Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The testator in this case prepared a holographic will providing that, if he and his wife died at the same time, specific charities would inherit his estate and providing that his wife would inherit his estate if he predeceased her. The will contained no provision addressing the disposition of the testator’s estate if he lived longer than his wife. The testator’s wife predeceased him. The courts below entered judgment in favor of the heirs at law and against the charities, finding that the testator died intestate. Specifically, the courts excluded extrinsic evidence of the testator’s intent, concluding that the will was unambiguous and failed to provide for the circumstance in which the testator’s wife predeceased him. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an unambiguous will may be reformed to conform to the testator’s intent if clear and convincing evidence establishes that the will contains a mistake in the expression of the testator’s intent at the time the will was drafted and also establishes the testator’s actual specific intent at the time the will was drafted. Remanded for the trial court’s consideration of extrinsic evidence. View "In re Estate of Duke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants for breach of contract and related claims. Defendants failed to file a responsive pleading, and the clerk entered Defendants’ default. The court then entered a default judgment. Defendants filed an application for relief from default under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 473(b) based on their attorney’s “sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” The superior court denied the motion. Thereafter, Defendants filed a renewed application for relief from default. Accompaying both applications were affidavits submitted by Defendants’ attorney explaining his reasons for the default. Although Defendants had not satisfied the requirements of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1008, the superior court granted their renewed application for relief from default, concluding that section Cal. Code Civ. P. 473(b) takes precedence over section 1008, and relief under section 473(b) based on an attorney’s affidavit of fault is mandatory where no part of the fault is shown to be attributable to the attorney’s clients. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that Defendants’ failure to comply with section 1008 required the trial court to reject their renewed application for relief from default. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 1008 governs renewed applications under section 473(b) for relief from default; and (2) Defendants’ renewed application did not satisfy section 1008. View "Even Zohar Constr. & Remodeling v. Bellaire Townhouses" on Justia Law

Cal. Fam. Code 771(a) provides that the “earnings and accumulations of a spouse…,while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse.” On December 30, 2008, Wife filed for dissolution of her marriage from Husband. Wife listed the date of their separation as June 1, 2006 even though she did not move out of the marital home at that date. In response, Husband listed the date of separation as of a few days after Wife’s filing of the petition. The trial court found the date of separation to be June 1, 2006. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that physically living apart is not an “indispensable threshold requirement” for separation under section 771(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 771(a) requires the spouses to be living in separate residences in order for their earnings and accumulations to be their separate property. View "In re Marriage of Davis" on Justia Law

Roy Caputo, Wade Faerber, and Matthew Neel leased commercial space from DKN Holdings LLC and were each jointly and severally liable on this contract. Caputo later sued DKN for, inter alia, breach of contract. DKN cross-complained for monies due. The court rejected Caputo’s claims and awarded $2.8 million in DKN’s cross-complaint. Before the statement of decision in the Caputo action was filed, DKN sued Faerber and Neel for breach of the lease. Faerber demurred, arguing that suit against him was barred by the rule against splitting a cause of action because DKN’s rights under the lease had been adjudicated in the Caputo action. The trial court sustained the demurrer and entered judgment for Faerber. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that a second suit is barred after entry of judgment against one of the contracting parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) joint and several liability does not implicate the “primary rights” doctrine wherein a cause of action arises from the invasion of a primary right and gives rise to only one cause of action; (2) the facts of this case do not support preclusion; and (3) Plaintiff has separate breach of contract claims against each defendant alleged to be jointly and severally liable. View "DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was under what circumstances an accomplice who lacks the intent to kill may qualify as a “major participant” in a felony murder so as to be statutorily eligible for the death penalty. Defendant Lovie Troy Matthews acted as the getaway driver for an armed robby in which Leon Banks and others participated. While escaping, Banks shot one of the robbery victims. After a jury trial, Matthews was found guilty of first degree murder under a felony-murder theory. The jury found true a felony-murder special circumstance. Matthews was sentenced to the mandatory lesser sentence for special circumstance murder, life imprisonment without parole. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the special-circumstance true finding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the special circumstance, and therefore, Matthews was statutorily ineligible for life imprisonment without parole. View "People v. Banks" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder by personal use of a firearm and second degree murder by personal use of a firearm. The jury further found true that Defendant committed the first degree murder while engaged in the commission of a robbery and a kidnapping and kidnapping for robbery. After a second penalty trial, the jury fixed the penalty at death. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death on both murder counts. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment of death as to the second degree murder conviction because death is not an authorized sentence for second degree murder; (2) set aside the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance finding due to instructional error; but (3) affirmed the judgment in all other respects, holding that no other prejudicial error occurred. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

