Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants Orlando Gene Romero and Christopher Self were convicted of three counts of first-degree murder, four counts of premeditated attempted murder, and numerous other crimes. The trial court entered judgments of death. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Self’s conviction for the robbery of Albert Knoefler on the basis that the testimony of an accomplice that Self robbed Knoefler was not corroborated; (2) vacated five multiple-murder special-circumstance findings for each defendant, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to make two multiple-murder special-circumstance findings as to each count of murder; and (3) otherwise affirmed the judgments, holding that no other prejudicial error occurred. View "People v. Romero" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery and first degree murder, among other charges. The jury returned a verdict of death for the murder, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in its entirety, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the use of leg restraints during trial; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing one juror during trial and another juror during deliberations; (3) the trial court did not err in instructing the jury; (4) the trial court’s responses to the jury’s requests for clarification regarding the law of conspiracy was not in error; (5) Defendant’s claim that the jury was coerced into reaching a verdict was without merit; (6) no prejudicial error occurred during the penalty phase; (7) Defendant’s challenge to California’s death penalty statute failed; and (8) Defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly imposed restitution without considering his ability to pay failed. View "People v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder. While this appeal was pending, the United States District Court for the Central District of California issued its opinion in Jones v. Chappell, which held that systemic delays in implementing the California death penalty law rendered it unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the guilt and penalty phase judgments in their entirety, holding (1) any evidentiary errors did not require reversal under either state law or federal law; (2) Defendant’s claim of judicial misconduct was forfeited for appeal; (3) certain of Defendant’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct during the guilt phase were forfeited, other prosecutorial misconduct claims were without merit, and while the prosecutor committed misconduct in other instances, the misconduct was harmless; (4) the jury instructions were not in error; (5) no prejudicial misconduct occurred during the penalty phase; (6) a Jones claim has not been proved here; and (7) Defendant’s constitutional challenges to California’s death penalty statute failed. View "People v. Seumanu" on Justia Law

The supervisor of Plaintiff, a firefighter, maintained a “daily log” regarding the employees he supervised. The daily log consisted of notes that memorialized the supervisor’s thoughts and observations of employees, which he used as a memory aid in preparing performance plans and reviews. Plaintiff and the Orange County Professional Firefighters Association filed suit seeking to require Defendants to comply with Cal. Gov't Code 3255 before including adverse comments in Plaintiff’s personnel files. Specifically at issue was whether section 3255, which gives a firefighter the right to review and respond to any negative comment entered into his or her personnel file “or any other file used for any personnel purposes by his or her employer,” gave Plaintiff the right to review and respond to negative comments in the supervisor’s daily log. The Court of Appeal concluded that section 3255 required that Plaintiff be given an opportunity to respond to the negative comments in the log before they were made known to the employer. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the log was not shared with or available to anyone other than the supervisor who wrote the log, it did not constitute a file “used for any personnel purposes by his or her employer,” and therefore, section 3255 did not apply. View "Poole v. Orange County Fire Auth." on Justia Law

This case concerned an insured’s assignment of the right to invoke defense and indemnification coverage under a liability policy issued by Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company. The Supreme Court held in Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., a case decided on similar facts, that the consent-to-assignment clause was enforceable and precluded the insured’s transfer of the right to invoke coverage without the insurer’s consent even after the coverage-triggering event had already occurred. At issue here was whether Cal. Ins. Code 520 - a statute that was not considered by the Court when it Henkel - changes the Court’s determination in Henkel. Section 520 specifically restricts an insurer’s ability to limit an insured’s right to transfer or assign a claim for insurance coverage. The court of appeal below concluded that section 520 does not apply to liability insurance and that, even assuming the statute applies, it should be construed to reflect the same rule articulated in Henkel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in light of the relevant language and history of section 520, the statute applies to third party liability insurance and bars an insurer from refusing to honor an insured’s assignment of policy coverage regarding injuries that predate the assignment; and (2) consequently, the decision in Henkel cannot stand. View "Fluor Corp. v. Superior Court of Orange County" on Justia Law

