Justia California Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Under California law, unlawfully carrying a concealed firearm and unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm in public are generally misdemeanors but become felonies when committed by an active participant in a criminal street gang, as defined in Cal. Penal Code 186.22(a). At issue in this case was whether possession of a firearm by a felon, a felony, constitutes “felonious criminal conduct” within the meaning of Cal. Pen. Code 186.22 so as to elevate to felonies the misdemeanor offenses of carrying that concealed firearm and carrying that loaded firearm in public. Defendant in this case was indicted on multiple firearm charges. Defendant argued that a violation of former Cal. Penal Code 12021(a)(1) may not be used to elevate the misdemeanor gun offenses charged in this case to felonies because “the same act of gun possession” cannot be used “to both establish the substantive gang charge and elevate the two otherwise misdemeanor gun offenses to felony gun offenses.” The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal, holding that possession of a firearm by a felon does qualify as “felonious criminal conduct.” View "People v. Infante" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the first degree murder of her husband under the special circumstances of murder by administering poison and murder for financial gain. At the penalty trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Defendant had murdered her infant daughter several years previously. The jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial court imposed that sentence. On appeal, Defendant raised allegations of error regarding primarily pretrial events, guilt trial issues, and penalty issues. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the circuit court did not reversibly err in its rulings and that Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial in this case. View "People v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a hospital staff physician, claimed the hospital’s decision to terminate his staff privileges was an act of retaliation for his reports of substandard performance by hospital nurses and thus a violation of Cal. Health & Safety Code 1278.5. Defendants moved to dismiss on grounds that Plaintiff could not bring a civil suit under section 1278.5 unless he first succeeded by mandamus in overturning the hospital’s action. The appellate court held that Plaintiff could pursue his claims based on section 1278.5 even though he had not previously sought and obtained a mandamus judgment against the hospital’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a physician’s claim that a hospital decision to restrict or terminate his or her staff privileges was an act of retaliation for his or her whistleblowing in furtherance of patient care and safety need not seek and obtain a mandamus petition to overturn the decision before filing a civil action under section 1278.5. View "Fahlen v. Sutter Cent. Valley Hosps." on Justia Law

Defendant was a life inmate. In 2005, the Board of Parole Hearings denied Defendant parole for the ninth time. The superior court ordered a new parole hearing, and in 2008, the Board found Defendant suitable for parole. In 2009, the Governor reversed the grant of parole. Defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging the reversal. While the petition was pending, the Board again found Defendant suitable for parole. The Governor did not review the second decision. Defendant was released from prison subject to a maximum five-year parole term under the relevant statute. The superior court subsequently found that the Board and Governor had acted unlawfully in denying Defendant parole and ordered that he receive credit against his parole term for the period he spent in prison following the Board’s deficient 2005 suitability finding. The court of appeal modified the order to provide credit only for the year-long period between the Governor’s 2009 reversal and Defendant’s release on parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to credit against his parole term for the time he spent in prison between the Governor’s erroneous reversal and his eventual release. View "In re Lira" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder with robbery and multiple-murder special circumstances and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in its entirety, holding (1) no error occurred during the selection of the jury; (2) the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings; (3) changes in the composition of the jury did not violate Defendants rights to trial by an impartial jury; (4) the trial court did not err in instructing the jury; (5) no error occurred during the penalty phase of the trial; and (6) the aspects of California’s death penalty Defendant challenged did not render it unconstitutional. View "People v. Duff" on Justia Law

Stephen Glass, the infamous journalist from the late 1990s who fabricated material for more than forty articles for The New Republic magazine and other publications, passed the California bar examination in 2006 and applied to join the bar. The Committee of Bar Examiners denied the application, determining that Glass did not satisfy California’s moral fitness test. The State Bar Court’s hearing department, however, found that Glass had established the good moral character to be admitted as an attorney. The Supreme Court granted review. After detailing Glass’s history of dishonesty, professional misconduct, lack of integrity, and tendency to advance his own agenda rather than to serve others in the community, the Court concluded that Glass failed to “carry his heavy burden of demonstrating rehabilitation and fitness for the practice of law” and declined to admit Glass to the practice of law. View "In re Glass" on Justia Law

The County Assessor reassessed two mobile home parks owned by resident-controlled nonprofit corporations after some residents sold both their mobile homes and their interests in the corporation. The mobile homes, classified as personal property, were assessed separately. The Assessor appraised the real property interest subject to reassessment by the extraction method of appraisal. The Appeal Board rejected the appraisals submitted by the Assessor and instead used those submitted by the corporations to calculate the value of the interests subject to reassessment. The Assessor filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate. The trial court denied the petition, and the court of appeal affirmed, concluding that the Assessor’s method for the taxation of changes in the mobile home ownership was not the method set out in Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 62.1(b). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 62.1(b) simply describes a unit of real property that is subject to reassessment and does not mandate any particular formula for appraising this unit; and (2) because the Appeal Board’s decisions were premised on an erroneously interpretation of section 62.1(b), the Appeal Board abused its discretion, and the Assessor’s petition for a writ of mandate should have been granted. View "Holland v. Assessment Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

A trust and an amendment to the trust both contained no contest clauses. In 2009, two of the trust’s beneficiaries filed a safe harbor proceeding seeking a determination that the petition they proposed to file challenging trustee conduct would not trigger the no contest clauses of the trust’s amendment. The probate court concluded the proposed petition did not constitute a contest. At issue on appeal was whether the no contest clause law that became operative in 2010, while the beneficiaries’ application was pending, or the no contest clause law in effect at the time the beneficiaries filed their application applied to the beneficiaries’ proposed petition. The court of appeal held (1) the former no contest law applied, and (2) the beneficiaries’ challenge constituted a contest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) safe harbor proceedings filed before 2010 were not affected by the repeal of the former law, which previously authorized safe harbor applications, and therefore, the probate court correctly ruled on the beneficiaries’ application; (2) the current law governed the question of whether the beneficiaries’ proposed claims triggered the no contest clauses; and (3) under the current law, the no contest clauses in the amended trust were unenforceable against the beneficiaries’ proposed petition. View "Donkin v. Donkin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of lewd conduct. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on battery as a lesser and necessarily included offense of lewd conduct. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal, holding (1) battery is not a lesser included offense of lewd conduct; (2) accordingly, if only lewd conduct is charged, the trial court has no duty to instruct on battery as a lesser included offense; and (3) therefore, the trial court in this case did not err in its judgment. View "People v. Shockley" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Burum and James Erwin were charged with aiding and abetting the receipt of bribes by members of a County Board of Supervisors and with conspiring with the supervisors to have them accept the bribes. The People's theory was that Burum, the payor of the bribes, and Erwin, who acted as Burum's agent, used threats and coercion to encourage the Supervisors to accept the illegal payments. Defendants demurred to all of the counts against them. The trial court sustained the demurrers in part. The court of appeals affirmed in part, concluding (1) the payor of a bribe, as a matter of law, cannot aid and abet the receipt of the same bribe or conspire to commit that offense; and (2) the payor's agent stood in the payor's shoes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the status of being the offeror or payor of a bribe does not disqualify that person, as a matter of law, from complicity in the offense of receiving the bribe; and (2) being the offeror or payor of a bribe does not disqualify that person, as a matter of law, from culpability for participating in a conspiracy to accept that same bribe. View "People v. Biane" on Justia Law