Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A commercial general liability insurer initially refused to defend its insured against a third-party lawsuit but subsequently provided independent counsel under a reservation of rights (so-called Cumis counsel) to defend its insured in the third party suit. A court order required the insurer to pay defense costs but expressly preserved the insurer’s right to later challenge and recover payments for “unreasonable and unnecessary” charges by counsel. The insurer sought reimbursement, alleging that independent counsel “padded” their bills by charging fees that were, in part, excessive unreasonable and unnecessary. The trial court concluded that the insurer’s right to reimbursement, if any, was from its insureds, not directly from Cumis counsel. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that reimbursement could not be obtained directly from Cumis counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the insurer could seek reimbursement directly from Cumis counsel. View "Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. J.R. Marketing, LLC" on Justia Law

A police officer investigating an emergency call regarding a fight pulled behind Defendant’s parked vehicle and activated the emergency lights on his patrol car. The officer approached and spoke with Defendant, who was sitting behind the wheel of the vehicle, apparently intoxicated. Charged with felony driving under the influence, Defendant moved to suppress evidence of his physical condition, statements, and breath test results as the fruits of an unlawful search. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the officer’s use of emergency lights in this situation constituted a detention of Defendant; and (2) Defendant’s brief detention was supported by reasonable suspicion. View "People v. Brown" on Justia Law

In this dispute over the sale of a car, Plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against Defendant, alleging, inter alia, that Defendant violated the Consumer Legal Remedies Act by making false representations about the condition of the automobile. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the sale contract that had a class action waiver. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the class waiver was unenforceable, and therefore, the entire arbitration agreement was unenforceable. After the trial court’s decision was filed, the United States Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts California’s unconscionability rule prohibiting class waivers in consumer arbitration agreements. On appeal, the Court of Appeal declined to address whether the class waiver at issue was enforceable and instead held that the arbitration appeal provision and the arbitration agreement as a whole were unconscionably one-sided in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeal erred as a matter of state law in finding the agreement unconscionable, as, in light of Concepcion, the FAA preempts the trial court’s invalidation of the class waiver on unconscionability grounds. View "Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC" on Justia Law

At dispute in this case was an environmental impact report (EIR) certified by the Board of Trustees (Board) of the California State University (CSU) that concerned the Board’s project to expand the campus of San Diego State University (SDSU) to accommodate more than 10,000 additional students. The SDSU project will contribute significantly to traffic congestion off-campus in the City of San Diego. The Board declined to use any of its budgeted funds, or any of CSU’s financial resources, for off-site environmental mitigation, finding that mitigation was infeasible. The Court of Appeal directed the Board to vacate its certification of the EIR. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the EIR in this case did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act where the Board erroneously assumed that a state agency may contribute funds for off-site environmental mitigation only through earmarked appropriations, to the exclusion of other available sources of funding. View "City of San Diego v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ." on Justia Law

The testator in this case prepared a holographic will providing that, if he and his wife died at the same time, specific charities would inherit his estate and providing that his wife would inherit his estate if he predeceased her. The will contained no provision addressing the disposition of the testator’s estate if he lived longer than his wife. The testator’s wife predeceased him. The courts below entered judgment in favor of the heirs at law and against the charities, finding that the testator died intestate. Specifically, the courts excluded extrinsic evidence of the testator’s intent, concluding that the will was unambiguous and failed to provide for the circumstance in which the testator’s wife predeceased him. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an unambiguous will may be reformed to conform to the testator’s intent if clear and convincing evidence establishes that the will contains a mistake in the expression of the testator’s intent at the time the will was drafted and also establishes the testator’s actual specific intent at the time the will was drafted. Remanded for the trial court’s consideration of extrinsic evidence. View "In re Estate of Duke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants for breach of contract and related claims. Defendants failed to file a responsive pleading, and the clerk entered Defendants’ default. The court then entered a default judgment. Defendants filed an application for relief from default under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 473(b) based on their attorney’s “sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” The superior court denied the motion. Thereafter, Defendants filed a renewed application for relief from default. Accompaying both applications were affidavits submitted by Defendants’ attorney explaining his reasons for the default. Although Defendants had not satisfied the requirements of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1008, the superior court granted their renewed application for relief from default, concluding that section Cal. Code Civ. P. 473(b) takes precedence over section 1008, and relief under section 473(b) based on an attorney’s affidavit of fault is mandatory where no part of the fault is shown to be attributable to the attorney’s clients. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that Defendants’ failure to comply with section 1008 required the trial court to reject their renewed application for relief from default. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 1008 governs renewed applications under section 473(b) for relief from default; and (2) Defendants’ renewed application did not satisfy section 1008. View "Even Zohar Constr. & Remodeling v. Bellaire Townhouses" on Justia Law

Cal. Fam. Code 771(a) provides that the “earnings and accumulations of a spouse…,while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse.” On December 30, 2008, Wife filed for dissolution of her marriage from Husband. Wife listed the date of their separation as June 1, 2006 even though she did not move out of the marital home at that date. In response, Husband listed the date of separation as of a few days after Wife’s filing of the petition. The trial court found the date of separation to be June 1, 2006. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that physically living apart is not an “indispensable threshold requirement” for separation under section 771(a). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 771(a) requires the spouses to be living in separate residences in order for their earnings and accumulations to be their separate property. View "In re Marriage of Davis" on Justia Law

Roy Caputo, Wade Faerber, and Matthew Neel leased commercial space from DKN Holdings LLC and were each jointly and severally liable on this contract. Caputo later sued DKN for, inter alia, breach of contract. DKN cross-complained for monies due. The court rejected Caputo’s claims and awarded $2.8 million in DKN’s cross-complaint. Before the statement of decision in the Caputo action was filed, DKN sued Faerber and Neel for breach of the lease. Faerber demurred, arguing that suit against him was barred by the rule against splitting a cause of action because DKN’s rights under the lease had been adjudicated in the Caputo action. The trial court sustained the demurrer and entered judgment for Faerber. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that a second suit is barred after entry of judgment against one of the contracting parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) joint and several liability does not implicate the “primary rights” doctrine wherein a cause of action arises from the invasion of a primary right and gives rise to only one cause of action; (2) the facts of this case do not support preclusion; and (3) Plaintiff has separate breach of contract claims against each defendant alleged to be jointly and severally liable. View "DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was under what circumstances an accomplice who lacks the intent to kill may qualify as a “major participant” in a felony murder so as to be statutorily eligible for the death penalty. Defendant Lovie Troy Matthews acted as the getaway driver for an armed robby in which Leon Banks and others participated. While escaping, Banks shot one of the robbery victims. After a jury trial, Matthews was found guilty of first degree murder under a felony-murder theory. The jury found true a felony-murder special circumstance. Matthews was sentenced to the mandatory lesser sentence for special circumstance murder, life imprisonment without parole. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the special-circumstance true finding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the special circumstance, and therefore, Matthews was statutorily ineligible for life imprisonment without parole. View "People v. Banks" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder by personal use of a firearm and second degree murder by personal use of a firearm. The jury further found true that Defendant committed the first degree murder while engaged in the commission of a robbery and a kidnapping and kidnapping for robbery. After a second penalty trial, the jury fixed the penalty at death. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death on both murder counts. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment of death as to the second degree murder conviction because death is not an authorized sentence for second degree murder; (2) set aside the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance finding due to instructional error; but (3) affirmed the judgment in all other respects, holding that no other prejudicial error occurred. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law