Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger, in violation of Penal Code section 21310, after a police officer found a Swiss Army knife in defendant's jacket pocket. The Court of Appeal reversed. The court found that the prosecution‘s expert demonstrated that the exposed blade of defendant‘s Swiss Army knife was not fixed or immobile and could be closed simply by applying pressure to the back of the blade. Therefore, the court concluded that the blade was not "locked into position" within the meaning of section 16470, and the knife was not a prohibited dirk or dagger. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Castillolopez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder with personal use of a firearm and sentenced to death. Defendant admitted the truth of a special circumstance allegation that he had a prior murder conviction. Defendant was seventeen-years-old when he committed the prior murder, but was tried and convicted as an adult. The court concluded that when a murder committed by a juvenile results in an adult criminal conviction, there is no legal proscription against the use of that conviction as a special circumstance if the defendant murders a second victim after reaching the age of majority. In this case, defendant‘s argument fails to distinguish sufficiently between the permissible use of his prior juvenile murder as an aggravating circumstance and its allegedly improper use as a special circumstance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Defendant, sixteen-years-old at the time of the offense, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in state prison with the possibility of parole after 50 years. After plaintiff was sentenced, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama that the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits a mandatory life without parole (LWOP) sentence for a juvenile offender who commits homicide. This court then held in People v. Caballero that the prohibition on life without parole sentences for all juvenile nonhomicide offenders established in Graham v. Florida applied to sentences that were the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence, including Caballero‘s term of 110 years to life. In this case, the court held that Penal Code section 3051 and section 4801 moot defendant‘s constitutional challenge to his sentence by requiring that he receive a parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration. In light of this holding, the court need not decide whether a life sentence with parole eligibility after 50 years of incarceration is the functional equivalent of an LWOP sentence and, if so, whether it is unconstitutional in defendant‘s case. Therefore, the court affirmed the sentence. The court remanded so that the trial court may determine whether defendant was afforded sufficient opportunity to make a record at sentencing of mitigating evidence tied to his youth. View "People v. Franklin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murdering his wife, petitioned for habeas relief contending that he is entitled to relief under the 2014 legislative revision of Penal Code section 1473. The Legislature amended section 1473 to state that - "'false evidence‘ shall include opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific research or technological advances." The court concluded that it is reasonably probable that the false evidence presented by the prosecution's dental expert at petitioner‘s 1997 jury trial affected the outcome of that proceeding. The expert had recanted his expert opinion testimony at trial that a lesion on the wife's hand was a human bite mark matching petitioner‘s unusual teeth. Accordingly, the court granted the petition. View "People v. Richards" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured by exposure to asbestos products, he filed suit against a raw asbestos supplier (Special Electric) for failure to warn him about the danger. At issue is the extent of the supplier's duty to warn. Under the sophisticated intermediary doctrine, the supplier can discharge this duty if it conveys adequate warnings to the material's purchaser (in this case, Johns-Manville), or sells to a sufficiently sophisticated purchaser, and reasonably relies on the purchaser to convey adequate warnings to others, including those who encounter the material in a finished product. Special Electric arguably forfeited the sophisticated intermediary defense by failing to present it to the jury. However, assuming the defense was preserved, the record does not establish as a matter of law that Special Electric discharged its duty to warn by reasonably relying on a sophisticated intermediary. The evidence is disputed about whether Special Electric consistently provided warnings to Johns-Manville during the relevant time frame; although the record clearly shows Johns-Manville was aware of the risks of asbestos in general, no evidence established it knew about the particularly acute risks posed by the crocidolite asbestos Special Electric supplied; plaintiffs presented evidence that at least one Special Electric salesperson told customers crocidolite was safer than other types of asbestos fiber, when the opposite was true; and the record does not establish as a matter of law that Special Electric actually and reasonably relied on Johns-Manville to warn end users like plaintiff about the dangers of asbestos. Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court did not err in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict because substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict against Special Electric. View "Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose. At issue is whether misdemeanor sexual battery is a lesser include offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose. The court concluded that the trial court erred by holding that misdemeanor sexual battery is a lesser included offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose, so that convictions of the greater offense could be reduced to the lesser. Here, the evidence failed to show that two of the victims' consent was negated by misrepresentation. That evidence was equally insufficient to establish lack of consent for purposes of misdemeanor sexual battery. Lack of consent may be shown in other ways to prove the misdemeanor offense, but the jury did not consider alternate grounds. Moreover, a charge of sexual battery under Penal Code section 243.4(c) does not notify the defendant of the need to contest the consent issue on any basis other than the alleged fraudulent representation. Therefore, misdemeanor sexual battery cannot be deemed a lesser included offense of sexual battery by misrepresentation of professional purpose. The court reversed and remanded. View "People v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants alleging claims of medical malpractice and then later filed a claim for elder abuse. At issue is whether the definition of neglect under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, Welf. & Inst. Code, 15600 et seq., applies when a health care provider - delivering care on an outpatient basis - fails to refer an elder patient to a specialist. The court concluded that the Act does not apply unless the defendant health care provider had a substantial caretaking or custodial relationship, involving ongoing responsibility for one or more basic needs, with the elder patient. It is the nature of the elder or dependent adult‘s relationship with the defendant - not the defendant‘s professional standing - that makes the defendant potentially liable for neglect. In this case, because defendants did not have a caretaking or custodial relationship with the decedent, the court found that plaintiffs cannot adequately allege neglect under the Elder Abuse Act. Plaintiffs rely solely on defendants‘ allegedly substandard provision of medical treatment, on an outpatient basis, to an elder. But without more, such an allegation does not support the conclusion that neglect occurred under the Elder Abuse Act. View "Winn v. Pioneer Med. Grp." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with carrying a loaded firearm on his person. The charge stemmed from an incident in which Defendant was wearing a backpack containing a loaded revolver while being pursued by a police officer. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the firearm was not carried “on the person.” The court of appeal reversed, holding that a person wearing a backpack containing a firearm carries the firearm on his person. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the backpack was on Defendant’s person and, accordingly, anything inside that backpack was also on his person. View "People v. Wade" on Justia Law

In a joint trial with her codefendant, Defendant was convicted of premeditated murder and attempted premeditated murder. The court of appeal reversed Defendant’s convictions, concluding (1) the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding a testifying defendant’s failure to explain or deny incriminating trial evidence; (2) the trial court erred in admitting Defendant’s codefendant’s out-of-court statement that he and Defendant went to shoot some gang members; and (3) the prosecution committed misconduct during closing argument in commenting about the reasonable doubt standard. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court properly gave the instruction at issue; (2) the trial court properly admitted the codefendant’s out-of-court statement; and (3) the prosecution’s comments on reasonable doubt did not constitute misconduct. View "People v. Cortez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated an unlawful detainer action against Defendant. The jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. Defendant’s attorney then substituted out of the case, and Defendant proceeded with self-representation. Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees. Defendant’s appeals from the underlying judgment and from the attorney fees award were consolidated. In a separately filed action in which Defendant was the plaintiff, the Court of Appeal declared Defendant a vexatious litigant plaintiff. Consequently, the presiding judge in the instant case directed Defendant to obtain permission to continue the Chan v. John consolidated appeal or to file a substitution of attorney before proceeding further. Defendant sought to vacate the prefiling order. The presiding judge declared that the court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the prefiling motion and dismissed Defendant’s consolidated appeals. The Court of Appeal vacated the appellate division’s order, holding that a defendant’s status as a vexatious litigant plaintiff in one matter cannot limit the same defendant’s ability to pursue her appeal in an action she did not initiate as a plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 391.7’s prefiling requirements do not apply to a self-represented vexatious litigant’s appeal of a judgment or interlocutory order in an action in which she was the defendant. View "John v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law