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for severance; (5) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting photographs of the victim; (6) any error in the stationing of a deputy near the witness stand during Defendant’s testimony was harmless; (7) no prejudicial error occurred during the penalty phase of trial; (8) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s automatic motion to modify the death verdict; and (9) California’s use of the death penalty does not violate international norms of evolving standards of decency in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. View "People v. Winbush" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the Insurance Commissioner’s 2011 regulation (the Regulation) covering replacement cost estimates for homeowners insurance. A few weeks before the Regulation was to become effective, Association of California Insurance Companies and the Personal Insurance Federation of California (collectively, the Association) filed a complaint for declaratory relief challenging the validity of the Regulation. The trial court invalidated the Regulation, concluding that the Regulation exceeded the Commissioner’s authority by attempting to define additional acts or practices by regulation rather than by the procedure set out in Cal. Ins. Code 790.06. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cal. Ins. Code 790.10 explicitly vests in the Commissioner authority to issue “reasonable rules and regulations” to administer the Unfair Insurance Practices Act, and this statutory authority supported the Regulation. View "Association of California Insurance Cos. v. Jones" on Justia Law