Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Until 2007, petroleum refinery property was assessed by separately assessing the value of land and improvements separately from the value of fixtures, including machinery and equipment. In light of evidence that petroleum refinery property, including land, improvements, and fixtures, was generally sold as a unit, the Board of Equalization enacted Cal. Code Regs. tit. 18, 474 (Rule 474), which provides that, for purposes of determining Proposition 8 declines in the value of petroleum refinery property, petroleum refinery property is rebuttably presumed to constitute a single appraisal unit - unlike most industrial property. The Western States Petroleum Association sought to invalidate the regulation. The trial court and court of appeal held that Rule 474 was both substantively and procedurally invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeal erred in finding that Rule 474 was substantively invalid, as the board was not statutorily or constitutionally prohibited from appraising refinery land and fixtures as a single unit; but (2) because the Board failed to provide an adequate assessment of the rule's economic impact, the rule was procedurally deficient under the Administrative Procedures Act. View "W. States Petroleum Ass'n v. Bd. of Equalization" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was whether insurance practices that violate the Unfair Insurance Practices Act (UIPA) can support an Unfair Competition Law (UCL) action. In 1988, the Supreme Court held in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies that the Legislature did not intend to create a private cause of action under the UIPA for commission of various unfair practices listed in Cal. Ins. Code 790.03(h). In this case, Plaintiff sued Insurer for, among other causes of action, violation of California's unfair competition law (UCL) for engaging in false advertising. The trial court concluded that the UCL claim was an impermissible attempt to plead around Moradi-Shalal's bar against private actions for unfair insurance practices under section 790.03. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) private UIPA actions are absolutely barred, and litigants may not rely on the proscriptions of section 790.03 as the basis for a UCL claim; (2) however, when insurers engage in conduct that violates both the UIPA and obligations imposed by other statutes or the common law, a UCL action may lie; and (3) here, Plaintiff alleged causes of action that provided grounds for a UCL claim independent from the UIPA. View "Zhang v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

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Until 2001, the federal Truth in Savings Act (TISA), 12 U.S.C. 4310 et seq., allowed civil damages to be sought for failure to comply with its requirements. The provision authorizing lawsuits was later repealed, however. After Congress's repeal of section 4310, Plaintiffs filed a class action against Bank of America, alleging unlawful and unfair business practices based on violations of TISA disclosure requirements. The trial court sustained the Bank's demurrer, and the court of appeal affirmed, concluding that Congress's repeal of section 4310 reflected its intent to bar any private action to enforce TISA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that TISA posed no impediment to Plaintiffs' claim of unlawful business practice under California's unfair competition law, where by leaving TISA's savings clause in place, Congress explicitly approved the enforcement of state laws such as the unfair competition law.View "Rose v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

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Three trials were held on the State’s petition to commit Defendant for secure confinement and treatment as a sexually violent predatory (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predators Act. After a third jury trial and a second SVP finding, the Court of Appeal overturned the trial court’s judgment, concluding that multiple incidents of prosecutorial misconduct prejudiced Defendant and created a fundamentally unfair trial. The Supreme Court reversed after identifying one clear instance of misconduct and one other instance of arguable misconduct, holding that there was no reasonable probability that these incidents affected the outcome of the third trial, nor did they render the trial fundamentally unfair. Remanded to the Court of Appeal to address several additional claims raised by Defendant. View "People v. Shazier" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, among other crimes. The jury found true the special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed while Defendant was engaged in the commission of rape and oral copulation and the allegation that Defendant personally used a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) juror misconduct occurred during the guilt phase, but Defendant was not prejudiced by that misconduct, and any error in the trial court’s evidentiary rulings was harmless; (2) there was no cumulative effect of error during the guilt phase; (2) there was no error at the penalty phase; and (3) Defendant’s challenges to the constitutionality of California’s death penalty law were without merit. View "People v. Merriman" on Justia Law

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Defendant broadsided at high speed a vehicle driving by Loraine Wong. Wong’s younger daughter, Sydney, was killed, and her older daughter, Kendall, sustained serious injuries. A jury convicted Defendant of vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence and found true the allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on Kendall. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court violated Defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by admitting evidence that Defendant, following his arrest but before receipt of Miranda warnings, failed to inquire about the other people involved in the collision. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-crimination by admitting evidence of Defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda failure to inquire about the welfare of the occupants of the other vehicle. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant needed to make a timely and unambiguous assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in order to benefit from it. Remanded. View "People v. Tom" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial in 1998 Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of attempted murder, among other crimes. The jury found true the allegation that the attempted murder was committed willfully, deliberately and with premeditation. After a penalty phase retrial, the trial court imposed a sentence of death. The Supreme Court reduced the conviction of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder to attempted murder and, in all other respects, affirmed the judgment, holding (1) the trial court did not err in overruling Defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges against three black prospective jurors; (2) the jury was not properly instructed on the meaning of the terms “willful,” “deliberate,” and “premeditated,” and therefore, a reduction of Defendant’s conviction on count two to a conviction for regular attempted murder was warranted; (3) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error in its evidentiary rulings; (4) Defendant failed to establish that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance or that he was denied his right to a fair trial before an unbiased judge; and (5) during the penalty phase, the trial court erred by excluding evidence of institutional failure, evidence regarding Defendant’s antisocial personality disorder, and evidence about lingering doubt, but the errors were harmless. View "People v. Banks" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and kidnapping with the purpose to commit a lewd act on a child under fourteen years old. The jury found true the special circumstance allegation of kidnapping murder and returned a verdict of death. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death on the murder count. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in the trial court’s rulings during the pretrial stage of the proceedings did not influence the verdict; (2) no prejudicial error occurred during the guilt phase; (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion excluding certain statements from the penalty phase; and (4) Defendant’s challenges to California’s death penalty were without merit. View "People v. McCurdy" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and arson of property. The jury found true the special circumstance that Defendant was previously convicted of first degree murder. The trial court imposed the death sentence for the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in its entirety, holding (1) the trial court did not err in granting the prosecution's challenge for cause against a prospective juror; (2) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of two uncharged murders; (3) the jury was properly instructed regarding flight; (4) the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance was valid; (5) the trial court did not err in its penalty phase rulings; and (6) Defendant's challenges to California's death penalty failed. View "People v. Rogers" on Justia Law

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Petitioner was charged in a misdemeanor complaint electronically generated by a superior court clerk with willfully violating her written promise to appear. Petitioner pled no contest to the conviction. Petitioner subsequently challenged the conviction, contending that the complaint was void because it was not issued by an executive branch officer with prosecutorial authority in violation of the California Constitution’s separation of powers and due process clauses. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for writ of mandate, holding the because the relevant prosecutorial agency has, through an established practice, implicitly approved in advance the clerk’s routine issuance of complaints for the offense of failure to appear, the practice is constitutional, and therefore, the complaint in this case is valid. View "Steen v. Appellate Div., Superior Court" on Justia Law