Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. After the penalty phase, the trial court declared a mistrial because the jury was unable to reach a penalty verdict. After a second penalty phase, the jury returned a verdict of death. The Supreme Court reversed the death sentence due to prejudicial juror misconduct and affirmed in all other respects, holding (1) the trial court did not commit prejudicial error during the guilt phase; but (2) there was a substantial likelihood that one juror was influenced or biased against Defendant by an improper conversation he had with his pastor during penalty deliberations and that the juror’s vote to impose the death penalty was not based solely on the evidence and instructions. Remanded for retrial of the penalty phase and resentencing on all counts. View "People v. Hensley" on Justia Law

The People filed a complaint against Defendants, Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (Pac Anchor) and Alfredo Barajas, for violating the unfair competition law (UCL), alleging that Defendants misclassified drivers as independent contractors and committed other violations of California’s labor and unemployment insurance laws. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in Defendants’ favor, determining that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempted the People’s action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that because the People’s UCL action was not related to Pac Anchor’s price, route, or service as a motor carrier, the FAAAA did not preempt this action against Defendants. After noting that the FAAAA does not preempt generally applicable employment laws that affect prices, routes, and services, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the FAAAA did not preempt the People’s UCL action against Defendants in this case, as the UCL action was independent of Defendants’ price, routes, or services with respect to the transportation of property. View "People ex rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant, while acting as manager for a motorcycle dealership, arranged for the fraudulent sale of twenty vehicles to fictitious buyers. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of twenty counts of grand theft, one count for each of the vehicles fraudulently sold. On appeal, Defendant argued that he could be convicted of one count of grand theft only because all of the sales were part of a single scheme. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction for the twenty counts of grand theft. At issue before the Supreme Court was the correct interpretation of the language in People v. Bailey, which some courts of appeal have interpreted as permitting only one conviction of grand theft in circumstances such as those presented in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a defendant may be convicted of multiple counts of grand theft based on separate and distinct acts of theft, even if committed pursuant to a single overarching scheme; but (2) the Court cannot not retroactively apply this new rule to Defendant, and therefore, under the law that has existed for decades, Defendant could only have been convicted of a single count of grand theft. View "People v. Whitmer" on Justia Law

During the course of one evening, Defendant and another man burglarized two businesses, robbing several people inside, and killing off-duty peace officer Shayne York. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder with the special circumstances of killing a peace officer in retaliation for the performance of his duties and of murder during the commission of robbery and burglary. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or in instructing the jury during the guilt phase; (2) sufficient evidence supported the finding that Defendant intentionally killed York in retaliation for the lawful performance of his duties, and the special circumstance allegation was constitutional; (3) Defendant’s challenges to the robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances were unavailing; (4) Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to self-representation was not violated at the penalty phase; (5) any error in the instructions during the penalty phase was harmless; and (6) Defendant’s death sentence was proportional and constitutional. View "People v. Boyce" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who formerly worked for Time Warner Cable, Inc. as a commissioned salesperson, filed a class action suit against Time Warner, alleging wage and hour violations. Time Warner paid Plaintiff through biweekly paychecks, which included hourly wages in every pay period and commission wages approximately every other pay period. Time Warner removed the matter to federal court and sought summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding that Time Warner could attribute commission wages paid in one biweekly pay period to other pay periods for the purpose of satisfying California’s compensation requirements. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s asked the Supreme Court to consider the issue. The Supreme Court answered the Ninth Circuit’s question in the negative, holding that an employer may not attribute commission wages paid in one pay period to other pay periods in order to satisfy California’s compensation requirements. View "Peabody v. Time Warner Cable, Inc." on Justia Law

The assumption under the Three Strikes law is that a defendant has had two prior opportunities to reform before being found incorrigible and receiving a life sentence. At issue in this case was whether an offender’s two previous qualifying felony convictions that are closely connected in their commission can nevertheless constitute two separate strikes under the Three Strikes law. Here, Defendant’s two prior felony convictions were tried in the same proceeding, committed during the same course of criminal conduct, based on the same act, and committed as the same time and against the same victim. The trial court concluded that Defendant fell “squarely within the spirit of [Three] Strikes” and denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss one of the prior convictions. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court was required to dismiss one of the prior convictions because failure to do so would be inconsistent with the spirit of the Three Strikes law. Remanded. View "People v. Vargas" on Justia Law

Defendants Reynaldo Junior Eid and Alaor Docarmo Oliveira were charged in an amended information with two counts of kidnapping for ransom, which is punishable by life in prison. A jury found Defendants guilty of the lesser included crimes of attempted extortion and misdemeanor false imprisonment. The trial court sentenced Defendants to four years and six months in custody. Defendants argued on appeal that they could not be convicted of two lesser included offenses of a single greater offense. The court of appeals agreed with Defendants and struck Defendants’ convictions for misdemeanor false imprisonment, thus reducing each Defendant’s sentence to two years and six months. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the jury may convict on more than one uncharged lesser included offense of a single charged greater offense. View "People v. Eid" on Justia Law

Under 28 U.S.C. 1367 federal courts may assume supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims that form part of the same case or controversy. If the federal basis for jurisdiction dissolves but supplemental claims remain, the federal court may dismiss the supplemental claims, requiring them to be refiled in state court. In this event, the limitations is “tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of thirty days after it is dismissed” pursuant to section 1367(d). At issue in this appeal was whether the statute affords parties a grace period or suspends the limitations clock. In the instant case, seventy-eight days after the plaintiff’s supplemental claims were dismissed by a federal court, the plaintiff refiled suit in state court. The court of appeal concluded that the suit was timely, reasoning that section 1367(d) suspended the statute of limitations and tacked on any unexpired time beginning thirty days after dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 1367(d) provides only a thirty-day grace period in which to refile otherwise expired claims. View "City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern" on Justia Law

Plaintiff prevailed at trial in an action for financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. After judgment, Plaintiff brought a separate action seeking to prevent or reverse Defendant’s transfer of real property to third persons. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed the fraudulent transfer action pursuant to an agreement with Defendant. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for costs and attorney fees incurred both on appeal from the elder abuse judgment and in the fraudulent transfer action. The court of appeals concluded that the fees and costs motion was untimely under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 685.040. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) as to attorney fees on appeal from the elder abuse judgment, the motion was not subject to section 685.080 because Plaintiff’s efforts in opposing Defendant’s appeal were not undertaken to enforce the judgment but to defend it against reversal or modification; and (2) Plaintiff’s motion was untimely as to fees incurred enforcing the judgment through the separate fraudulent transfer action because the fees incurred in that action could only be recovered under section 685.040. View "In re Conservatorship of McQueen" on Justia Law

One of the jurors in Defendant’s criminal case prematurely decided to vote guilty, repeatedly talked about the case outside deliberations, prematurely reached a conclusion regarding the veracity of certain testimony, and adopted the mantle of an advocate, repeatedly telling the other jurors that Defendant was guilty. The trial court found that the juror engaged in serious misconduct but that Defendant did not suffer prejudice. Defendant appealed his conviction of two counts of first degree murder and death sentence on the basis of juror misconduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the People did not discharge their burden of establishing that there was no substantial likelihood that the juror was actually biased against Defendant. View "People v. Weatherton" on Justia Law