At issue in this criminal case was whether the prosecution’s obligation under Brady v. Maryland and its progeny would be satisfied if it simply informs the defense that the confidential personnel records of police officers might contain Brady material, which would allow the defense to decide for itself whether to seek discovery of that material pursuant to statutory procedures. The superior court denied the prosecution’s motion asking the court to review in camera the personnel records of two San Francisco police officers, potentially important witnesses in this criminal case, to determine whether they contained any material exculpatory information under Brady v. Maryland that was subject to disclosure. The Court of Appeal concluded that the prosecution may and, before the court becomes involved, should itself review the personnel files of peace officer witnesses for Brady material. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prosecution must follow the same procedures that apply to criminal defendants, i.e., make a Pitchess motion, in order to seek information in the confidential personnel records of police officers who are potential witnesses in criminal cases; and (2) the prosecution fulfills its Brady duty if it informs the defense of what the police department informed it, namely, that the specified records might contain exculpatory information. View "People v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In two separate cases in 1998, Defendants were convicted of criminal offenses. The jury sentenced them under the Three Strikes Law. In 2012, the electorate passed Proposition 36, which authorizes prisoners serving third-strike sentences whose current offense is not a serious or violent felony to petition for recall of the sentence and for resentencing as a second-strike case. Defendants petitioned for recall of their sentences. In one case, the trial court denied the petition. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that a prison whose current offense was a serious or violent offense on the effective date of Proposition 36 is not eligible for resentencing. In the second case, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that Defendant’s conviction for a serious felony rendered him ineligible for resentencing with respect to his conviction which was not serious or violent. The Supreme Court affirmed in both cases, holding (1) when a court resentences a third-strike defendant the classification of an offense as serious or violent is based on the law as of the effective date of Proposition 36; and (2) the presence of a current offense that is serious or violent does not disqualify an inmate from resentencing with respect to a current offense that is neither serious nor violent. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of the first degree murders of three victims. A jury was sworn for the penalty phase and returned a verdict of death. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death for the three first degree murders with special circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in its entirety, holding (1) there was no abuse of discretion in the use of physical restraints during Defendant’s transit through the hallways of the courthouse; (2) the trial court did not violate Defendant’s rights to due process and a fair trial when it excluded him from numerous pretrial proceedings and the guilt phase of his trial; (3) Defendant’s waiver of a guilt phase jury was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (4) Defense counsel provided effective assistance; (5) the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings; (6) there was no prejudicial error committed during jury selection; (7) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s automatic application for modification of the death verdict; (8) Defendant’s sentence was not disproportionate; and (9) Defendant’s challenges to the constitutionality of California’s death penalty scheme failed. View "People v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder, sixteen counts of robbery, and three counts of assault with a deadly weapon, and related charges. The jury sentenced Defendant to death. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court improperly excluded three prospective jurors based on their death penalty views. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment of death and remanded the matter for a new penalty determination, holding that written and oral voir dire responses of the three excused panelists did not give the trial court sufficient information to conclude that they were incapable of performing their duties as capital jurors, and therefore, the record did not support the jurors’ dismissals; and (2) affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "People v. Leon" on Justia Law