Client advanced Attorney funds to cover attorney’s fees in litigation. After Client terminated the representation, Attorney refused to return the unearned attorney’s fees. Attorney demurred on the ground that the lawsuit was barred by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 340.6(a), which sets forth a one-year limitations period for actions against an attorney for a “wrongful act or omission” arising in the performance of “professional services.” The trial court sustained the demurrer, concluding that section 340.6(a) applied to Client’s claims and that she filed her complaint more than one year after Attorney informed her that he would not return her money. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order sustaining Attorney’s demurrer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 340.6(a) applies to a claim when the merits of the claim will necessarily depend on proof that an attorney violated a professional obligation in the course of providing professional services; and (2) in this case, Client’s complaint could be construed to allege a claim for conversion whose ultimate proof at trial may not depend on the assertion that Attorney violated a professional obligation. View "Lee v. Hanley" on Justia Law

In 1998, Defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI) to one count of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child and was committed to Napa State Hospital. In 2011, the Santa Clara County District Attorney petitioned to extend Defendant’s commitment a fourth time. Defendant opposed an extension of his commitment, and defense counsel requested a bench trial. After a bench trial, the trial court entered an order extending Defendant’s commitment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court must advise an NGI defendant personally of his or her right to a jury trial and, before holding a bench trial, must obtain a personal waiver of that right from the defendant unless the court finds that the defendant lacks the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver, in which case defense counsel controls the waiver decision; and (2) the trial court in this case erred in conducting a bench trial that extended Defendant’s commitment because the court did not advise Defendant of his right to a jury trial, did not obtain Defendant’s personal waiver of that right, and did not find substantial evidence that Defendant lacked the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver. Remanded. View "People v. Tran" on Justia Law

In 2006, Defendant was declared a mentally disordered offender and committed to Atascadero State Hospital as a condition of parole. In 2011, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a third petition to extend Defendant’s commitment. Defendant opposed an extension of his commitment, and defense counsel requested a bench trial. After a bench trial, the trial court extended Defendant’s commitment. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to advise him of the right to a jury trial and by conducting a bench trial without first obtaining his personal waiver of that right. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in conducting a bench trial that extended Defendant’s commitment, as (1) the statutory scheme that governs mentally disordered offender commitment proceedings expressly provides for advisement and waiver of the right to a jury trial; and (2) the trial court did not advise Defendant of his right to a jury trial in this case, did not obtain Defendant’s personal waiver of that right, and did not find that Defendant lacked the capacity to make a knowing and voluntary waiver. Remanded. View "People v. Blackburn" on Justia Law

The negligent driving of a third party driver caused another car to strike a magnolia tree planted on a center median owned and maintained by the City of Los Angeles. The collision with the tree resulted in the deaths or injuries of all of the car’s occupants. Plaintiffs sued the City under Cal. Gov't Code 835, under which a public entity may be held liable for injury proximately caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the risk of injury was reasonably foreseeable and the entity had sufficient notice of the danger to take corrective measures. Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted that the configuration of the roadway was a dangerous condition of public property. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the City, ruling that the magnolia tree did not constitute a dangerous condition of public property because it did not cause the accident that killed the decedents. The court of appeal affirmed, reasoning that Plaintiffs could not show that the magnolia tree contributed to the third party motorist’s criminally negligent driving. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 835 did not require Plaintiffs to show that the allegedly dangerous condition caused not only their decedents’ fatal injuries but also the third party conduct that precipitated the accident. Remanded. View "Cordova v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and related charges. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murders. The Supreme Court struck the sentence enhancements under Cal. Penal Code 186.22(b)(1) from the sentences imposed for actively participating in a gang in counts 3, 5, 7, 10, and 14, and affirmed the judgment in all other respects, holding (1) no prejudicial error occurred with regard to Defendant’s convictions arising out of the murder of either victim; (2) no prejudicial error occurred with regard to Defendant’s conviction arising out of the shootings of two other individuals and the related charge of active participation in a gang on an aiding and abetting theory; (3) it was improper to add to each of Defendant’s convictions for the crime of gang participation a sentence enhancement for committing the crime for the benefit of a gang under section 186.22(b)(1); (4) no prejudicial error occurred during the guilt phase or penalty phase; (5) Defendant’s challenges to California’s death penalty law were without merit; and (6) no reversal was warranted due to the cumulative effect of nonprejudicial errors during guilt and penalty phase. View "People v. Nguyen" on Justia Law