Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Penal Code section 424 applies to "[e]ach officer of this state, or of any county, city, town, or district of this state, and every other person charged with the receipt, safekeeping, transfer, or disbursement of public moneys." The court held that section 424 applies only to those public officers imbued with such responsibility over public moneys. In this case, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict finding defendant, who served as superintendent of the District, was charged with the "receipt, safekeeping, transfer, or disbursement" of public funds. The evidence demonstrated that defendant had explicit contractual responsibilities to oversee the "budget and business affairs" of the District, testimony that superintendents like defendant owe a duty to safeguard school district funds, and defendant‘s responsibility to ensure such public funds were spent in accordance with the law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "People v. Hubbard" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to felony possession of heroin and was sentenced to 16 months in prison. Defendant was given credit for time served, including conduct credits, of 220 days. Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (d), provides that a person who has been resentenced under the measure and given credit for time served “shall be subject to parole for one year following completion of his or her sentence, unless the court, in its discretion, as part of its resentencing order, releases the person from parole.” The court concluded that credit for time served does not reduce the parole period. When it voted on Proposition 47, the electorate was informed, and it intended, that a person who benefited from the new legislation by receiving a reduced sentence would be placed on parole for one year after completion of the reduced sentence, subject to the court's discretion to release the person from that parole. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Morales" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was injured, he sought benefits from Defendant-insurer under an indemnity benefit policy. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit alleging that Defendant breached the insurance contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The jury awarded Plaintiff $31,500 in unpaid policy benefits, $35,000 in damages for emotional distress, and $19 million in punitive damages. The parties stipulated that the amount of attorney fees to which Plaintiff was entitled under Brandt v. Superior Court was $12,500, and the court awarded that amount. Defendant moved for a new trial seeking a reduction in the punitive damages award on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally excessive. The trial court granted the motion and reduced the jury’s award to a 10-to-1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. In so doing, the court considered only the $35,000 damages award but did not include the $12,500 in Brandt fees. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in determining whether a punitive damages award is unconstitutionally excessive, Brandt fees may be included in the calculation of the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, regardless of whether the fees are awarded by the trier of fact as part of its verdict or are determined after the verdict has been rendered. Remanded. View "Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Legislature specified that any amendments to a measure submitted for comment must be “reasonably germane to the theme, purpose, or subject of the initiative measure as originally proposed.” At issue is the scope of Elections Code provisions enacted in 2014, which created a new process by which a proposed initiative measure is submitted for public comment. In this case, proponents decided to amend their measure, deleting some provisions and adding others that were supported by Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. Challengers sought a writ of mandate requiring the Attorney General to reject the amendments. The trial court granted the writ. The proponents, joined by the Governor, sought emergency relief in this court. The court granted the requested relief and directed the trial court to vacate its judgment. The court concluded that the legislative history and statutory language demonstrate that the Legislature intended the comment period to facilitate feedback, not to create a broad public forum. Nor did the Legislature preclude substantive amendments. The court concluded that, while the new process imposes time constraints on various governmental functions, the constraints are similar to those that existed under the former statutory scheme. In particular, the Legislature continued existing law relating to fiscal analyses of the impacts of proposed measures. View "Brown v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger, in violation of Penal Code section 21310, after a police officer found a Swiss Army knife in defendant's jacket pocket. The Court of Appeal reversed. The court found that the prosecution‘s expert demonstrated that the exposed blade of defendant‘s Swiss Army knife was not fixed or immobile and could be closed simply by applying pressure to the back of the blade. Therefore, the court concluded that the blade was not "locked into position" within the meaning of section 16470, and the knife was not a prohibited dirk or dagger. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Castillolopez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder with personal use of a firearm and sentenced to death. Defendant admitted the truth of a special circumstance allegation that he had a prior murder conviction. Defendant was seventeen-years-old when he committed the prior murder, but was tried and convicted as an adult. The court concluded that when a murder committed by a juvenile results in an adult criminal conviction, there is no legal proscription against the use of that conviction as a special circumstance if the defendant murders a second victim after reaching the age of majority. In this case, defendant‘s argument fails to distinguish sufficiently between the permissible use of his prior juvenile murder as an aggravating circumstance and its allegedly improper use as a special circumstance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Defendant, sixteen-years-old at the time of the offense, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in state prison with the possibility of parole after 50 years. After plaintiff was sentenced, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama that the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits a mandatory life without parole (LWOP) sentence for a juvenile offender who commits homicide. This court then held in People v. Caballero that the prohibition on life without parole sentences for all juvenile nonhomicide offenders established in Graham v. Florida applied to sentences that were the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence, including Caballero‘s term of 110 years to life. In this case, the court held that Penal Code section 3051 and section 4801 moot defendant‘s constitutional challenge to his sentence by requiring that he receive a parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration. In light of this holding, the court need not decide whether a life sentence with parole eligibility after 50 years of incarceration is the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence and, if so, whether it is unconstitutional in defendant‘s case. Therefore, the court affirmed the sentence. The court remanded so that the trial court may determine whether defendant was afforded sufficient opportunity to make a record at sentencing of mitigating evidence tied to his youth. View "People v. Franklin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murdering his wife, petitioned for habeas relief contending that he is entitled to relief under the 2014 legislative revision of Penal Code section 1473. The Legislature amended section 1473 to state that - "'false evidence‘ shall include opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific research or technological advances." The court concluded that it is reasonably probable that the false evidence presented by the prosecution's dental expert at petitioner‘s 1997 jury trial affected the outcome of that proceeding. The expert had recanted his expert opinion testimony at trial that a lesion on the wife's hand was a human bite mark matching petitioner‘s unusual teeth. Accordingly, the court granted the petition. View "People v. Richards" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured by exposure to asbestos products, he filed suit against a raw asbestos supplier (Special Electric) for failure to warn him about the danger. At issue is the extent of the supplier's duty to warn. Under the sophisticated intermediary doctrine, the supplier can discharge this duty if it conveys adequate warnings to the material's purchaser (in this case, Johns-Manville), or sells to a sufficiently sophisticated purchaser, and reasonably relies on the purchaser to convey adequate warnings to others, including those who encounter the material in a finished product. Special Electric arguably forfeited the sophisticated intermediary defense by failing to present it to the jury. However, assuming the defense was preserved, the record does not establish as a matter of law that Special Electric discharged its duty to warn by reasonably relying on a sophisticated intermediary. The evidence is disputed about whether Special Electric consistently provided warnings to Johns-Manville during the relevant time frame; although the record clearly shows Johns-Manville was aware of the risks of asbestos in general, no evidence established it knew about the particularly acute risks posed by the crocidolite asbestos Special Electric supplied; plaintiffs presented evidence that at least one Special Electric salesperson told customers crocidolite was safer than other types of asbestos fiber, when the opposite was true; and the record does not establish as a matter of law that Special Electric actually and reasonably relied on Johns-Manville to warn end users like plaintiff about the dangers of asbestos. Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court did not err in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict because substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict against Special Electric. View "Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose. At issue is whether misdemeanor sexual battery is a lesser include offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose. The court concluded that the trial court erred by holding that misdemeanor sexual battery is a lesser included offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose, so that convictions of the greater offense could be reduced to the lesser. Here, the evidence failed to show that two of the victims' consent was negated by misrepresentation. That evidence was equally insufficient to establish lack of consent for purposes of misdemeanor sexual battery. Lack of consent may be shown in other ways to prove the misdemeanor offense, but the jury did not consider alternate grounds. Moreover, a charge of sexual battery under Penal Code section 243.4(c) does not notify the defendant of the need to contest the consent issue on any basis other than the alleged fraudulent representation. Therefore, misdemeanor sexual battery cannot be deemed a lesser included offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose. The court reversed and remanded. View "People v. Robinson" on Justia Law