Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was charged in a misdemeanor complaint electronically generated by a superior court clerk with willfully violating her written promise to appear. Petitioner pled no contest to the conviction. Petitioner subsequently challenged the conviction, contending that the complaint was void because it was not issued by an executive branch officer with prosecutorial authority in violation of the California Constitution’s separation of powers and due process clauses. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for writ of mandate, holding the because the relevant prosecutorial agency has, through an established practice, implicitly approved in advance the clerk’s routine issuance of complaints for the offense of failure to appear, the practice is constitutional, and therefore, the complaint in this case is valid. View "Steen v. Appellate Div., Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sale and possession for sale of a controlled substance. At trial, evidence showed that the pills contained 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA). The court of appeal affirmed, holding that although there was not a stipulation or expert testimony showing that MDMA met the definition of a controlled substance or controlled substance analog within the Health and Safety Code, the name supported the inference that the pills contained some quantity of methamphetamine or amphetamine. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidence of MDMA's chemical name, standing alone, was insufficient to prove the material is a controlled substance where MDMA is not listed in the Code.View " People v. Davis" on Justia Law

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. sought to expand its store in the City of Sonora. The City Council postponed its vote on the project while a voter-sponsored initiative was circulated, which proposed to adopt a plan for the contemplated expansion. The Council subsequently adopted the ordinance. The Tuoloumne Jobs & Small Business Alliance sought a writ of mandate based on four causes of action, the first of which asserted that the Council violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by adopting the ordinance without first conducting a complete environmental review. The Court of Appeals granted the writ as to the first cause of action, concluding that when a land use ordinance is proposed in a voter initiative petition, full CEQA review is required if the city adopts the ordinance rather than submitting it to an election. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that CEQA review is not required before direct adoption of an initiative, just as it is not required before voters adopt an initiative at an election. View "Tuolumne Jobs & Small Bus. Alliance v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with committing four lewd acts upon his niece. Before trial, the prosecution offered evidence under Cal. R. Evid. 1108 that Defendant had sexually abused his sister when Defendant was nearly fourteen. Defendant opposed the prosecutor's motion, arguing that the evidence should be excluded because, as a minor under the age of fourteen, he was presumed incapable of committing a crime. The court allowed the evidence. During trial, the trial court did not give an instruction directing the jury to assess Defendant's capacity to commit the offense admitted under section 1108 under Cal. Penal Code 26(1). The jury convicted Defendant on all counts. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court erred by not sua sponte instructing the jury that the prosecution must prove by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct admitted under section 1108. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) proof was required that Defendant knew the conduct at issue was wrongful and was thus capable of committing a crime; and (2) the trial court was not required to sua sponte instruct the jury to consider Defendant's age at the time of his act admitted under section 1108. Remanded. View "People v. Cottone" on Justia Law

In this automatic appeal, defendant was convicted of first degree murder, second degree robbery and escape from jail, and was sentenced to death. The court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying counsel's request for second counsel, that defendant was not prejudiced even if the trial court erred in not appointing counsel, and that defense counsel abandoned his request to withdraw. The court found no error except for instruction on the section 190.2, subdivision (a)(14) special-circumstance allegations, and with respect to this error as well as any error the court has assumed, the court concluded that there was no prejudice. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims. Accordingly, the court vacated the two true findings on the section 190.2, subdivision (a)(14) special circumstance allegations and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Carrasco" on Justia Law

In this automatic appeal, defendant was convicted of one count of attempted willful, premeditated murder; six counts of first degree robbery; three counts of carjacking; one count of first degree burglary; two counts of rape in concert; and two counts of forcible oral copulation. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in joining some of defendant's charges; the court rejected defendant's claims of error during voir dire of prospective jurors, including the trial court's dismissal of 22 prospective jurors who stated that they would be unable or unwilling to impose the death penalty regardless of the evidence; and the court rejected defendant's guilt phase claims and challenges to the death penalty statutes and instructions. The court directed the superior court to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect that defendant's sentence on count 15 is life with the possibility of parole and to forward the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Capistrano" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants for negligence and premises liability, as well as battery. At issue was whether patients suffering from Alzheimer's disease are liable for injuries they inflict on health care workers hired to care for them at home. California and other jurisdictions have established the rule that Alzheimer's patients are not liable for injuries to caregivers in institutional settings. The court concluded that the same rule applies to in-home caregivers who, like their institutional counterparts, are employed specifically to assist these disabled persons; it is a settled principle that those hired to manage a hazardous condition may not sue their clients for injuries caused by the very risks they were retained to confront; the court's opinion is consistent with the strong public policy against confining the disabled in institutions; and the court encouraged the Legislature to focus its attention on the problems associated with Alzheimer's caregiving. View "Gregory v. Cott" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. After the penalty phase, the trial court declared a mistrial because the jury was unable to reach a penalty verdict. After a second penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death. The Supreme Court reversed the death sentence due to prejudicial juror misconduct and affirmed in all other respects, holding (1) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error during the guilt phase; but (2) there was a substantial likelihood that one juror was influenced or biased against Defendant by an improper conversation he had with his pastor during penalty deliberations and that the juror’s vote to impose the death penalty was not based solely on the evidence and instructions. Remanded for retrial of the penalty phase and resentencing on all counts. View "People v. Hensley" on Justia Law

The People filed a complaint against Defendants, Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (Pac Anchor) and Alfredo Barajas, for violating the unfair competition law (UCL), alleging that Defendants misclassified drivers as independent contractors and committed other violations of California’s labor and unemployment insurance laws. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in Defendants’ favor, determining that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempted the People’s action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that because the People’s UCL action was not related to Pac Anchor’s price, route, or service as a motor carrier, the FAAAA did not preempt this action against Defendants. After noting that the FAAAA does not preempt generally applicable employment laws that affect prices, routes, and services, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the FAAAA did not preempt the People’s UCL action against Defendants in this case, as the UCL action was independent of Defendants’ price, routes, or services with respect to the transportation of property. View "People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant, while acting as manager for a motorcycle dealership, arranged for the fraudulent sale of twenty vehicles to fictitious buyers. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of twenty counts of grand theft, one count for each of the vehicles fraudulently sold. On appeal, Defendant argued that he could be convicted of one count of grand theft only because all of the sales were part of a single scheme. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction for the twenty counts of grand theft. At issue before the Supreme Court was the correct interpretation of the language in People v. Bailey, which some courts of appeal have interpreted as permitting only one conviction of grand theft in circumstances such as those presented in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a defendant may be convicted of multiple counts of grand theft based on separate and distinct acts of theft, even if committed pursuant to a single overarching scheme; but (2) the Court cannot not retroactively apply this new rule to Defendant, and therefore, under the law that has existed for decades, Defendant could only have been convicted of a single count of grand theft. View "People v. Whitmer" on Justia Law